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Abstract 
In 1991, the Communist Government of the USSR was voted out of 
existence and this formally brought to an end in Central and Eastern Europe, as well 
as in other countries, to a failed political ideology that had endured for more than 
seventy years with massive implications for control and allocation of economic 
resources.  The term ‘transition economy’ was coined to describe the economies of 
those countries that that were propelled were propelled as a consequence of this, into 
a process of transition from planned (or socialist) economy to a market-based 
economy. The implications of this were far reaching and as private property was re-
introduced, stock markets had to be established so that equity could be traded in 
newly created privately owned bodies corporate.  This posed enormous problems, 
not least because new generations, unaccustomed to the operation of capital markets, 
had grown up under socialism and viewed the newly created stock markets with 
suspicion and caution. One of the major challenges in the transition economies was 
therefore to educate investors and to explain to nature of risk capital. However, 
efforts to educate investors were somewhat confounded because, coupled with the 
absence of understanding, there was an absence of reliable information about the 
companies traded on the stock market and lack of trust in the operation of the market 
itself.  In this thesis, we investigate the emergence and development of stock 
markets in ten Central and East European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia).  As 
well as surveying their development we test whether the function efficiently and 
whether they are sufficiently development so as to exhibit comovement with the 
world’s major stock markets.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM AND THE PROGRESS OF 
TRANSITION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: A GENERAL 
OVERVIEW 
 
1.1 The Legacy of Central Planning 
In 1991, the Communist Government of the USSR was voted out of existence 
and this formally brought to an end in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as well as in 
other countries, to a failed political ideology that had endured for more than seventy 
years with massive implications for control and allocation of economic resources.  In 
fact, economic change preceded political change and the collapse of central planning as 
a mechanism for allocating resources occurred spontaneously throughout CEE in 1989.  
Gradually markets emerged to fill the economic void left by the demise of central 
planning. The rise and subsequent fall of central planning ranks among the most 
significant events of the twentieth century posing major challenges to both economic 
theory and policy.  By the late 1980s, the economic limitations of central planning had 
become abundantly clear and, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries that had 
maintained centrally planned economies embarked on the transition to market 
economies.  For some countries the process of transition was slower than for others, but 
within twenty years after the start of transition, all the economies of CEE had 
functioning market economies.   
The main economic feature of the former socialist countries with their 
centralised economies was the use of the plan as an instrument for guiding economic 
activity. Economic plans can, of course, be found in developed and developing 
countries with market economies, but the difference between these and the former 
socialist economies of CEE lies in the ideological orientation of the plan in the latter 
and the compulsory organisation of the entire economy through the plan.  
In market economies, plans tend to set out the program governments intend to 
implement to achieve their aims without taking the form of a quantitative obligation or 
legally binding constraint on economic management.  The plan’s intended outcomes are 
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achieved (insofar as they are achieved) by creating the necessary economic conditions 
and incentives to encourage consumer choice and production decisions in accordance 
with the aims of the plan.  In some cases, State spending will be undertaken to further 
the objectives of the plan.  In contrast, planning in the former socialist countries was 
backed up by direct government intervention, usually in the form of instructions to 
production units involving rigid target levels of output to encourage the fulfilment of the 
plan in terms of achieving specified levels of output consistent with the plan.  To make 
this possible, plans were embedded with both physical and financial features to ensure 
that the plan was internally consistent and that resource requirements necessary to 
ensure the plan’s fulfilment would be available.  
Over the years, reliance on the planning process to allocate resources created 
severe structural problems that the planning mechanism was quite simply unable to 
resolve.  Soviet economic growth began to falter and slow in the early 1970s and this 
was the beginning of the end for the centrally planned economies.  1990 was a crisis 
year and vividly illustrates how inefficient the planning process had become.  In that 
year Soviet agriculture achieved a record harvest, but there were food shortages all over 
the Soviet Union.  Cities such as St Petersburg and Moscow were on the verge of 
starvation and yet food lay rotting in the fields as the harvest went ungathered because 
price controls made it unprofitable to take in the crop.  To prevent starvation, food was 
sent from many parts of the world including the EU.  Manufacturing was in a similar 
state of decay.  In many cases the techniques of production were unchanged in decades.  
Many goods taken for granted in the West were simply not available in the Communist 
countries of the former Soviet Union (including the economies of CEE) and many of the 
products that were produced were of such poor quality that there was no export market 
for them.  The problem was compounded because imports, many illegally smuggled in, 
were increasing and this adversely impacted on the growth of GDP in the region.   
As the Communist system of planned economies collapsed, the aftermath left 
countries facing a plethora of problems which can be briefly summarised as follows: 
 
 GDP was depressed and falling so that unemployment was rising and living 
standards were falling.  Unemployment was a new phenomenon in the transition 
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economies.  In a State system of directed labour there was no official unemployment.  
There was therefore a complete absence of any kind of social security system to provide 
for those without work since such a system was unnecessary under central planning.  
Not only did enterprises provide employment; they also provided services like 
education, healthcare and housing for their employees.  Organisation in the provision of 
these started to disintegrate causing economic and social upheaval. 
 
 The current account of the balance of payments moved sharply into deficit 
as countries, unable to provide for themselves, relied increasingly on imports from the 
West.  Worse still, the arrangements for international trade were centralised and corrupt, 
and during Communist times involved relatively little trade with countries outside the 
Communist bloc with no regard to comparative advantage. 
 
 The collapse of central planning left the transition economies without 
functioning markets for labour, capital and consumer goods and services.  Economic 
agents had been used to responding to directives and once the directives disappeared, a 
vacuum was left and countries foundered like rudderless ships without any mechanism 
for allocating resources. 
 
 Furthermore, because all the means of production had been in State hands 
there was no legislative framework for enforcing property rights, the valuation and 
disposal of assets or the liquidation of unprofitable enterprises.  In other words, the legal 
mechanism on which the creation of markets depends was missing so that there was no 
framework within which markets could emerge and develop.   
 
 There was a complete lack of understanding about the operation of the price 
mechanism.  There was no understanding of profit and loss accounting or of the profit 
motive.  In some countries there was a small and undeveloped private sector mainly in 
agriculture, but in general there was little understanding of the nature and role played by 
the entrepreneur in market economies. 
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 Banking in the planned economies was a bookkeeping operation and credit 
was allocated according to the plan rather than in relation to some assessment of risk.  
Capital markets were non-existent so that anyone wishing to start a business found it 
difficult to raise venture capital.  
 
The economic structures of planning were not based on notions of comparative 
advantage.  Instead the structure was based on an exaggerated view of the importance of 
economies of scale and was designed to create interdependence with a view to 
establishing political control rather than promoting economic efficiency.  The result was 
a highly concentrated system that left some countries heavily dependent on the 
production of a range of defence and capital goods for which there was now little 
demand.  Under COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - an economic 
organisation from 1949 to 1991 under the leadership of the Soviet Union that comprised 
the countries of the Eastern Bloc along with a number of Communist States elsewhere 
in the world) Belarus was awarded tractors, the Slovak Republic tanks, Bulgaria 
toothpaste and so on. 
 
 The planned economies were almost universally characterised by energy 
inefficiency.  The absence of any understanding of opportunity cost led to gross waste 
of energy.  It is somewhat ironic that a wasteful energy policy coincided with a high 
endowment of natural resources in many countries in the former Soviet Union.   
 
 Economic welfare and living standards in the former planned economies 
emphasised measures of GDP.  No consideration was given to the notion that the 
environment was an economic resource and that externalities have an important bearing 
on welfare.  As a result, the environmental consequences of production were ignored 
and environmental degradation occurred on an alarming scale with pollution as the 
major cause.  
 
 When the planning process collapsed, the national banks of the transition 
economies were ill prepared to perform the functions of conventional central banks in 
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market economies.  In a command economy the national bank did perform some of the 
conventional functions of a central bank in developed economies, but the difference is 
that these activities were all part of a wider central plan.  In centrally planned 
economies a cash plan ensured that enterprises could pay the wages of their workers and 
a credit plan allocated loans to enterprises to support their investment, stocks and work 
in progress.  When the planning system collapsed there was therefore no mechanism for 
setting interest rates, managing the financial system, controlling money growth and so 
on.  
 
 In the command economies everything was dictated by the plan and so no 
instruments of economic policy were in place to prevent economic collapse.  
Governments in market economies typically have two sets of policy instruments at their 
disposal: fiscal and monetary policy.  In the centrally planned economies, fiscal policy 
instruments did not exist.  Taxes were levied on State owned enterprises and private 
individuals paid income tax, but the purpose of levying taxes was to enable the State to 
perform executive functions such as the provision of law and order, defence and so on.  
Taxation and expenditure were therefore part of the national plan and were not designed 
to achieve any kind of macroeconomic objective.  Consequently, fiscal policy 
instruments at the disposal of governments in the early stages of transition were not 
suited to the needs of emerging market economies.   
 
1.2  Consequences of Economic Decay 
As noted above, economic decay did not happen in the economies of CEE 
overnight. Instead decline became increasingly apparent throughout the 1970s onwards.  
This decline manifested itself in relatively low economic growth and the primary causes 
of this were:  
1.2.1 Low Productivity Growth.  The Communist growth strategy was based on 
increasing the quantity of labour and capital inputs with little emphasis on harnessing 
the gains from technological advances or exploiting comparative advantage.  
Communist economies were protected from competition and burdened with all kinds of 
rigidities with the result that product development and innovation were not regarded as 
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important by most managers and planners, and those that did perceive their importance 
were incapable of effecting any kind of change.   
Similarly there was little incentive to improve productivity.  Planning involved 
setting targets for factory managers.  However, if the targets were exceeded managers 
received no reward (financial or otherwise) and instead either found their target 
increased, or else the resources at their disposal were reduced, when the plan was 
revised.  This was an incentive to underachieve and typically factory managers hoarded 
labour so that when workers had to be released in the summer to help with the harvest, 
they could cope with the extra strain.   
 
1.2.2 Inefficient Allocation of Resources.  There are all kinds of reasons why 
resources were misallocated in planned economies.  Planners might well have been able 
to decide which goods were to be produced in the economy, but they had little power to 
persuade consumers to purchase products they didn't want to buy.  More important was 
the fact that price controls were rigidly applied in an attempt to reduce inequality.  This 
was an important part of Communist ideology, but it led to a situation where the price 
consumers paid for many goods and services was well below the free market price and 
consequently there was over consumption of some goods and shortages of others.  The 
absence of price signals meant that planners had to guess how resources could most 
appropriately be allocated.   The existence of long queues, flourishing black markets in 
goods that were otherwise unobtainable to the vast majority of people, and empty 
shelves, provided ample testimony to the failure of planning. 
 
1.3   The Beginning of Reform 
This was the foundation on which the transition economies had to build market 
economies and the gravity of these problems, which generated deep macro and 
microeconomic imbalances and an increasing gap between socialist economies and 
developed market economies in terms of living standards, made fundamental economic 
reform not just necessary, but inevitable. However, long before the failure of planning 
became evident, an awareness was building in many economies of CEE of the 
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deficiencies caused by plan centralisation, control and isolation from the world 
economy to the extent that many CEE economies attempted piecemeal reform. 
The first tentative initiatives to introduce decentralised decision taking through 
markets and new economic mechanisms were created in Poland, Romania and Hungary.  
However, the two pillars of socialist economies, collective resource ownership and the 
planning mechanism, remained untouched. Later, in Hungary and the former 
Yugoslavia, some decision-making powers were transferred from the centre to firms 
and local authorities, and planning directives were diminished. The aim was to 
encourage initiative by enterprise managers so as to develop effective and flexible 
production strategies more in keeping with the operation of free markets.  However, the 
vast majority of the experiments aimed at ‘reforming’ socialism in CEE countries had 
negative results. The potential gains in terms of increased efficiency and productivity 
from decentralisation and the limited introduction of market forces failed to materialise 
because there was no change in the structure of resource ownership and financial 
markets, whose function is to allocate funds on the basis of risk assessment, did not 
exist.    
Other factors that contrived to ensure the failure of these reforms were retention 
of the powers of patronage that left governments free to appoint directors of enterprises 
of their choice. However, probably the most important element in this litany of factors 
ensuring the failure of reform is that prices remained under central control which 
ensured a continuation of distortions in the allocation of resources.  The limited results 
of these experiments in ‘market socialism’ and the increasing macroeconomic 
imbalances forced the CEE countries to develop fundamental post-socialist reforms that 
propelled the countries into transition and ultimately resulted in the creation of 
functioning market economies. The problem of State ownership of resources meant that 
when the planned economies collapsed, there was no legislative framework for 
enforcing property rights, the valuation and disposal of assets or the liquidation of 
unprofitable enterprises.  In other words, the legal mechanisms on which the creation of 
markets depends was missing so that the foundations on which markets could emerge 
and develop were absent. This problem had to be resolved as part of the process of 
transition.    
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 1.4 Introduction to Transition 
The term ‘transition’ became part of the economic vocabulary in the 1990s to 
describe the changes taking place in the economies of the former Soviet Union 
following the collapse of that economic and political group of countries.  This collapse 
unleashed forces for economic, social and political change, and the motives for 
economic change at least were based on the poor performance of centrally planned 
economies including inefficiencies in production, the absence of work incentives, lack 
of consumer choice, lengthy queues and poor-quality goods.  The combined effect of 
these was to slow the growth of living standards so that in absolute terms they 
increasingly fell below those of developed market economies.  
Prior to the start of this process, a great deal had been written about the 
transition from capitalism to socialism. However, virtually nothing had been written 
about the reverse since this was unimagined until the process actually began.  When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, it collapsed with spectacular speed and there was no blue print 
mapping out the course to be followed to replace the planning mechanism with the 
market mechanism. As The Economist (1990) put it: “Hundreds of books have been 
written on the transition from capitalism to Communism but not the other way. There is 
no known recipe for unmaking an omelette” (pp 22). 
In brief, transition describes the process of transforming an economy from plan 
to market and implies simultaneous dislocations in economic behaviour and major 
changes in multiple aspects of the economic system.  Essentially transition involves 
discontinuity in the structure of opportunities and incentives and is identified by major 
institutional, legal and political changes in the economic system.  Among other 
developments, the process of transition involves the institution of private property and 
the rule of law to enforce these property rights and the creation of markets to value 
products and assets including newly privatised firms.   
In this introductory chapter, we shall see that whilst the nature of the reform 
process in transition is clear, the pace and scale of transition varied between countries.  
Some countries achieved market economy status relatively quickly.  In others the pace 
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has been slower and even now, 26 years into transition, in some countries, though not 
the countries of CEE,  reform still has far to go. 
One thing is clear: development differs fundamentally from transition.  
Development is an on-going and evolutionary process that follows a well-trodden path 
that all developed economies have at one time or another followed culminating in 
industrialisation of the economy.  It involves a shift of population from rural 
communities to urban settlements.  Typically development focuses on poorer countries 
with poverty defined in terms of a low per capita income compared to developed 
countries.  In fact, less developed countries are also plagued by other problems such as 
high levels of malnutrition, low levels of life expectancy, low literacy rates, poor 
sanitation and so on.  However, whilst it is easy to identify the characteristics of less 
developed countries; the characteristics of transition economies can sometimes differ 
markedly.  
At the start of transition, the economies of CEE also had relatively low per 
capita incomes and shared many of the other characteristics of the less developed 
economies.  However, they differed fundamentally from less developed countries in that 
they were already industrialised and urbanised, and they possessed an educated, and in 
many cases a highly skilled, work force.  They had already experienced the rural-urban 
upheaval that industrialisation involves with large shifts of workers from agriculture to 
industry.  A critical difference was that many of these shifts as they occurred under 
Communism were driven by government ideology over a very short time period in 
contrast to the more uncoordinated shifts seen through developing countries.  Typically 
they had well-developed and relatively large manufacturing sectors, but they lacked the 
institutions that enable developed market economies to function.  The transition 
economies also differed widely in economic structure, history, geography, resource 
endowments, culture and levels of debt.  Note that even though central planning was a 
common feature of these countries, differences in economic structure existed.  The 
countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had experienced over 
seventy years of central planning at the outset of transition, whilst for others central 
planning was imposed after the Second World War.  Some countries such as the Czech 
Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland had implemented reforms prior to 
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the onset of transition.  In others such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Romania, the 
planning mechanism was strong and these countries functioned as classic text book 
examples of centrally planned economies. 
It is clear that transition differs from development, but, since transition describes 
the process of transforming an economy from plan to market, it also differs from 
economic reform - although economic reform is clearly a part of the transition process.  
In all economies we can find examples of reform.  For example, in the UK (along with 
other Western economies) over the last three decades and more, we have seen markets 
deregulated and whole industries privatised.  The same changes have occurred in 
transition economies, but transition implies much more.  As noted above, transition 
implies far more sweeping and all embracing changes than this and impacts on 
economic, legal, institutional and political dimensions of those economies that embark 
on transition.  It also involves enormous economic change being driven through in a 
relatively short space of time. 
This distinction between transition and reform is important because it is the 
specialist knowledge of economists that has provided the basic advice informing 
government decisions in the transition economies.  The problem is that whereas reform 
can be analysed in terms of comparative statics, transition cannot.  When analysing 
reform we might ask what are the consequences of deregulating the airline industry, 
what are the consequences of deregulating the capital market and so on.  Transition is 
different because it alters the preferences of economic agents and revalues their skills 
and capital assets across the entire economy.  In these circumstances it is difficult for 
economists to recommend policies that promote Pareto efficiency because the policies 
associated with transition are so fundamental they will change society's preferences and 
through this will change ideas about efficiency in the allocation of resources. In the 
early stages, transition was expected to consist of a series of successive shocks that were 
meant to provide an economic environment in which geo-political, economic, social and 
psychological factors were intertwined to improve living standards, increase stability 
and pave the way for the creation of a market economy. Lavigne (1999) identifies two 
different approaches to the transition process. One is attributed to the institutional views 
of the IMF and the OECD and is technical in nature, the other deals with a more micro-
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oriented approach implying that transition is primarily a learning process requiring a 
change of mentality, attitudes and behaviour.   
Understanding the nature of reform, the magnitude of the task and its success in 
achieving transition can only be fully appreciated against the backdrop of the situation 
confronting the economies of CEE following the collapse of Communism which was 
most vividly illustrated when the Berlin Wall was dismantled in 1989.  Whilst 
differences existed between the transition economies, the reform programs established 
at the very beginning of transition by newly formed governments had a common goal: 
the creation of a market economy. However, as the process of transition got underway, 
for many it ushered in a period of economic collapse and hyperinflation which revealed 
to all the full excesses of how markets operate.  Tables 1.1 and 1.2 give some data on 
CEE countries in the early stages of transition.  Table 1.1 vividly illustrates the severity 
of the economic dislocations that were taking place in these economies at that time.  Not 
only did output collapse spectacularly in the early stages of transition plummeting to 
levels not experienced in the West since the Great Depression beginning in 1929, 
transition was accompanied by rampant inflation as Table 1.2 illustrates.  However, 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 also demonstrate that the countries of CEE experienced different 
states of economic collapse and this ended any notion that a single model or path of 
transition would be optimal for all countries. Instead, a specific economic model for 
each economy based on local characteristics came to be regarded as the only viable 
approach by policy makers.   
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Table 1.1: Growth in Real GDP in Central and Eastern European Economies 1989-1999  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2002  
 
Table 1.2: Inflation in Central and Eastern European Economies 1989–1999  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 2002 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria 0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.9 -6.9 3.5 2.4 
Czech Rep 1.4 -1.2 -11.6 -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.8 -1.0 -2.2 -0.8 
Estonia -8.1 -6.5 -13.6 -14.2 -8.8 -2.0 4.6 4.0 10.4 5.0 -0.7 
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 
Latvia 6.8 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.9 1.1 
Lithuania 1.5 -5.0 -5.7 -21.3 -16.2 -9.8 3.3 4.7 7.3 5.1 -3.9 
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.0 6.8 4.8 4.1 
Romania -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 3.9 -6.1 -5.4 -3.2 
Slovak Rep 1.4 -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.7 6.2 6.2 4.1 1.9 
Slovenia -1.8 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.8 5.2 
Country 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria 6.3 26.3 333.5 82.0 73.0 96.3 62 123.0 1,082.0 22.2 0.7 
Czech Rep 1.4 9.7 52.0 11.1 20.8 9.9 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 
Estonia 6.1 23.1 210.5 1,076.0 89.8 47.7 29.0 23.1 11.2 8.2 3.3 
Hungary 17.0 28.9 35.0 23.0 22.5 18.8 28.1 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.0 
Latvia 4.7 10.5 172.2 951.2 109.2 35.9 25.0 17.8 8.4 4.7 2.4 
Lithuania 2.1 8.4 224.7 1,020.5 410.4 72.1 39.6 24.6 8.9 5.1 0.8 
Poland 251.1 585.8 70.3 43.0 35.3 32.2 27.8 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 
Romania 1.1 5.1 170.2 210.4 256.1 136.7 32.3 38.8 154.8 59.1 45.8 
Slovak Rep 2.3 10.8 61.2 10.0 23.2 13.4 9.9 5.8 6.1 6.7 10.6 
Slovenia 1,306.0 549.7 117.7 207.3 32.9 21.0 13.5 9.9 8.4 8.0 6.1 
United Kingdom            
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At the outset of the transition process there was therefore no consensus in the 
literature about its dimension and evolution. Actually, the phenomenon of transition was 
new and unprecedented and the term had never before been conceived by either 
classical or modern economists. The challenge raised by this process focused attention 
on the connections between microeconomic and macroeconomic variables, and also on 
the sequencing and timing of the whole transition process. A particular problem existed 
because lack of historical data prohibited the use of classical econometric techniques 
over longer time frames.  For the most part therefore, early research on transition 
consisted of assessing the different reforms that would be necessary to develop 
embryonic market economies and the timing of their implementation.  
The solutions to these problems had to be given by practitioners without the 
benefit of any theoretical foundation which meant that the early days of transition are 
characterised by a lack of any coherent strategy to be followed across time by 
successive governments. Practitioners relied on the interests of the moment and so 
short-termism was the key element of the public management process in the early years 
of transition. The lack of any clear strategy, generated by the urgency with which 
policies needed to be formulated and implemented, created an environment 
characterised by lack of economic culture concerning the construction and 
implementation of long-term objectives.  
 
1.5 The Early Stages of Transition 
1.5.1 Patterns of Transition 
According to the IMF (2000) the main ingredients of the transition process were 
agreed upon fairly early. They are: 
Liberalisation: the process of allowing most prices to be determined in free 
markets and lowering trade barriers that had shut off contact with the price structure of 
the world's market economies. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation: primarily the process through which inflation is 
brought under control and lowered over time after the initial burst of relatively high 
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inflation that followed liberalisation and the release of pent-up demand. This process 
required discipline over central government budgets and restraints on the growth of 
money and credit, that is, discipline in fiscal and monetary policies, as well as progress 
toward a sustainable balance of payments.  
Restructuring and privatisation: the processes of creating a viable financial 
sector and reforming the enterprises in these economies to render them capable of 
producing goods that could be sold in free markets and of transferring ownership of 
firms into private hands.  
Legal and institutional reforms: These are needed to redefine the role of the 
State in transition economies as a prelude to creating market economies and required 
establishing the rule of law to enforce property rights, as well as the introduction of 
appropriate competition policies.  
Havrylyshyn and Wolf (1999) also set out the specifics of transition and argue 
that in a broad sense, transition implies:  
 liberalizing economic activity, prices, and market operations, along with 
reallocating resources to their most efficient use; 
 developing indirect, market-oriented instruments for macroeconomic 
stabilisation; 
 achieving effective enterprise management and economic efficiency, usually 
through privatisation and deregulation; 
 imposing hard budget constraints, which provide incentives to improve 
efficiency;  
   and  
 establishing an institutional and legal framework to secure property rights, 
the rule of law, and transparent market-entry regulations. 
Both sets of criteria broadly involve the same changes and adjustment to achieve 
transition and it seems there was broad based agreement on what the process involved.  
However, differences existed in terms of timing the implementation of change and the 
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extent of change required under the different criteria identified.  However, Lavigny 
(1999) also identified reform of the banking system as an important element of the 
transition process which she argued must be carried out prior to privatisation because 
the expertise of financial intermediaries is essential if capital is to be allocated 
efficiently and newly privatised organisations are to function as commercial enterprises.  
Assessment of the risk-return profile of these enterprises would not have been possible 
before privatisation, and even after this, it would have remained impossible in the 
absence of banking reform because banking in the planned economies was a 
bookkeeping operation and credit was allocated according to the plan rather than in 
relation to some assessment of risk.  Failure to apply commercial principles by the 
banks would have increased the probability of bank failure with the potential to generate 
systemic risk throughout the banking sector risking further economic collapse.   This 
aspect of transition is considered in more detail in Chapter 2. Below we give more detail 
on those aspects of transition identified in the IMF (2000) report and by Havrylyshyn 
and Wolf (1999). 
At the beginning of transition, important policy choices had to be made with 
respect to the speed and timing at which State assets were to be privatised and the 
economy liberalised.  One approach favoured rapid change based on the belief that 
‘shock therapy’ would quickly lead to the creation of functioning markets.  In doing so, 
rationalisation and restructuring would be forced on firms since their very survival 
would depend on change.  As part of this process, it was argued that hard budget 
constraints would be imposed on firms and as a result inefficient firms would be closed 
and resources released for use by more efficient organisations.  It was also envisaged 
that this would facilitate new business start-ups and the institutions necessary for 
transition would emerge as a consequence of these changes.  The problem with this 
approach, which in the event occurred in several of those economies which adopted this 
approach, is that restructuring, downsizing and closures would release resources, 
particularly labour, at a faster rate than existing firms could grow and new firms emerge 
to create employment opportunities and absorb the displaced labour.  In fact, shock 
therapy led to a substantial decline in output, breath taking increases in unemployment 
and a reduction in economic growth.  All of these adverse consequences were only 
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reversed when structural adjustments had worked their way through and market 
institutions reached a sufficient state of development to support a functioning economy 
so that the process of transition was no longer constrained. 
An alternative approach suggested was a more ‘gradualist’ approach to 
privatisation and liberalisation.  The basic idea underlying this approach was that 
enterprises would scale back their operations and employment at an orderly pace thus 
allowing new start-ups to occur gradually leaving greater time for people to adjust to the 
changing conditions and become more aware of how markets operated and the 
opportunities they presented.  In this model, the private sector would develop and 
expand in synchronisation with the decline of uneconomic enterprises which were a 
throwback to the days of central planning.  As resources were released from these 
enterprises, they would be absorbed into the expanding private sector.  Indeed, it was 
envisaged that their very availability would facilitate expansion of the private sector 
which otherwise might be stifled as inertia restricted resource movement and 
constrained the development and operation of markets.  It was also envisaged that rather 
than relying on the spontaneous emergence of institutions that support transition, a 
gradualist approach would allow institutions, so necessary for macroeconomic stability 
and sustained growth, to develop in line with markets and private enterprise.  However, 
this strategy was not without risk and a piecemeal approach to reform clearly allows the 
preservation of rents and creates powerful vested interests with an incentive to block 
further reform.  This is exactly what happened in some countries.  For example, 
Belarus, Bulgaria, Romania and Uzbekistan initially made progress with liberalisation 
and privatisation, but after three or four years of transition these processes were 
reversed to the extent that the pre-transition state was almost completely restored. 
 In the event, the transition economies tended to follow one of the two broad 
patterns along the lines outlined above.  In the more advanced economies (broadly 
Central and Eastern Europe excluding Bulgaria and Romania) liberalisation was 
relatively rapid and was accompanied by sustained macroeconomic stabilisation and a 
comprehensive approach to privatisation which included large and small scale 
privatisations.  In tandem with these developments, institutions were created that 
facilitated the operation of markets and the growth of private enterprise.  In the less 
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advanced economies, (broadly the CIS countries but also including Bulgaria and 
Romania) liberalisation proceeded at a slower and more uneven pace.  Macroeconomic 
stabilisation was compromised by the existence of soft budget constraints which 
prevented markets from discharging their role of eliminating inefficient producers.  The 
effect of this was to preserve the sub-optimal allocation of resources that had 
condemned the centrally planned economies to inefficiency and low productivity 
growth.  By constraining the operation of market forces, progress in transition was 
necessarily limited.  The preservation of inefficient organisations no doubt partially 
stifled the development of business awareness and entrepreneurship and, as a 
consequence, the rate of new start-ups was well below levels achieved in the more 
advanced transition economies.      
It was initially envisaged by most that liberalisation and macroeconomic 
stabilisation could be undertaken fairly quickly, as could the privatisation of small-scale 
enterprises. However, the view was that privatisation of large-scale enterprises and legal 
and institutional reform would intensify at a later stage of the transition process and take 
a longer time to complete.  In the event, macroeconomic stability and control of 
inflation were not achieved with the speed that some might have anticipated.  This was 
partly because, as noted earlier, when the planning process collapsed, the national banks 
of the transition economies were ill prepared to perform the functions assigned to 
central banks in market economies leaving no mechanism for setting interest rates, 
managing the financial system, controlling money growth and so on.    
We now turn our attention to the indicators of transition initially identified by 
the IMF (2000) in its World Economic Outlook. 
1.5.2 Liberalisation 
Whilst the process of liberalisation is clear and well understood involving 
freeing markets from central control and allowing decentralised decision taking, the 
pace and extent of liberalisation varied widely across the transition countries.  
Liberalisation is a relatively easy concept to digest, but measuring the extent to which 
liberalisation had taken place is a different matter. However, in its Transition Report of 
1994, the EBRD unveiled its Index of Liberalisation which aimed to give some 
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objective assessment of the progress of transition.  This Index establishes a score card 
against which progress in transition can be measured and in so doing the Index also 
provides a basis for comparison. The entries in the Index have changed over the years 
and in the context of this thesis we focus only on ‘Enterprises’ and ‘Markets’.   A full 
list of what the scores in the Index imply is given in the Appendix on pages  but we note 
here that a score of 4+ represents the standard achieved in an industrialised market 
economy.  On this measure of liberalisation, considerable progress is clearly discernible 
throughout the first decade of transition by reference to Table 1.3 which shows that, 
except for Bulgaria, all other countries in the Table achieved a score of 4+ for 
privatisation of small scale assets with Bulgaria still achieving a 3+. Furthermore, with 
the exception of Estonia and Romania, all CEE countries in our sample, achieved a 
score of 4+ for trade and foreign exchange.  Nevertheless, Estonia and Romania come 
close with a score of 4.  In all other measures of liberalisation, 3 (±) were the most 
common scores.  These results look very encouraging in terms of the early progress of 
transition.  However, as Table 1.7 shows, the same Index indicates that the process of 
liberalisation was still not fully complete as late as 2014.   
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Table 1.3: Index of Liberalisation in 1999. 
 
 
 
 
Note that transition indicators range from 1 to 4+ with 1 representing little or no change 
from a rigidly centrally planned economy and 4+ representing the standards of an 
industrialised market economy. 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, 1999 
 
1.5.3 Stabilisation 
As with liberalisation, the first decade of transition was characterised by 
considerable variation in stabilisation and financial discipline across the region.  Tables 
1.1 and 1.2 show that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had painful 
experiences with falling GDP and rising inflation during the early part of transition.  
Falling GDP could easily have been anticipated in the early years of transition as 
patterns of consumption changed and unproductive enterprises faced the unsympathetic 
winds of market forces.  However, it does seem likely that the extent of the fall took 
many by surprise.  Table 1.1 shows that although all CEE countries experienced falling 
real GDP, in some countries the fall was particularly severe.  
 Enterprsies Markets 
 Large Scale 
Privatisation 
Small Scale 
Privatisation 
Governance 
and 
Enterprise 
Restructuring 
Price 
Liberalisation 
Trade and 
foreign 
Exchange 
Rate 
System 
Competition 
Policy 
Bulgaria 3 3+ 2+ 3 4+ 2 
Czech 
Republic 
4 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 
Estonia 4 4+ 3 3 4 3- 
Hungary 4 4+ 3+ 3+ 4+ 3 
Latvia 3 4 3- 3 4+ 3- 
Lithuania 3 4+ 3- 3 4+ 3- 
Poland 3+ 4+ 3 3+ 4+ 3 
Romania 3- 4- 2 3 4 2 
Slovak 
Republic 
4 4+ 3 3 4+ 3 
Slovenia 3+ 4+ 3- 3 4+ 2 
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The inflation experienced in all transition economies reached levels unthinkable 
in developed countries.  In many of the transition countries there is little doubt that the 
major cause of inflation was increasing budget deficits especially because these tended 
to be financed by printing money.  Table 1.4 shows the evolution of budget deficits in 
CEE throughout the first decade of transition and Table 1.5 details the growth of broad 
money over the same period.  In the main, budget deficits remained relatively high 
throughout the first decade of transition, but as transition progressed the average size of 
the budget deficit fell throughout the region.  The same is true of broad money growth 
though even as late as 1999, the rate of broad money growth would be alarming in 
developed economies.  Certainly in the early days of transition, such rates of broad 
money growth were inconsistent with price stability and the relatively high rates of 
inflation documented in Table 1.2 are easily explained as a consequence of this. 
In a cash-based economy, where government has a monopoly over currency 
issue, printing cash provides a straightforward alternative to raising taxes as a means of 
financing government spending.  In the early years of transition, money emission was 
the primary route through which governments financed the growing gap between 
government spending and tax revenues and rising levels of inflation were the inevitable 
consequence.  Rising budget deficits were inevitable and, on reflection, there also seems 
to be some inevitability that these would be financed by resorting to the printing 
presses.  In the early days of transition, the tax base in transition economies was 
relatively small and the tax system was unsuited to a market economy.  (Tanzi and 
Tsilbouris, 2000.)  Indeed, in command economies taxation largely consisted of 
turnover taxes, taxes on enterprises and payroll taxes with the whole tax administration 
based on agreements between enterprises and government officials rather than on a 
codified system with tax bases and tax rates clearly defined in law.  Coupled with this, 
the fall in output impacted negatively on tax revenues and expenditure increased as 
governments initially propped up failing State owned enterprises with soft budget 
constraints in an attempt to mitigate the fall in output. The clear implication is that in 
the early years of transition, fiscal policy was not available as an instrument of 
stabilisation.  Neither could it be used to change incentives and preferences in labour 
and product markets the way it is in developed economies. 
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Table 1.4 General Government Budget Balances as a % of GDP  
 
Country 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria -5.5 -10.9 -5.8 -6.4 -10.4 -3.0 1.0 -3.6 
Czech Rep -3.1 0.5 -1.1 -1.8 -1.1 -2.1 -2.6 -5.0 
Estonia -0.3 -0.7 -1.3 -1.3 -1.9 2.2 -0.3 -3.0 
Hungary -7.2 -6.6 -8.4 -6.4 -3.0 -4.8 -4.8 -4.5 
Latvia -0.8 0.6 -4.0 -3.9 -1.7 0.1 -0.8 -3.8 
Lithuania 0.5 -3.3 -5.5 -4.5 -4.5 -1.8 -5.8 -7.0 
Poland -6.7 -3.1 -3.1 -2.8 -3.3 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 
Romania -4.6 -0.4 -1.9 -2.6 -4.0 -3.6 -3.3 -2.7 
Slovak Rep N/A -7.0 -1.3 0.2 -1.9 -4.4 -5.8 -3.2 
Slovenia 0.2 0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -1.7 -1.4 -1.0 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2000 
 
 
 
Table 1.5 Broad Money Growth (% change pa) 
 
Country 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria 110.0 53.6 47.6 78.9 40.3 117.2 356.8 11.9 13.0 
Czech Rep 26.8 20.7 22.5 20.8 20.3 9.1 10.8 5.4 7.7 
Estonia NA 59.0 93.0 40.1 27.8 37.2 37.8 4.2 23.5 
Hungary 35.7 27.6 15.7 13.0 18.4 40.9 19.8 15.5 15.6 
Latvia 153.0 169.9 84.1 47.7 -23.1 19.9 38.7 5.9 8.0 
Lithuania 143.0 245.3 100.2 63.0 28.9 -3.5 34.1 14.5 7.7 
Poland 37.0 57.5 36.0 38.2 34.9 34.3 28.1 24.7 20.1 
Romania 101.2 79.6 141.0 138.1 71.6 66.0 104.9 48.9 45.0 
Slovak Rep NA NA 16.8 20.1 19.1 16.6 9.1 2.7 13.0 
Slovenia NA 131.6 64.2 50.8 25.9 21.8 34.1 25.4 12.1 
 
 
Source: Transition Reports 1999 and 2003 
 
Similarly, at the outset of transition, all CEE economies lacked a central bank 
and financial markets through which debt instruments could be traded and banks could 
relieve their funding shortages through transactions in the interbank market.  The 
prevailing system under command economies was one in which monobanks, performed 
all banking functions. Roaf et al (2005) summarised it thus: “The Communist 
monobanks encompassed functions of money emission and foreign exchange 
management, commercial banking (in the sense of passively providing finance for 
transactions arranged by the planning agencies) and even deposit taking in some cases.” 
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(pp15)  In this system, monetary policy was entirely passive and had no role in 
stabilising the macro economy.  Before monetary policy could perform this role, 
monetary reform was necessary to transform the monobanks into a two-tier banking 
system which separated the macroeconomic and prudential role of a central bank from 
commercial banking.  Central banks were quickly created by restructuring the national 
monobanks and these banks were given the conventional roles performed by central 
banks in developed market economies. The newly created central banks were 
immediately given considerable autonomy and the constitution of the Bundesbank was 
widely used as a model for designing the new central banks of CEE.  (Healey and 
Ilieva, 2005.)  Other banking functions (investments, customer deposit facilities and so 
on which are directly related to business) were transferred to newly created financial 
intermediaries which were immediately set up as private sector institutions.  
Unfortunately, the prevalence of soft budget constraints quickly meant that financial 
intermediaries developed bad loan problems.  However, as with all private sector 
institutions, private firms learn how to survive or perish.  Before the first decade of 
transition had passed, financial intermediaries were thriving throughout the CEE region. 
1.5.4 Privatisation 
For the transition economies, structural reforms aimed at changing the whole 
mechanism of the economic system and, among other far reaching reforms, privatisation 
of assets and the institution of enforceable property rights were central to the creation of 
a market economy.  Privatisation is also a way in which governments raise finance and 
Megginson (2010) has estimated that by1999, over $1 trillion had been raised by 
governments world-wide from the sale of State-owned enterprises to private investors 
and corporations with over two-thirds of this being raised after 1989.  However, the 
‘mass privatisation’ programs broadly used by the transition economies actually raised 
relatively small sums of money for governments despite the fact that these privatisations 
involved by far the largest number of companies ever privatised.  
The interpretation of the term ‘privatisation’ can differ from one country to 
another. In general, privatisation is taken to imply the sale of State-owned assets or 
equity to private investors. However, in the transition economies privatisation implies 
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the transformation of almost an entire command economy into a market-oriented 
economy with ownership of private property rights enshrined in law. 
The history of privatisation began with the election of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative Government in the UK in 1979 and became an essential ingredient of the 
transition of the former planned economies, including CEE countries, on their road to 
becoming market economies.  As previously noted, governments of the former 
Communist countries of CEE sold or gave away many State-owned enterprises as part 
of a broader effort to transform themselves from command to market economies.   
While these programs resulted in a massive reduction of State ownership and were 
initially popular politically, they subsequently became unpopular in many countries 
(especially Russia) because they seemed to encourage the emergence of new oligarchs 
and a widening gap between low income individuals and the new elite. From the late-
1990s onwards, CEE governments have all relied on the more standard methods of 
privatisation, that is, asset sales and share issuance programs.  Table 1.6 gives 
information on the changing nature of private ownership of resources in the CEE 
economies for various years from 1992-2012.  Apart from Slovenia, where the share of 
private sector output increased from 65per cent of GDP to 70 per cent of GDP, the share 
of private sector output has remained static from 2007.   
 
Table 1.6: Private Sector Share of GDP (%) (Selected Years) 
 
Country Mid 1992 Mid 1995 Mid 1999 Mid 2007 Mid 2012 
Bulgaria 45 45 60 75 75 
Czech Republic 70 70 80 80 80 
Estonia 65 65 75 80 80 
Hungary 60 60 80 80 80 
Latvia  60 60 60 70 70 
Lithuania 55 55 70 75 75 
Poland 60 60 65 75 75 
Romania 40 40 60 70 70 
Slovak Republic 60 60 75 80 80 
Slovenia 45 45 55 65 70 
    
Source: EBRD Transition Reports (Various)  
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Megginson (2010) mentions five types of techniques used through which assets 
have been privatised: 
1. Asset sale, or trade sale, which implies the direct sale of a company to another 
company or group of investors. 
2. Share Issue Privatisation (SIP), which deals with the public offering of 
common stock to private investors on national or international markets. 
3. Voucher privatisation, which means the distribution of exchangeable purchase 
rights to citizens for free. These vouchers can then be converted into shares in State-
owned enterprises. 
4. Concessions, which governments grant to private entities that receive the right 
to operate assets in exchange for an amount paid in advance. 
5. The public-private partnership, which uses project finance techniques to build 
public assets with private capital.  
In CEE, assets were mostly privatised through asset sales. One reason for the 
preference of this approach is that asset sales can be executed more rapidly than SIPs.  It 
is also the case that asset sales might attract foreign investors (if this is desired by policy 
makers) and can protect strategic assets through well-crafted selling conditions. On the 
other hand, some empirical research results (See for example, Gupta, Schiller and Ma 
1999) suggest that they typically raise less revenue than SIPs.  A further problem with 
asset sales is that they are opaque and are therefore likely to reduce trust in the 
privatisation process. 
By comparison, SIPs, the next most widely used instrument of privatisation, 
have the advantage of raising more revenue for the government whilst at the same time 
allowing for discrimination that favours, for example, domestic investors over foreign 
investors (if this is desired by policy makers).   They are also the most transparent 
method of privatisation and allow for the development of national stock markets by 
encouraging equity trades in these markets.  Against this, SIPs are difficult to undertake 
and require considerable organisation involving legal formalities and heavy sunk costs.  
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Consequently, SIPs are only economically viable when relatively large State-owned 
enterprises are privatised.   
Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco (2004) estimate the determinants of the 
fraction of privatisation revenues that come from public offerings (SIPs) for 
privatisations in 49 countries. They find that the greater the selling government’s deficit 
and the more conservative the selling government, the more likely it is that privatisation 
will occur through public offerings. Fluck, John and Ravid (2007), examine the auction 
versus private negotiation choice for emerging market governments wishing to divest 
assets in a politically constrained environment that limits the government’s set of 
choices.  They find that the degree of political constraints are instrumental in 
determining which mechanism is more successful in raising funds. 
Using a sample of 2,477 privatisations that raised $1,189 billion in 108 countries 
over the period 1977-2000, Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004) examine why 
938 firms were privatised using share offerings (in public capital markets), but 1,539 
companies were privatised via trade sales (in private markets). They find that SIPs are 
more likely to occur in countries with less developed capital markets and suggest that 
this may be due to the political need to boost these markets by increasing liquidity and 
absorptive capacity. This is in keeping with the results of Subrahmanyam and Titman 
(1999) who find evidence that SIPs can jump-start stock-market development and 
trigger gains in economic growth and efficiency by encouraging the creation of the so-
called ‘equity culture’. We return to this issue in the next chapter. 
Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004) also provide results in support of 
the hypothesis that a country’s political and legal environment affects financing 
decisions. They find that governments that have less State control over the economy 
tend to privatise State-owned companies via asset sales. Investors are more willing to 
make the substantial investments through asset sales when there is a stronger 
commitment that they will be able to maintain ownership of those assets without undue 
government intervention.  
They also find that the stronger the legal and political environment in providing 
protection to minority interests, the more likely the firm is to be privatised via a SIP. 
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Firm-specific characteristics, such as the size of the offering for sale and the 
profitability of the State-owned company, also impact the favoured method of 
privatisation. Larger offerings and more profitable State-owned enterprises are more 
likely to be privatised through SIPs and the public capital markets. Existing public 
capital markets are better able to absorb the largest offerings and asymmetric 
information problems are fewer for larger and more profitable offerings which thus 
attracts more potential investors.  
1.6 Identifying the Institutional Framework 
 We have referred above to the creation of institutions as a crucial aspect of 
the transition process, but these institutions were neither identified nor defined in our 
discussion.  In fact, there are many definitions of institutions, but for our purposes 
institutions are taken to imply some aspect of society that serves to organise economic 
behaviour.  In particular, the major elements of a market economy are: - 
Firms and households are basically decentralised decision takers and are 
responsible for decisions concerning consumption and, through that in a market 
economy, for production.  Decisions are motivated by the structure of incentives which 
form the basis of the allocative mechanism and are based on the allocation of ownership 
rights and the rules and regulations which limit economic actions and behaviour.  In the 
former Soviet Bloc countries of CEE, the existence of an economic plan placed 
considerable constraints on the activities of firms since for most, all decisions relating to 
output and employment were taken centrally.   Decisions by consumers were 
decentralised for most products, but long waiting lists existed for many of these such as 
cars, washing machines and so on.  At the outset of transition, both firms and 
households had to learn the implications of decentralised decision taking.  This was 
particularly problematical for those firms which had only experienced soft budget 
constraints, but which were sometimes quickly and brutally exposed to the harsh 
realities of hard budget constraints.  Inevitably standards of governance were poor by 
Western standards and before firms could effectively perform their traditional role in 
market economies, adequate governance structures had to be put in place. Table 1.7 
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shows that as late as 2005, sixteen years after the start of transition, much still remained 
to be done in many CEE countries in terms of creating sound governance structures. 
 
Table 1.7: Country Transition Indicator Scores 2014 
 
 
 Enterprises Markets 
 Large Scale 
Privatisation 
Small Scale 
Privatisation 
Governance 
and 
Enterprise 
Restructuring 
Price 
Liberalisation 
Trade and 
foreign 
Exchange 
Rate 
System 
Competition 
Policy 
Bulgaria 4 4 3- 4+ 4+ 3 
Czech 
Republic 
NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Estonia 4 4+ 4- 4 4 4- 
Hungary 4 4+ 4- 4+ 4+ 3+ 
Latvia 4- 4+ 3+ 4+ 4+ 4- 
Lithuania 4 4+ 3 4+ 4+ 4- 
Poland 4- 4+ 4- 4+ 4+ 4- 
Romania 4- 4- 3- 4+ 4+ 3+ 
Slovak 
Republic 
4 4+ 4- 4+ 4 3+ 
Slovenia 3 4+ 3 4 4+ 3- 
 
 
Note that transition indicators range from 1 to 4+ with 1 representing little or no change from a 
rigidly centrally planned economy and 4+ representing the standards of an industrialised market 
economy.  
 
Source EBRD Transition Report 2014 
 
Markets are the mechanisms through which goods and resources are exchanged 
between firms and households and through the process of exchange, markets determine 
the allocation of resources throughout the economy.  The existence of markets gives 
expression to the development of economic opportunities and encourages both 
productive and allocative efficiency through the development of competitive pressure.  
In many of the planned economies free markets existed for some products.  For 
example, many people sold excess produce from their gardens on street stalls at prices 
determined outside of the central plan.  However, before transition free markets were 
limited and comparatively insignificant in the centrally planned economies.  Consumers 
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and producers were therefore obliged to learn the lessons of market participation and in 
the event these lessons had to be learned quickly since the collapse of the planning 
mechanism occurred without warning and at spectacular speed. 
Financial institutions provide a crucial link in the integration of transactions over 
time.  They provide facilities for savers and opportunities for firms and households to 
borrow to finance their consumption and short term investment plans.  Without banks, 
markets can only function at high cost (Fries and Taci 2002).  Banks mobilise and 
allocate capital efficiently and prudentially to facilitate the process of saving and 
investment that promotes long term growth and prosperity.  By providing money 
transmission facilities, banks also aid the development of stock markets by ensuring that 
settlement procedures operate efficiently giving confidence in the execution of buy and 
sell orders. 
The development of functioning stock markets is fundamental to the transition 
process since they provide the means through which long term savings are made 
available to firms to fund long term investments.  This involves the sale of stock giving 
rights of ownership which are irredeemable on demand, but which can subsequently be 
transferred to other stake holders in the secondary market.     
The State plays an important role in market economies by providing a set of 
rules within which other institutions (firms, households and markets) operate. These 
rules give protection against fraudulent or dangerous activities and attempt to ensure 
that information disseminated among individuals and institutions is accurate and not 
deliberately misleading so that the conditions are created to facilitate rational decision 
taking by all economic agents.  In the absence of these rules, risk taking by 
entrepreneurs and investors generally would be discouraged and consumers and firms 
would take sub-optimal decisions that would lead to lower value transactions, and, in 
the extreme, to the pursuit of value reducing activities. 
 In market economies, the State also has a responsibility to avoid market 
failure as far as possible.  This again can be done through the creation of rules that 
restrict the growth of monopoly and through direct provision of public goods and merit 
goods that would otherwise not be produced at all, or, in the case of merit goods, would 
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be under-produced in relation to the socially optimal level if provision were left entirely 
to the market.  The State also intervenes to alter the structure of preferences by granting 
subsidies to merit goods to encourage consumption and taxing demerit goods to 
discourage consumption.  In any case, State involvement is funded through tax revenues 
and here again the State has a responsibility to ensure that taxes are collected in ways 
that do not cause unintended side effects and have little influence, except where such 
influence is intended to discourage production and consumption decisions that reduce 
total utility, for example because they impose social costs on society that are not priced 
by the market. 
 
1.7 Progress in Transition 
At the outset of transition, many envisaged that the process would be rapid and 
that building market oriented economies would lead quickly and inexorably to rapidly 
rising living standards and strong economic growth.  In the event, the process has been 
complex, difficult and lengthy.  Neither has it been smooth nor of uniform pace in every 
country.  Some countries progressed quite rapidly, whilst in others, progress was 
laboured and proceeded at a relatively slow pace so that change occurred gradually.  It 
seems strangely naive that uniformity in transition experiences could ever have been 
expected since economies vary widely in so many different ways, as this chapter has 
shown.   
1.7.1 EBRD Indicators of Transition  
It is now more than twenty five years since the process of transition first began 
in CEE.  A very early development was the reunification of Germany which clearly 
eased the process of transition for the former East Germany because it was, and remains 
even now, heavily subsidised by the former West Germany. However, other countries 
have also achieved considerable success in the process of transition and Bulgaria, the 
Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and 
Slovenia have all joined the European Union.  Slovenia was first to join the euro in 
2007 followed by the Slovak Republic (2009) Estonia (2011) Latvia (2014) and 
Lithuania (2015).  Since a condition of entry into the EU is that countries satisfy the 
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Copenhagen Criteria which stipulate, among other requirements, that a country must 
have a functioning market economy, it is clear that for these countries transition is now 
complete.  A general indication of how far transition has progressed in Central and 
Eastern Europe can be gleaned from Table 1.7 which shows country transition 
indicators as they stood at 2014. Comparison with Table 1.3 shows that, although 
progress has been made by all countries since the earlier period, no country has yet 
achieved a score of 4+ across the board. Interestingly, Romania experienced a decline in 
its score for ‘Governance and Enterprise Restructuring’ and Slovenia experienced a 
decline in its score for ‘Large Scale Privatisations’ compared with the situation in 1999 
as indicated in Table 1.3.  Nevertheless, although transition is clearly complete for all 
the countries of CEE, several are still not fully comparable with developed market 
economies on all indicators set by the EBRD. 
1.8  Macroeconomic Developments 
Along the way, there have been bumps and reversals and early in the process of 
transition, the financial crisis in Russia in 1998 adversely impacted on progress.  At this 
time, many of the former transition economies of CEE still had strong trading links with 
Russia and, when Russia devalued the ruble, this led many foreign investors to 
withdraw their funds from the transition economies of CEE.  As Dezseri (2013) notes 
“Every time Russia has experienced a financial crisis, there has been ‘contagion’ to the 
financial markets of Central and Eastern Europe.  This phenomenon is partly a 
reflection of perceptions rather than realities.  Large numbers of Western investors still 
handle their dealings with the transition economies as if they constitute a single bloc 
disregarding the difference, both in macroeconomic fundamentals and in progress 
toward reform between Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and Russia and 
other CIS countries on the other.” (pp 178).   
As a direct consequence of the flight of foreign capital, the confidence of 
domestic investors declined and the prices of stocks in companies with heavy Russian 
exposure fell significantly generating a contagion effect which led to a general fall in 
share prices with stock market indices falling in Hungary by 44 per cent, by 25 per cent 
in Poland and the Czech Republic, and by around 5% in the Slovak Republic. (Dezseri 
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2013).  The heavy exposure of many of the region’s banks to the Russian economy 
further meant that capital losses from exchange rate movements and falls in asset prices 
precipitated banking crises throughout CEE.  However, as Tables 1.1 and 1.2 suggest, 
the financial crisis in Russia does not appear to have had a major negative medium term 
or long term impact on the course of transition in CEE. Indeed, before the crisis began, 
concern was growing over the large amounts of ‘hot money’ flowing into the region 
which was driving many CEE countries’ exchange rates upwards.  “Some of these 
currencies were being traded near the top of their official trading bands.  Exporters 
feared that overvaluation would choke off economic growth, while the monetary 
authorities feared that they would have to cut interest rates prematurely, thus 
jeopardising the fight against inflation.” (Dezseri 2013 pp178.)  The Russian crisis 
completely changed the situation and had a positive impact on the prospects of the 
transition economies. ‘Hot money’ deserted the CEE region seeking a home elsewhere 
so that exchange rate pressure evaporated.  Again as Dezseri (2013) notes “So much 
‘hot money’ has left the region that the Polish zloty, the Hungarian forint, and other 
currencies that were under pressure were being traded comfortably in the centre of their 
rolling trading banks in the spring of 1999.  It has become possible once again to cut 
interest rates without driving up inflation.” (pp178.)  Tables 1.1 and 1.2 therefore 
provide supporting evidence that the Russian financial crisis did not exert a powerful 
impact on either growth or inflation in the transition economies of CEE.  Output dipped 
during the crisis but it had been falling across the region in the years prior to the crisis 
and inflation continued its downward path.  It is, of course, possible that the Russian 
financial crisis exacerbated the decline in output and may have impeded further 
progress in reducing inflation.  To the extent that this is true, the effects seem negligible 
and were quickly reversed.  A decade earlier, the effects of the Russian financial crisis 
would almost certainly have had a far more serious impact on the economies of CEE 
because of the integrated nature of these economies with Russia.  It is a measure of how 
far transition had progressed within a decade that the Russian financial crisis had a 
negligible impact at best on the CEE economies and passed almost unnoticed in some 
countries. 
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The second decade after the process of transition began was, for the most part, a 
period of expansion and growth, accompanied, again for the most part, by declining 
inflation.  However, there is no doubt that towards the end of the second decade, as the 
global financial crisis erupted, the economies of CEE, no longer by then transition 
economies, were in deep crisis.  As Table 1.8 shows, in 2008, most countries in the 
region experienced a slowdown in economic growth.  Hungary and Romania bucked the 
trend, but across the board output continued its downward spiral in 2009.  Ironically, in 
terms of the region’s economic progress and prospects, this was an encouraging sign.  
Two decades earlier, a financial crisis in the West would have had comparatively little 
impact on the countries of CEE because of their closer integration and economic ties 
with the former Soviet Union.  In 2009 these economies were more fully aligned with 
the West and the most graphic demonstration of this was that, like the rest of Europe 
and the USA, the financial crisis had a quite abrupt and devastating impact throughout 
CEE with the Baltic countries experiencing the severest fallout with output declines in 
excess of 14 per cent.   Latvia experienced the worst excesses of this downturn which 
continued into 2010 and, even by the end of 2014 the negative effects of the recession 
had still not been fully recouped.  Despite this, most of the CEE countries had returned 
to positive growth by 2010.  Nevertheless, the whole of the CEE region learned a harsh 
lesson: membership of the EU and increasing integration with the West does not simply 
confer benefits. It also comes with risks and costs and whilst Europe and the West 
stagnated, Russia and many of the former CIS countries experienced growth.   
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Table 1.8: Growth in Real GDP in Central and Eastern European Economies  
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bulgaria 5.4 4.0 4.8 4.5 6.6 6.0 6.5 6.9 5.8 -5.0 0.7 2.0 0.5 1.1 1.7 
Czech Rep 3.9 2.6 1.5 3.2 4.9 6.4 6.9 5.5 2.7 -4.8 2.3 2.0 -0.9 -0.5 2.0 
Estonia 7.9 6.5 7.2 6.7 6.5 9.5 10.4 7.9 -5.3 -14.7 2.5 8.3 4.7 1.6 2.1 
Hungary 5.2 3.8 3.5 2.9 4.8 4.3 4.0 0.5 0.9 -6.6 0.8 1.8 -1.5 1.5 3.6 
Latvia 6.9 8.0 6.4 7.5 8.9 10. 2 11.6 9.8 -3.2 -14.2 -2.9 5.0 4.8 4.2 2.4 
Lithuania 3.9 6.4 6.8 9.0 4.9 6.4 7.4 11.1 2.6 -14.8 1.6 6.1 3.8 3.3 2.9 
Poland 4.0 1.0 1.4 3.8 5.1 3.5 6.2 7.2 3.9 2.6 3.7 4.8 1.8 1.7 3.4 
Romania 1.8 5.3 4.9 5.2 8.4 4.2 8.1 6.9 8.5 -7.1 -0.8 1.1 0.6 3.4 2.9 
Slovak Rep 2.0 3.8 4.6 4.5 5.2 6.5 8.3 10.7 5.5 -5.3 4.8 2.7 1.6 1.4 2.4 
Slovenia 4.1 2.7 3.5 2.7 4.4 4.0 5.7 6.9 3.3 -7.8 1.2 0.6 -2.6 -1.0 2.6 
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Control of inflation is another element of macro stabilisation and, as Table 1.2 
shows, the early years of transition were catastrophic in this sense with rates of inflation 
measures in three, and for Estonia and Lithuania four, digits were experienced.  Rates of 
inflation of these magnitudes are unimaginable in developed economies and led to 
economic misery for the majority of the population.  This explosion of inflation was 
caused by excess demand occasioned by deferred consumption decisions earlier in the 
period, wage increases, rising import prices (including oil) and rising central 
government budget deficits financed by printing money.  In a cash-based economy, 
where government has a monopoly over the issue of currency, printing cash provides a 
straightforward alternative to raising taxes as a means of financing government 
spending.  In the early years of transition, money emission was the primary route 
through which governments financed the growing gap between government spending 
and tax revenues.  In any economy there are three ways in which a budget deficit can be 
financed: 
1. Increasing taxation; 
2. Increasing the note issue or borrowing from the banking system – both of which 
will increase the money supply and, in the latter case, will increase government 
debt; 
3. borrowing from the public or from abroad – which increases government debt. 
In the early days of transition, the tax base was relatively low and so, even 
though budget deficits were low by developed economy standards, increasing taxation 
as a method of financing budgetary expenditures was not viable in the early stages of 
transition.  Moreover budget deficits increased as governments found it difficult to cut 
back on expenditures and many allowed the continuation of soft budget constraints for 
several years after the commencement of transition.  There was also a problem with 
selling debt to the public because in developed economies this is usually done through 
the stock market and, in the early stages of transition, these were absent in the countries 
of CEE.  Borrowing from abroad also posed problems because of the relatively high 
default risk since foreign debt must be repaid in foreign currency and some doubt 
existed about whether the transition economies would be able to raise the necessary 
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foreign currency to service and repay any debt bought by foreign nationals or 
institutions.  Inevitably governments resorted to the printing press to finance their 
deficits and this generated hyperinflation which, in some cases, took almost a decade to 
reign back.   
Against this constellation of inflationary factors, output was declining as 
exposure to markets forced structural change on industrial enterprises which were 
unable to respond to the change in consumer preferences at a rate sufficient to take up 
the slack generated by the closure of uneconomic firms.  After the first decade of 
transition, inflation in most CEE countries was at impressively low rates given the 
experiences of the early and middle years of the decade. 
Again there have been set backs along the road to sustained low inflation and 
different countries had different experiences because of country specific factors such as 
the state of business activity, the conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, the differing 
effects of changes in world prices on individual economies and so on.  As Table 1.9 
illustrates, throughout the region inflation gathered momentum from 2004 onwards until 
2008. Latvia experienced the worst excesses of inflation which peaked at 15.3 per cent 
in 2008.  This was followed by Bulgaria which recorded a peak of 12 per cent in 2008 
and was closely followed by Lithuania which recorded a peak of 11.1 per cent in 2008 
and Estonia which recorded a peak on 10.8 per cent in the same year.  After the highs of 
2008, inflation was increasingly brought under control mainly because of tight 
monetary and fiscal policies applied by all CEE central banks and governments 
respectively and by the economic slowdown that began in 2011 and continued into 
2013.  By 2013, no country in the region experienced inflation that differed 
substantially from levels close to the targets set by central banks in similarly developed 
countries.   
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Table 1.9: Inflation in Central and Eastern European Economies 2000-2014 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 2015 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Bulgaria 9.9 7.4 5.9 2.3 6.1 6.0 7.4 7.6 12.0 2.5 3.0 3.4 2.4 0.4 -1.6 
Czech Rep 4.0 4.7 1.8 0.2 2.6 1.6 2.1 3.0 6.3 0.6 1.2 2.1 3.5 1.4 0.4 
Estonia 4.0 5.8 3.6 1.3 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.7 10.8 0.2 2.7 5.1 4.2 3.2 0.5 
Hungary 9.8 9.2 4.8 4.9 6.8 3.5 4.0 7.9 6.0 4.2 4.9 4.0 5.7 1.7 -0.3 
Latvia 2.6 2.5 1.9 3.0 6.2 6.9 6.6 10.1 15.3 3.3 -1.2 4.2 2.3 0.0 0.7 
Lithuania 1.0 1.5 0.3 -1.2 1.2 2.7 3.8 5.8 11.1 4.2 1.2 4.1 3.2 1.2 0.2 
Poland 10.1 5.5 1.7 0.7 3.6 2.2 1.3 2.6 4.2 4.0 2.7 3.9 3.7 0.8 0.1 
Romania 45.7 34.5 22.5 15.4 11.9 9.1 6.6 4.9 7.9 5.6 6.1 5.8 3.4 3.2 1.4 
Slovak Rep 12.0 7.3 3.0 8.5 7.5 2.8 4.3 1.9 3.9 0.9 0.7 4.1 3.7 1.5 -0.1 
Slovenia 8.9 8.4 7.5 5.6 3.7 2.5 2.5 3.8 5.5 0.9 2.1 2.1 2.8 1.9 0.4 
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1.8.1 Fiscal Policy 
One of the main instruments to achieve macroeconomic stabilisation in any 
economy is fiscal policy.  Fiscal stance can be measured by the size and direction of the 
general government structural balance.  In this sense, the stance of fiscal policy in the 
economies of CEE has shown clear signs of consistent improvement since the early 
years of transition when, as Table 1.4 shows, the state of the budget deteriorated 
markedly from the outset of transition and into the early 90s.  At the outset of transition, 
fiscal imbalances deteriorated because the tax system was not geared to the needs of a 
market economy and inflows of revenue declined because, as the economies of CEE 
were exposed to the forces of the market, output inevitably collapsed and it took time 
for recovery, adjustment, and the implementation of a properly codified tax system in 
line with that in place in modern industrial economies.  However, as Table 1.10 shows, 
most countries brought down their fiscal imbalances during the 1990s, albeit some more 
quickly than others. 
By 2000, all CEE countries had overhauled their taxation system and VAT had 
been introduced by all.  As well as a major source of government revenue, VAT was 
introduced as a means of improving the allocation of resources by reducing distortions 
in product and factor markets.  However, to maintain fiscal sustainability, it was also 
necessary for countries to bring down public expenditure.  To achieve this, subsidies to 
firms were reduced or eliminated and defence spending was trimmed.  Against this, 
social expenditures have increased as governments took more responsibility for 
provision in this area which, under the command system, had formerly been the 
responsibility of employers. 
Even as transition was completed and economic development progressed, fiscal 
imbalances in some CEE economies remained outside the 3 per cent of GDP ratio 
normally regarded as the ratio associated with economic stability by Western policy 
makers, as Table 1.10 shows.  However, there is no doubt that on average, fiscal 
imbalances had improved and for many countries, the budget deficit was well within the 
ratio of 3 per cent of GDP.  In 2013, Slovenia, with a ratio of -13.8 remained well 
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outside the target and the only other country to breach the 3 per cent ratio was Poland 
with a ratio of -4.3 per cent.  There is no doubt that the drive towards meeting the fiscal 
obligations enshrined in the Maastricht criteria provided impetus to improving the 
magnitude of the general government budget balance throughout the entire CEE region, 
and membership of the euro (for those that have joined) has placed them in the fiscal 
straight jacket of the Stability and Growth Pact.   
 
Table 1.10 General Government Budget Balances as a % of GDP Average 2008-2013, 
2012 and 2013 
 
Country Average 
2008-2013 
2012 2013 
Bulgaria -1.1 -0.5 -1.9 
Czech Rep -3.3 -4.2 -1.5 
Estonia -0.6 -0.2 -0.2 
Hungary -2.1 -0.2 -2.4 
Latvia -4.5 01 -1.1 
Lithuania -5.2 -3.3 -2.2 
Poland -5.4 -3.9 -4.3 
Romania -4.6 -2.5 -2.5 
Slovak Rep -4.9 -4.5 -2.8 
Slovenia -5.6 -3.1 -13.8 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Rapacki et al (2015) 
 
Despite the encouraging figures shown in Table 1.10, there is no doubt that the fiscal 
position of countries in the CEE region, like other countries, has deteriorated because of the 
global financial crisis in 2008 and the economic downturn that followed has led to falling 
tax revenues and rising expenditures.  Rising government deficits impact on levels of public 
debt and the combined effect is to reduce the credibility of countries experiencing these.  
This leads to rising interest rates and, in some cases, a decline in the flow of direct foreign 
investments and foreign credits – especially for those countries currently outside of the 
euro.   
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1.8.2 Monetary Policy 
In keeping with global trends, central banks in most CEE countries have now 
adopted inflation targeting as the anchor for monetary policy, though for five of them 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) this is a de facto 
consequence of their participation in the euro.  Of the remaining economies of CEE, 
only Bulgaria, which has a currency board, has not adopted inflation targeting as a 
nominal anchor for monetary policy.  That this policy has succeeded in maintaining 
impressively low rates of inflation is shown in Table 1.9. This was partly because of the 
more relaxed approach to monetary policy adopted by many central banks in the region.  
For example, some countries, including Hungary, Latvia and Romania, relaxed reserve 
requirements in order to pump liquidity into the financial sector.  The Vienna Initiative, 
launched by European banks and governments at the height of the first wave of the 
financial crisis in January 2009, provided a framework for safeguarding the financial 
stability of emerging economies by ensuring that foreign banks did not make rapid and 
disorderly withdrawals of funds that would have caused financial chaos. 
1.8.3 Banking and Capital Market Developments 
Under Communism, financial markets were non-existent since they served no 
purpose and had to be created from scratch once the Soviet Union disintegrated in 1989.  
Without financial intermediation and a functioning stock market, a market economy 
cannot be created.  Progress in creating a monetary sector providing financial 
intermediation and an efficient capital market has been impressive throughout the CEE 
region.  For this to happen, a sound regulatory framework had to be created with strong 
legal foundations backed up by the emergence of institutional investors in the form of 
pension funds and insurance companies. (Institutional investors are more formally 
defined as “Specialised financial institutions which manage savings collectively on 
behalf of small investors towards a specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return 
maximisation and maturity of claims” (Davis, 1996 pp64)) It is also a prerequisite for 
the creation of a transparent and efficient capital market.  Testimony to the resilience of 
the financial sector is the way it has withstood the financial crisis (EBRD 2010).    
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One widely used measure of financial market development is the ratio of 
domestic lending to private sector to GDP.  This measure indicates the width and depth 
of financial intermediation.  Table 1.11 details the changes that have taken place in this 
indicator between 1995 and 2012.  Whilst for most CEE countries impressive progress 
is clearly discernible, the average for industrialised Western countries is around 160 per 
cent implying the CEE region as a whole still has far to go.   
 
Table 1.11 Domestic Lending to the Private sector as a Percentage of GDP 1995 and 
2012 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 
 
Like financial markets, capital markets were also extinguished under 
Communism and,had to be created from scratch.   Stock markets were not created 
immediately and required the creation of a properly functioning financial sector to 
facilitate the transfer of funds between stock market traders.  However, by the mid 
1990s, all countries in the CEE region had emerging stock markets.  As might be 
expected, market capitalisation was relatively low at the outset of transition, but grew as 
confidence grew and the privatisation programmes gathered momentum. Table 1.12 
gives some relevant details.  Again, market capitalisation lags well behind the levels of 
 Domestic 
lending to 
Private Sector 
(% GDP) 
Country 1995 2012 
Bulgaria 39.9 71.4 
Czech Rep 70.8 56.7 
Estonia 16.2 77.4 
Hungary 22.6 56.8 
Latvia 8.1 67.6 
Lithuania 14.7 51.0 
Poland 16.0 53.7 
Romania N/A 45.0 
Slovak Rep 36.4 45.0 
Slovenia 25.2 87.4 
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developed Western stock markets with the UK and the USA having market 
capitalisation rates of 115.5 per cent of GDP.   
Table 1.12 Market Capitalisation a Percentage of GDP 1995 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Standard and Poor’s Global Stock Market Factbook 2000 and 2014 
 
At the outset of transition, there were many reasons to suppose that capital 
markets would not be efficient and that efficiency of these markets would develop over 
time.  In the early days of a newly created market, trading is very thin, there exist only 
limited disclosure requirements on firms and opportunities for market participation are 
neither well distributed nor well understood by many potential investors with little 
knowledge of marketing, profit and loss accounting and so on.  In these circumstances 
the actions of market participants would be unlikely to accord with the efficient market 
paradigm.  However, as we shall see later in chapters 4 and 5, a battery of tests confirm 
that stock markets in the CEE region are informationally efficient and have been for a 
number of years.   
This is important because there is evidence that establishing appropriate 
financial and economic institutions is an important feature of successful transition from 
a centrally planned economy  to a market economy (Young and Reynolds, 1995; EBRD 
1998; Ibrahim and Galt, 2002).  Well-functioning financial markets are vital to a 
thriving economy because these markets facilitate price discovery, risk hedging and the 
 Market 
Capitalisation 
(% GDP) 
Country 1995 2012 
Bulgaria 0.5 13.0 
Czech Rep 28.3 18.9 
Estonia 21.8 10.4 
Hungary 5.4 16.9 
Latvia 0.2 3.9 
Lithuania 2.0 9.4 
Poland 3.3 36.3 
Romania 0.3 9.4 
Slovak Rep 4.9 5.0 
Slovenia 1.5 14.3 
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allocation of capital to its most efficient use.  Because firms require equity as well as 
debt funds, capital markets play an important role in this process.  Mendelson and Peake 
(1993) have argued that in market economies the availability of true equity prices is 
important for the establishment of appropriate hurdle rates for capital expenditures and 
to provide investors with the confidence that they are not being cheated.  They further 
argue that in transition economies, the sooner sound equity markets can be established, 
the sooner there will be sound benchmarks for enterprises to be privatised.  The clear 
implication is that an efficient capital market is helpful in creating the conditions 
necessary for a functioning market economy.   
1.8.4 Trade and Payments 
The web of trade and payments arrangements binding countries of CEE under 
the CMEA assistance arrangements is incompatible with liberalised trading 
arrangements and currency convertibility.  It is therefore informative to reflect on the 
extent to which the countries of CEE have become more open economies, that is, 
dependent on exports and imports to and from a variety of destinations, and in particular 
the extent to which they have become integrated with Western Europe since transition 
began.  Specific details about the structure of trade among the CEE countries prior to 
transition is scant to say the least, but Table 1.13 gives details of exports for four CCE 
countries in 1989.  The degree of interdependence is striking and, although 
generalisations cannot be made, the implication is that the structure of trade throughout 
the pre-transition CEE was dominated by trade within the Soviet Union.  For example, 
reflecting on the Russian financial crisis of 1998, Roak et al (2014) have noted that 
“The shock from the Russian financial crisis reverberated both regionally and globally. 
In the region, it was felt most strongly through the collapse of Russian imports which 
halved in the months following the (ruble’s) devaluation.” (pp 31)  The authors go on to 
note that the Baltics were particularly hard hit because their export shares to Russia 
were in the region 20-25 per cent of total exports.  Nevertheless, as Table 1.1 indicates, 
setbacks were quickly overcome and transition progressed remorselessly onwards. 
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Table 1.13: Shares of some CMEA in exports of member Countries; Shares of 
the USSR in exports of member Countries (1989 – percentage of total exports) 
 
 
 CMEA/Total USSR/CMEA 
Country X M X M 
Bulgaria 83 73 79 74 
Hungary 39 39 62 56 
Poland 35 32 60 56 
Romania 40 55 58 59 
 
 Source: Michopoulos and Tarr (1991) 
 
 
Table 1.14: Foreign Trade and its Direction (2012) 
 
Country Trade 
as %age 
of GDP 
Main Directions of Trade (% of total) 
  W Europe CSEE CIS Other 
  X M X M X M X M 
Bulgaria 69 45.9 43.9 23.0 17.6 6.2 24.6 24.9 13.9 
Czech 
Republic 
75 63.6 56.4 21.1 19.8 5.1 7.7 10.2 16.1 
Estonia 90 54.4 57.0 17.9 28.5 15.3 6.7 12.4 7.8 
Hungary 86 56.4 53.6 26.2 19.3 6.0 10.4 11.4 16.7 
Latvia 62 32.5 40.9 34.8 39.0 22.8 14.1 9.9 6.0 
Lithuania 83 36.3 36.2 27.2 22.5 29.6 35.6 6.9 5.7 
Poland 46 63.4 60.6 17.5 11.1 9.7 14.0 9.4 14.3 
Romania 43 56.0 58.6 18.3 22.1 6.3 10.3 19.4 9.0 
Slovak 
Republic 
93 54.9 43.4 37.5 29.6 4.0 11.1 3.6 15.9 
Slovenia 74 51.2 55.3 29.9 20.0 6.6 1.8 12.3 22.9 
 
Source: Rapacki et al (2015) 
 
Table 1.14 gives details of exports and imports as a percentage of GDP for the 
CEE region and also records the percentages of exports and imports traded with 
Western Europe, Central and South Eastern Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent 
States and other destinations as a percentage of the respective total values in 2012.  The 
emergence of Western Europe as the dominant trading partner for CEE countries is 
clear. Overall, with respect to trade, Poland is the most integrated country with 63.4 per 
cent of its total exports to Western Europe and 60.6 per cent of its total imports from the 
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same region, and the least integrated country is Lithuania. But even here, Western 
Europe is still the dominant trading region with 36.3 per cent of exports destined for 
Western Europe and 36.2 per cent of imports coming from the same region.  For the 
smaller economies of CEE, the value of trade as a percentage of GDP falls within the 
range of any other small open economy which, according to the World Bank, typically 
record values which range from 50- 90 per cent (World Bank, 2012).  The larger 
economies of Poland and Romania recorded a lower ratio of trade to GDP indicating a 
lower degree of openness.  Nevertheless, in all cases the importance of Western Europe 
as a trading partner is clear, though the Central and South Eastern European region also 
remains important in trade flows.  However, just as striking as the importance of 
Western Europe is the decline of the CIS in terms of trade flows with CEE.  Latvia, 
Lithuania and Bulgaria still maintain strong trading links with the CIS, but for other 
CEE countries the CIS is considerably less important and certainly far less important 
than it was at the start of transition.    
Continuing balance of payments deficits predictably remained a problem 
throughout the CEE region as transition progressed throughout the 1990s. However, 
even as transition progressed and was completed, deficits remained stubbornly 
persistent in some countries and, until recent times, remain so more than twenty five 
years since transition began.  For example, for countries in the region the average 
current account deficit deteriorated from 7 per cent of GDP in 2004 to 10 per cent of 
GDP in 2008 (Balázs and Jevčák 2015). Paradoxically, for many CEE countries, the 
financial crisis resulted in an improvement in their external payments situation as 
declining economic growth reduced imports by more than exports, and by 2013, on 
average, countries were recording a small surplus.  Table 1.15 gives more specific 
details. 
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Table 1.15 Current Account Balances 2009-2014  
 
Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014* 
Bulgaria -8.637 -1.45 0.083 -1.119 2.253 0.045 
Czech Rep -2.336 -3.67 -2.111 -1.567 -0.53 0.615 
Estonia 2.542 1.799 1.355 -2.484 -1.128 0.053 
Hungary -0.812 0.28 0.752 1.899 4.143 4.248 
Latvia 8.036 2.316 -2.795 -3.261 -2.337 -3.115 
Lithuania -0.33 -3.848 -1.19 1.601 -0.368 0.213 
Poland -3.962 -5.463 -5.151 -3.55 -1.328 -1.221 
Romania -4.493 -4.586 -4.626 -4.522 -0.81 -4.681 
Slovak Rep -3.459 -4.737 -4.984 0.947 1.52 0.161 
Slovenia -0.698 -0.079 0.225 2.651 5.607 5.773 
 
*Estimates 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Databases 
 
It is clear that some countries had much stronger current account positions than 
others and the region as a whole clearly has a relatively high propensity to import 
which implies an inefficient and uncompetitive production base. The significance of 
current account deficits depends not only on their size, but also on the mechanism 
through which they are financed.  Unless current account deficits are offset by 
autonomous, rather than accommodating, capital inflows, the domestic economy and 
the external value of the currency are weakened and, as foreign debt grows, this 
reduces the potential for future economic growth.  A deficit financed by an 
autonomous inflow of foreign capital does not restrict future growth to the same extent 
and might even enhance it. 
Historically, the volume of foreign debt (public and private) for countries 
within the region has not been a cause for concern and has been comparable with 
IBRD standards for less and medium developed economies (Rapacki, et al 2015).  
However, in more recent years, foreign debts have increased significantly in several 
countries in the region.  As Table 1.16 shows, in 2013 foreign debt in Hungary, Latvia 
and Slovenia considerably exceeded 100 per cent of GDP and in Bulgaria, foreign debt 
stood at 97.2 per cent of GDP and at 90.8 in Estonia.  In all other CEE countries 
foreign debt was less than 80 per cent of GDP which is consistent with IBRD targets 
for countries at the stage of development within the target group of countries that are 
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the subject of this investigation.  Despite this, in most CEE countries the ratio of 
foreign debt to public debt is relatively high, and this, coupled with the strengthening 
real exchange rate, (see Table 1.16) indicates that current account deficits were largely 
financed by flows of capital to the private sector and this implies autonomous 
financing of the current account deficit. To that extent, current account deficits in CEE 
countries are financed by autonomous investment and, to the extent that this 
autonomous investment is real investment in capital assets rather than portfolio 
investment, economic growth is likely to be enhanced. This is particularly important 
since it might otherwise provide a brake on future growth when overseas debt falls due 
for redemption and must be repaid.  In these circumstances, domestic investment and 
consumption will necessarily have to be reduced as overseas debt is repaid and this will 
be easier if investment has been in productive assets and has generated greater growth. 
 
Table 1.16 Public and Foreign Gross Debt as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
 Public 
Debt 
Foreign 
Debt 
Country 2013 2012 
Bulgaria 42.7 97.2 
Czech Rep 47.9 47.4 
Estonia 11.3 90.8 
Hungary 79.2 130.3 
Latvia 32.1 139.8 
Lithuania 39.3 73.3 
Poland 57.5 74.4 
Romania 39.3 77.3 
Slovak Rep 54.9 77.2 
Slovenia 73. 0 115.6 
 
Source: Rapacki et al (2015) 
 
1.8.5 Exchange Rates  
By and large, the economies of CEE opted early for some sort of pegged 
exchange rate system with some requiring softer pegs than others.  However, as 
economies have evolved, so preferences for different exchange rate systems have 
evolved.  The firmest peg of all has been established by those countries adopting the 
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euro, but Bulgaria, through its currency board, also has a very firmly pegged exchange 
rate.  Of the remaining countries of CEE, the Czech Republic and Romania have a 
managed float and Hungary and Poland have free floating exchange rates.    
Table 1.17 gives details of the behaviour of the real exchange rate over 2005-
2013 for those CEE countries that have not joined the euro.  The upward march of the 
real exchange rate over the period implies some strength in the external position of 
those countries represented in Table 1.17.  This is encouraging because it is consistent 
with a market view of the external position of countries in the region being financed in 
a sustainable medium term way.   
 
Table 1.17 Changes in the Real Effective Exchange Rate (Selected Countries) 2005-
2013 (2005 = 100) 
 
 2013 
Country 2005 = 100 Average 
Annual 
Growth Rate 
Bulgaria 123.3 2.6 
Czech Rep 118.7 2.2 
Hungary 102.6 0.3 
Poland 101.3 0.2 
Romania 105.4 0.7 
 
Source: Rapacki et al ) 
 
On the whole, and despite the stubbornness of deficits in the recent past in 
some countries, there has been no significant deterioration in external positions for the 
region across the board (as business cycle theory predicts) as economies recovered 
from recession.  As Rapacki,, et al (2015) have noted, most CEE countries have 
brought their current accounts closer to equilibrium and some (Hungary, the Slovak 
Republic and Lithuania) have even achieved a surplus. 
The improvement in external balances was largely attributable to a fall in 
investment along with an increase in the gross savings ratio in most countries (Balázs 
and Jevčák 2015).  This is important because, along with budget deficits, the state of 
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the current account restricts the implementation of an active policy designed to 
promote prosperity and growth.   
 
1.9 Conclusion 
 
For all CEE countries in this investigation, transition is complete and all 
countries have functioning market economies displaying many of the features of a fully 
developed economy. In less than two decades these countries witnessed the birth of 
enterprise, the creation of independent central banks and a stable banking sector fit for 
the needs of a market economy.  These countries have created functioning stock 
markets which are informationally efficient and modelled along the lines of those in 
developed market economies.  They have overhauled their tax systems and have public 
debt at levels which range from relatively low to relatively high when judged against 
the widely accepted level of sustainability at sixty per cent of GDP.  They have become 
open economies and all have now joined the EU.  Predictably, economic progress in 
some countries has exceeded that in others, but given the state of economies 
throughout the CEE region when the Soviet Union collapsed, progress across the board 
has been impressive and, in the longer term at least, continuous.   Despite this, no 
country in the CEE region has yet reached a state of development comparable to that of 
Western Europe so more progress is possible yet. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE EMERGENCE OF STOCK MARKETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 
2.1  Introduction 
As the process of transition gathered momentum, industries were privatised and 
control was transferred from the State to private individuals.  Largely as a response to 
this, stock markets were created so that individuals could transfer ownership of equity 
received through the privatisation process to other individuals and institutions on 
organised markets that could objectively value their worth. 
Stock markets, once a feature of all CEE economies, were extinguished under 
Communism and had to be created from scratch because it is impossible to have a 
functioning market economy unless a country also has a functioning stock exchange 
(EBRD 1998).  A stock exchange provides an institution that enables companies to raise 
risk capital and provides benchmark rates of return against which risk can be assessed.  
It therefore facilitates the growth of companies and through this the allocation of 
reslources to meet the changing demands of consumers that characteriss the operation of 
a market economy.  A great deal of the early literature on stock market development in 
transition economies focussed on microstructure.  Microstructure basically refers to 
market design which is crucial to the development and functioning of efficient stock 
markets because it impacts on market capitalisation, liquidity, and the emergence of 
trust.  The problem for the transition economies was that there was no blueprint which 
gave an established route from start to finish leading to the creation of a functioning and 
efficient stock market.  Instead there were examples of efficient stock markets in 
developed countries and stock markets at various stages of development, in some cases 
embryonic, in emerging economies. However, there was nothing to guide the creation of 
stock markets from scratch in economies emerging from decades of central planning 
and the suppression of market forces. 
During the era of planned economies, new generations, unaccustomed to the 
operation of capital markets, had grown up and viewed the newly created stock markets 
with suspicion and caution.  One of the major challenges in the transition economies 
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was therefore to educate investors and to explain to them the nature of risk capital.  
However, efforts to educate investors were somewhat confounded because, coupled 
with an absence of understanding, there was also an absence of reliable information 
about the companies traded on embryonic stock markets.  The information that was 
disclosed by companies was often inaccurate or incomplete, and was frequently based 
on different accounting standards and practices.  Moreover, reliable information and 
corporate governance structures of the type common in developed market economies 
were not in place and companies were subject to few, if any, mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  Indeed the information that was disclosed by companies often embodied 
mistakes and inaccuracies and was based on different accounting standards as the 
system of business accounting was changing so as to be brought more into line with 
internationally accepted standards (Kawalec and Kluza, 2000).  Besides, the 
management of newly privatised corporations were not used to the rules of a market 
economy and this led to mistakes and intentional abuses of power in traded companies.  
This increased the informational problems and risk analysis involved in stock exchange 
trading. 
Encompassing all of these issues was the absence of a regulatory framework to 
establish the rules within which a market economy could be created and develop and a 
stock market could emerge and function efficiently as an integral part of that process.  
The legal systems of the different transition countries had to be changed substantially so 
as to incorporate rights to the ownership and disposal of private assets, to provide 
guarantees to investors over the proper use of investment funds, to create a legal base 
for the existence of the stock market, to define legally the different financial instruments 
traded on the stock market, to provide a consistent set of accounting standards, to 
reform laws concerning the tax system and so on.  All of these are taken for granted in 
developed market economies and these therefore provided the blueprint suitable for 
market realities to emerge and function in transition economies.  
Creating functioning stock markets is therefore essential for the growth and 
development of a functioning market economy.  In developed economies, stock markets 
perform many roles that promote the allocation of capital to its most efficient uses and 
through this enhance the functioning of the economic system generally so as to promote 
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growth, wealth creation and employment.  When stock markets function efficiently, 
growing companies are able to raise additional finance at a lower cost than would 
otherwise be the case.  In the absence of a stock market, such companies would be 
compelled to rely on internal finance which would ultimately stifle their growth.  Stock 
markets therefore provide a source of new funds for companies, but they also provide a 
secondary market in equity which gives investors confidence that they can cash in their 
purchases of equity relatively easily when the time comes and, in an efficient market, at 
fair value prices reflecting all available information.  Without the ability to dispose of 
holdings of equity, economic agents would be largely unwilling to buy a stake in the 
ownership of joint stock companies which is essential if growing companies are to 
finance expansion.  Reluctance to buy equity in certain companies is also essential if 
inefficient companies are to be eliminated through natural selection and resources are to 
be allocated to their most efficient use.   Stock markets also give companies a choice of 
financing options that enables them to adjust the balance between equity and debt in 
ways that accord with their aims and current prospects.  By being less reliant on debt, 
companies are more likely to survive an economic downturn that might otherwise force 
those companies with relatively high gearing ratios out of business.  Moreover, once 
stock exchanges are established, they are likely to lead to improved governance systems 
and by enforcing minimum disclosure requirements on firms they increase transparency 
for investors and facilitate more optimal choices.  
The basic function of any market is price discovery and this refers to the ability 
of the market to value assets at their fair value price.  In the case of equity markets, fair 
value prices reflect the underlying prospects of the firm and, as those prospects change, 
in an efficient market the fair value price of the firm’s equity will change to reflect these 
changed prospects.  The speed and accuracy with which exchanges respond to new 
information about changes in the underlying fundamentals are important indicators of 
market efficiency for an exchange. There are two main factors that influence the 
efficiency of price discovery on a stock exchange.  One is simply the fairness and 
integrity of prices.  Price integrity is far more likely to be achieved when there are legal 
regulations governing all aspects of trading and stock exchange monitoring procedures 
are in place to prevent manipulation and front-running whereby brokers use known, but 
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not executed, purchasing decisions that are likely to push up prices of assets purchased 
on their own account, before executing the trade on behalf of their client.  Price integrity 
also requires regulations to prevent fraud in general, self-dealing and the use of inside 
information.  Secondly, and equally important is the information structure available to 
investors.  The extent of information on firms that is readily and easily available to 
investors partly determines how well prices reflect the fundamentals.  This information 
structure is enhanced through accounting rules, disclosure requirements and corporate 
governance standards.  These are often dictated by exchange listing requirements or by 
security market regulators and, in establishing their stock markets, the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe attempted to formulate rules that would 
encourage price integrity.  (See for example, Harrison and Paton 2005.) 
Price discovery is important to investors because it directly impacts on the risk 
of holding stock.  In particular where information asymmetries exist, traders with 
private information can exploit their advantage to the detriment of traders with access to 
only publicly available information.  Easley et al (2002) have shown that uninformed 
traders, knowing that they are potentially at a disadvantage, will demand a greater risk 
premium to hold stocks where they perceive the existence of greater private information 
risk.  Further evidence consistent with this finding is provided by Botosan (1997) who 
has shown that a one unit difference in the disclosure measure is associated with a 
difference of approximately twenty eight basis points in the cost of equity capital after 
controlling for market beta and firm size; and by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) who 
find that enforcement of insider trading laws lowers the cost of capital.  Furthermore, 
LaPorte et al (2000) show that laws on corporate governance impact on returns because 
of their influence on the way that returns are split between insiders and outsiders.    
Arising out of all of this is the clear implication that market design should focus 
on reducing execution costs and facilitating price discovery.  Unfortunately there is no 
unique blue print for establishing a stock market from scratch that will achieve these 
goals.  It is hardly surprising therefore that the transition economies attempted to import 
design features from functioning stock markets in the developed countries that delivered 
these goals.  However, this approach posed problems in terms of deliverable results 
because developed markets achieve their goals partly as a result of being open to 
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international competition and in the early stages of stock market development in the 
transition economies, this was disallowed.  Market liquidity and turnover are also 
important in enabling developed stock markets to perform and achieve their goals.  
However, in the early days of stock market creation in the transition economies, market 
liquidity and turnover were low by any standards and initially at least, they typically 
opened only one or two days a week and usually for only a few hours each week. 
In developed markets, the stock of large companies is often traded on more than 
one market so price discovery might take place in multiple markets with the possibility 
of arbitrage, and liquidity might be greater in an overseas market than in the domestic 
market.  (See for example, Harrison and Moore, 2010.) However, in the early stages of 
transition, even relatively large companies in the domestic economy were comparatively 
small by international standards and therefore price discovery and liquidity were 
confined to the domestic market.  In many cases, stock markets in the transition 
economies were opened to foreign investors relatively quickly after their creation.  
However, in the uncertain environment that existed, especially in the early stages of 
transition, it was always more realistic to assume that the investor base in the transition 
economies would be comparatively small and local.  (See for example, Coval and 
Maskowitz 1999; and Hubermann 2001.)  Nevertheless, many companies in the 
transition economies, even at the outset of transition, were clearly going to grow into 
companies capable of having their stock traded on global markets.   
To the extent that defection of the largest firms from national markets to global 
markets happened, this might serve the best interests of international investors and 
might lower the costs of capital for the firms concerned, but it also had implications for 
the design of stock markets in these countries.  In particular, the revenue of an exchange 
is mainly volume driven and an often quoted rule of thumb is that ninety per cent of an 
exchange’s revenue is derived from ten per cent of its listed companies. The fear existed 
that the migration of larger companies would result in a loss of revenue to the newly 
created stock markets that might stifle their growth.  However, in the event such fears 
proved to be unfounded and the empirical evidence suggests that the increased exposure 
of a country to global markets raised the investment profile of a country and enhanced 
trading activity.  (See for example, Sofianos and Smith 1996; Karolyi 1998 and Hargis 
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and Ramanlal 1998.)  However, the transition economies also introduced product 
diversification enabling trade in futures and options, as well as exchange traded funds as 
soon as was practicable.  This also enhanced their growth and gave added impetus to 
liquity and trading volume.   
Stock markets will be fully emerged when they are both informationally 
efficient and fully integrated into the world’s stock markets with company equity 
trading on more than one developed and efficient market.  The benefits of this are both 
micro and macro.  At the macro level, capital market integration enlarges the menu of 
assets available to both savers and borrowers.  By designing savings vehicles in a more 
attractive way and extending the reach of financial intermediation, saving is encouraged 
and the utility of a given volume of savings to the holders of financial assets is 
enhanced.  Similarly, on the borrowing side the introduction of new borrowing 
instruments facilitates and, perhaps more importantly, helps improve stock market  
quality.  If secure and liquid assets are readily available, yielding real rates of interest 
comparable with those available elsewhere, savings are less likely to be retained by 
firms for low productivity investments and/or diverting into inflation hedges.   
Another macroeconomic benefit stems from closer international links among 
capital markets and financial institutions.  The integration among capital markets makes 
it easier for savings raised in mature economies to be used to finance high yielding 
investment in economies with higher growth potential.  This promotes economic growth 
in two ways: by improving the efficiency of investment and by strengthening the 
discipline of governments and central banks to pursue sound economic and financial 
policies. 
2.2  Problems Inhibiting Stock Market Development 
Once stock markets were established in the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe, three issues needed to be addressed before further development could 
take place 
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 The threat posed to transparency and standards of disclosure in equity 
markets in general, and minority shareholder rights in particular. 
 The need for growth of institutional investors to trade in equity markets. 
 The conflict between trends towards decentralised decision taking that 
characterises market economies and ambitions to centralize trading in the interests of 
promoting transparency 
We discuss each of these issues in turn and they do, in any case, provide a theme 
running throughout this chapter. 
2.2.1 The Threat Posed to Transparency and Standards of Disclosure in Equity 
Markets in General and Minority Shareholder Rights in Particular. 
A major stumbling block to stock market development in transition economies 
was the lack of transparency in deal making and investor protection once trading 
activity began to develop and markets for corporate control came into existence.  Stock 
markets will only continue to grow and develop if investors have confidence in the 
standards of fairness, accountability and protection given by, and enforced through, 
appropriate legislation. In this context, it is possible that certain methods of privatisation 
have been open to abuse and management/employee buyouts are especially conducive 
to the emergence of non-transparent practices.  We discuss methods of privatisation 
later. 
2.2.2 The Need for Growth of Institutional Investors to Trade in Equity Markets 
Institutional investors have emerged as the dominant trading agents in all stock 
markets in recent decades.  Their increasing importance is mirrored in the growing 
impact institutional investors have on the functioning of financial markets as well as 
their own reliance on and need for market depth, liquidity and efficient infrastructure.  
Unsurprisingly, institutional investors were slow to develop in the transition economies 
of Central and Eastern Europe. However, as the basic elements of market economies 
such as the right to own private property and freedom to decide what to produce 
(subject to restrictions covering, for example, poisons, explosives, armaments and so 
on) were put in place, institutional investors gradually emerged. We return to this issue 
later.   
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2.2.3 The Conflict Between Trends Towards Spontaneous Market Fragmentation 
and Ambitions to Centralise Trading in the Interests of Promoting 
Transparency 
Market fragmentation can occur for two reasons. One is the development of a 
superior market which is more attractive to investors because it is technologically 
superior. The development of an electronic trading system would be an example of this.  
The second reason is that order flow, that is, the action of brokers to route buy and sell 
trades to market makers, can fragment a market if satellite markets offer faster 
execution and lower commissions.  The latter can be detrimental to orderly stock market 
development since it enhances the potential for higher returns in one market compared 
to other markets. 
2.3 The Role of Stock Markets in Economic Growth 
The creation of a reliable monetary system in the emerging markets is necessary 
for stock market development because it facilitates the creation of an efficient and 
reliable payments mechanism.  The absence of this would stifle the growth of trade on 
an organised market and through this, the economy generally.  Its creation represents an 
economic endeavour meant to gather the involvement of important resources and 
persuasion of policy makers to include the necessary infrastructure at the very core of 
their reform agendas.  Empirical support for this has been provided by a growing 
amount of research analysing the relationship between the operation of the financial 
system and economic growth.  (See for example, Levine, 2004.)  The empirical and 
theoretical works generally show the dependence of domestic savings, capital 
accumulation, technological innovation and income growth on the size and quality of 
the financial sector within a national economy.  
Notions on the role of the financial sector in promoting economic growth date 
back at least as far as Schumpeter (1934) who argued that financial sector development 
is an important factor encouraging economic growth primarily because of its effect on 
levels of capital accumulation, savings and technological innovation. The financial 
sector performs its role through a variety of supportive mechanisms which play a crucial 
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role in driving sustainable growth which encourages the emergence and expansion of 
companies and in this way provides the pressing need for the development of a 
functioning stock market.  A wide range of evidence surveying ever increasing numbers 
of countries and using ever more sophisticated techniques, confirms this finding.  A 
survey provided by Levine (2004) confirms that countries with better-functioning banks 
and financial markets grow faster partly because of this than economies with less well 
functioning financial markets.  A major factor explaining this result identified by Levine 
(op cit) is that better-functioning financial systems succeed in easing the external 
financing constraints on companies which are seen as an important impediment to the 
expansion of companies, and this in turn is a mechanism through which financial 
development encourages growth.  
In his review of the connection between financial sector development and 
economic growth, Levine (2004) identifies five functions of financial markets that are 
instrumental in this context.  In particular, financial systems:  
 Produce information ex ante about possible investments and allocate 
capital.   
This feature of financial systems relies on their ability to make information 
available to all market participants.  Bagehot (1873) realised that the requirement for 
capital to reach the most profitable firms is that investors, that is, providers of capital, 
have good information about firms, managers and market conditions.  The presence of 
financial intermediaries reduces the costs of acquiring and processing information and 
thereby improves resource allocation (Boyd and Prescott, 1986).  The benefit of 
developing financial markets comes from the fact that in the absence of intermediaries, 
the cost of information may inhibit investment decisions and hence reduce economic 
development.  Bhattacharya and Pfeiderer (1985), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
(1984) also develop models where financial intermediaries arise to produce information 
on firms and sell this information to savers.   
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) mention the importance of securities’ markets 
in improving information on firms, managers, and economic conditions for the 
acceleration of economic growth.  The selection of the most promising firms is 
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therefore facilitated through the provision of higher quality information made available 
through the financial markets.  
An important issue frequently raised in the literature is the direction of causation 
between finance and growth.  Greenwood and Jovanovic (op cit) model the dynamic 
interactions between finance and growth in which growth is achieved when more 
economic agents have the financial resources to make use of financial markets.  This 
encourages economies of scale in information gathering and risk assessment, and 
improves the ability of financial intermediaries to produce better information with 
positive implications for growth.  In this way their modeling sheds light on the 
intertwined dynamics of finance and growth and reveals the negative relationship 
between income distribution and financial development during the process of economic 
development generally.   
The provision of information in the market also has important implications for 
technological innovation in the sense that banks help in the identification and selection 
of those entrepreneurs with the best chances of successfully initiating new goods and 
production processes (King and Levine, 1993b; Blackburn and Hung, 1998; Acemoglu, 
Aghion, and Zilibotti, 2002).   
As far as stock markets are concerned, Levine (2004) identifies their important 
role in stimulating the production of information about firms.  The possibility to trade in 
large and liquid markets allows for an efficient way to profit from information issued by 
the participants through arbitrage (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and sets the stage for 
even more liquidity in a self-stimulating system (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993).  
Intuitively, with larger and more liquid markets, it is easier for an agent who has 
acquired information to disguise this private information and make money by trading in 
the market.  Thus, larger, more liquid markets will boost incentives to produce this 
valuable information with positive implications for capital allocation (Merton, 1987).  
The final argument made by Levine (2004) shows that despite the many ways in 
which stock markets facilitate and encourage economic development in general, the 
imperfections that are characteristic features of many emerging markets (see Harrison 
and Paton, 2005, for example) give rise to market inefficiency and this adversely 
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impacts on growth through the obvious channels, but also by impeding investment in 
human capital (Galor and Zeira, 1993).  
 
 Monitor investments and establish standards of corporate governance after 
providing finance 
The way in which providers of capital succeed in monitoring, sometimes 
through direct involvement, the activities of firms and induce managers to maximise 
firm value has important implications for the stimulation of growth in general.  The 
separation between management and ownership raises the ’agency problem’ which can 
only be solved by proper corporate governance mechanisms such as professional and 
independent auditing of accounts.  
By the same reasoning, the involvement of all stakeholders of a company, from 
creditors to institutional investors and regulators, allows for good corporate governance 
through their relations with managers which seems likely to improve resource allocation 
and utilisation thus facilitating better selection of successful projects, not least, through 
the provision of more reliable information.  
To the extent that shareholders and creditors effectively monitor firms and 
induce managers to maximise firm value, this will improve the efficiency with which 
firms allocate resources and make savers more willing to finance production and 
innovation.  In turn, the absence of financial arrangements that enhance corporate 
governance may impede the mobilisation of savings from disparate agents and also keep 
capital from flowing to profitable investments (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983).  Thus, the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms directly impacts firm performance 
with potentially important effects on national growth rates. 
One of the means through which healthy corporate governance features are 
induced in a market is to ensure that provision is made for the protection of minority 
shareholders and by developing the conditions for businesses to be owned by a diverse 
group of stockholders. Such a structure of ownership may effectively encourage the 
development  of corporate governance by independently voting on crucial issues, such 
as mergers, liquidations, and fundamental changes in business strategy.   Starting from 
at least Berle and Means (1932) however, many researchers have argued that small, 
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diffuse groups of equity holders may encounter a range of barriers to exerting sound 
control over corporations.  Levine (2004) notes that on the one hand the market frictions 
that are common to developing countries have the  potential to induce managers to 
follow their own favoured projects to the detriment of other equity holders whilst, on 
the other hand, the fact that small shareholders usually lack the expertise to provide 
effective monitoring  of managers potentially gives rise to a ‘free rider’ problem when 
economic agents take advantage of being able to use a resource without paying for it 
such that each of the small stock owners expects the others to act in their own self-
interest with the result that the quality of monitoring might diminish. 
A reaction to the poor governance exercised by small uncoordinated and 
disparate groups of shareholders is to favour large concentrated ownership and this is an 
important element in the principal-agent problem (Grossman and Hart, 1980, 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Stulz, 1988).  However, there exists a long list of 
research papers (starting with the theoretical identification of the issue in Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) showing evidence that large shareholder concentration tends to 
influence the board of directors to alter business activities in ways that best serve the 
large shareholders’ interests with less than optimal effects.  Indeed, the stream of 
literature produced in this area overwhelmingly documents the negative implications of 
these actions (Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung, 2005, La Porta et al., 1998; Faccio and 
Lang, 2002).  
The fact that neither diffuse nor concentrated shareholders guarantees effective 
standards of corporate governance encouraged the search for other instruments.  Levine 
(2004) mentions the power of liquid equity markets, debt contracts and banks, each of 
which have their respective pros and cons. 
The same seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) argues that well 
functioning stock markets seem to be one of the most important solutions to the 
corporate governance problem. Efficient stock markets, as is well documented, 
instantaneously reflect new information about firms.  This generates benefits such as (i) 
performance-linked instruments that are issued to managers as compensation packages 
thus linking their interests to those of the shareholders (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1982; 
and Jensen and Murphy, 1990); (ii) easier takeover of poorly managed companies which 
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sets the stage for benefits from new managers being elected according to performance 
and again aligning their interests to those of the shareholders (Scharfstein, 1988; and 
Stein, 1988). 
An amelioration of the corporate governance problem may arise through debt 
contracts. Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) demonstrate that these contracts 
may drive down costs of monitoring the firm for insiders so that managers need to 
comply with the interests of the shareholders. 
In terms of intermediaries, Diamond (1984) develops a model in which a 
financial intermediary improves corporate governance.  The intermediary mobilizes the 
savings of many individuals and lends these resources to firms.  This ‘delegated 
monitor’ economises on aggregate monitoring costs and eliminates the free-rider 
problem since the intermediary, by monitoring the risk of debt default, does the 
monitoring for all of the investors.  Furthermore, as financial intermediaries and other 
corporate bodies develop long-run relationships, this can further lower information 
acquisition costs.  
In terms of economic growth, a number of models show that well-functioning 
banks influence growth by boosting corporate governance.  Bencivenga and Smith 
(1991 and 1993) show that financial intermediaries that improve corporate governance 
by economising on monitoring costs will reduce credit rationing and thereby boost 
productivity, capital accumulation, and growth.  Sussman (1993) and Harrison, 
Sussman, and Zeira (1999) develop models where financial intermediaries facilitate the 
flow of resources from savers to investors in the presence of informational asymmetries 
with positive growth effects.  Focusing on innovative activity, De La Fuente and Marin 
(1996) develop a model in which intermediaries arise to undertake the particularly 
costly process of monitoring innovative activities.  This improves credit allocation 
among competing technology producers with positive implications for economic 
growth.  
 
 Facilitate the trading, diversification, and management of risk 
A functioning financial system provides risk diversification resources which will 
help promote long-run economic growth by encouraging savings thus allowing 
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potentially profitable projects to develop.  Levine (2004) considers that there are three 
important categories of risk that impact the way in which finance relates to economic 
development: cross-sectional risk diversification, intertemporal risk sharing, and 
liquidity risk.  
The discussion on cross-sectional diversification relies on classical reckoning 
that financial intermediaries provide the tools for diversification in the investors’ quest 
for risk mitigation.  This process drives attention to riskier, high-return projects, which 
receive financing exactly due to this phenomenon hence producing beneficial effects for 
the whole economy in the sense that they encourage growth by means of 
implementation of technological innovations (Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Patrick, 1966; 
Greenwood and Jovanovic, 1990; Saint-Paul 1992; Devereux and Smith, 1994; and 
Obstfeld, 1994).  One example of note is the modeling structure proposed by Acemoglu 
and Zilibotti (1997) which shows that, starting from the assumption of risk aversion 
which usually usually characterises providers of capital, diversification positively 
impacts on economic growth by widening the range of productive activities and thus 
reducing the impact of a negative shock impacting on any one industry.  The stimulation 
of innovative activity is mentioned and supported by King and Levine (1993b).  
Besides cross-sectional risk diversification, financial systems may improve 
intertemporal risk sharing.  Allen and Gale (1997) investigated the opportunity of risk 
mitigation in a cross-generations investment.  Their findings are that long-lived 
intermediaries can facilitate intergenerational risk sharing by investing with a long-run 
perspective thus offering returns that are relatively low in boom times, and relatively 
high in slack times.  
The last type of risk that is mentioned by Levine (2004) is liquidity risk. He 
mentions that “Liquidity is seen as the cost and speed with which agents can convert 
financial instruments into purchasing power at agreed prices.  Risk in this area is created 
by the uncertainties associated with converting assets into a medium of exchange”. (pp 
692.) 
In fact, the existence of high liquidity is required for the provision of capital to 
projects which require long-term capital commitment.  Usually these projects are the 
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ones that are mostly revolutionary in terms of technological innovation with 
characteristics similar to laboratories or research and development units.  The 
possibility to transform ownership of these long-lived projects into cash (the exit 
facility) encourages investors to include those projects offering higher expected returns 
in their diversified portfolios thus providing the necessary long-term capital.  The 
existence of financial intermediaries facilitates this outcome. 
One aspect of research in this area refers to the modeling trials of savers that are 
facing two investment alternatives – a relatively low return project, which is liquid and 
quite certain, and a relatively high-return project which is less liquid and more 
uncertain.  The inducement of uncertainty by the use of probabilistic shocks that is 
meant to create a risky environment shows that liquid projects are usually preferred.  
The work of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) who evolved the model, assumes that 
information about the shocks received by other individuals is prohibitively costly 
implying that agents cannot verify whether other agents received shocks.  It is this 
which generates the need for operational financial markets.  The extension of the model 
provided by Levine (1991) and further extended by Bencivenga, Smith, and Starr 
(1995) provides an environment in which markets (secondary markets in the latter 
paper) exist and show that agents do not question the existence of shocks that impact on 
other agents.  The conjecture produced by the latter paper illustrates how the reduction 
of trading costs in the secondary market increases the probability of success of longer-
run projects by ensuring access to capital. 
Hedging against liquidity risk is important to commercial banks that construct 
diversified portfolios aimed at achieving an optimal mix of liquid and illiquid 
investments.  They therefore have an incentive to promote high-return less liquid 
investments which generate growth in the long-run and promote economic 
development.   
 Mobilise and pool savings 
Another benefit of a functioning financial system deals with the power of 
pooling funds to be invested in diversified portfolios with a  reduced burden caused by 
transaction costs and informational asymmetry problems.  Levine (2000) shows that a 
better financial system helps to encourage increased savings, the exploitation of 
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economies of scale and provides incentives to overcome the problem of investment 
indivisibilities.  In this way, the collected funds can be used to invest in high cost 
projects that can attract resources by syndicated loans and may induce technological 
innovations and newly developed products.  
Levine (2004) investigates the importance of trust that investors need to have in 
financial intermediaries for them to develop their activities.  Similarly, as shown by 
Boyd and Smith (1992), the concentration of funds depends on the ability 
of ’mobilisers’ to convince savers of the soundness of their investments.  The 
relationship with economic growth follows the same root as arguments mentioned in the 
previous sections, respectively the fact that large productive projects that require long-
term financing cannot be developed without the possibility of access to large pools of 
capital developed by groups of sound financial intermediaries.  The benefit of such a 
pool of funds is twofold – on the one hand households are provided with investment 
vehicles for longer periods of time and new financial instruments are created, and on the 
other hand high innovative long-term projects have access to resources that are needed 
for their development.  The result is that economic growth is encouraged in those 
economies that succeed in mobilising funds on a sufficiently large scale to facilitate 
growth. 
The importance of savings is also highlighted in many other papers as the main 
engine driving the development of stock markets. Wright, Chrisney and Vives (1995) 
argue that in Latin American markets, savings are a lower percentage of GDP than in 
the Asian countries. They further argue that capital markets encourage household 
savings as well as a switch from real assets to financial assets. The provision of new 
financial assets can reduce risk and encourage longer term investments and this is also 
likely to lead to increased private sector savings. 
 
 Ease the exchange of goods and services 
Economies exist to facilitate exchange and the more efficiently this takes place, 
the more economies will grow.  One model built on the connections between exchange, 
specialisation and innovation is that of Greenwood and Smith (1996) who argue that 
increased specialisation requires an increased volume of transactions the costs of which 
65 
 
are instrumental for the success of specialisation and increased productivity.  The model 
assumes that lower transaction costs do not directly stimulate the appearance of new 
production technologies, but expand the set of opportunities and define better levels of 
the market with respect to the ability to generate more specialised production processes.  
There is a wide consensus among researchers that sustained economic growth 
requires more, rather than less, macroeconomic stability.  Even though the financial 
system might be supposed to produce stability through optimal risk allocation that is 
meant to protect the whole economy from shocks in the dynamics of economic 
variables, there is a stream of literature including, for example, Easterly, Islam and 
Stiglitz (2000), that documents the tendency of the financial system to offer 
opportunities for speculation and bubbles that can increase volatility and in so doing 
increase the probability of financial crises.  The experience of the last 20 years in 
emerging markets shows that contagion may impair economic performance if 
integration is not accompanied by proper development of domestic financial markets.  
Indeed one important aspect of the development of financial markets quoted in the 
literature is that financial innovation is usually faster than the infrastructure created for 
market surveillance and this is true of  developed, as well as developing, financial 
markets.  This provides a source of on-going risk that cuts right across all financial 
markets as innovation and the search for profitable opportunities encourages 
developments that precede and necessitate surveillance and regulation.   
2.4 The Role of the Financial System in Supporting Stock Market Development 
The development of sound financial markets goes hand in hand with the 
development of stock markets because private firms cannot grow without financial 
intermediaries to support their activities.  Moreover, settlement of stock market 
transactions would be impossible without a functioning banking system.  In this context, 
using data from 44 industrial and developing countries from 1976 to 1993, Demirguc-
Kunt and Levine (1996) investigate the relationship between stock market development 
and financial intermediary development and find that the countries with better 
developed stock markets also have better developed financial intermediaries. Thus, they 
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conclude that stock market development goes hand-in-hand with financial intermediary 
development with the combined result leading to greater growth of a nation’s economy 
The issue is therefore how to develop a financial system that facilitates and 
supports economic growth in the context of financial stability.  Historically, many 
financial crises have involved bank failures that stemmed from poor regulation and 
supervision.  Financial stability is synonymous with a reduction of volatility in the main 
economic variables including interest rates, exchange rates and, of course, stock prices, 
by creating an environment in which the failure of financial institutions is less likely.  
An event such as a run on a bank could quickly develop into a systemic crisis through 
contagion with potentially serious consequences for economic growth.  There are, 
however, disagreements over how to sequence financial sector development in 
developing countries.  Lin et al (2009), argue that these countries should make the first 
step the creation of domestic financial institutions in the form of small banks that could 
help small-scale manufacturing firms which form the bulk of firms in poorer countries.  
Lin et al (op cit) further argue that the size and sophistication of the financial 
institutions from the developed countries may not be appropriate for the low-income 
countries and advise local governments to resist the temptation of building ‘modern’ 
stock markets in the early period of their country’s development. However, as noted 
below, there are many academics who disagree with this view. 
Banerjee (2015) finds no evidence that, unlike domestic banks, foreign banks 
contribute to economic growth and also that, as expected, neither does he find evidence 
of the failure of big financial institutions to be too detrimental for the economy.  Still, 
he points to the fact that small banks may not be able to build portfolios of credits that 
allow for the financing of riskier projects, while the stock markets, by the power of 
diversification, are more likely to achieve this.  However, the efforts required for the 
implementation of a securities market, at least in terms of regulation and creation of 
supervisory bodies might not be compensated by the benefits of the presumably 
functioning stock market. Moss et al (2007) find that stock markets might not be able to 
provide capital in poorer countries and that local financial institutions might more 
suitably provide this.  On the other hand they argue that the choice between local banks 
versus stock markets is not actually what governments in these countries are facing.  
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Instead, it should be their objective to create the legal and financial framework 
necessary to promote access to credit in appropriate cases for firms seeking funding.  
They also note that stock markets are helpful in promoting stock market development in 
emerging economies by allowing individuals to participate in privatisations, as well as 
offering multinationals the opportunity to list their local subsidiaries.  
Singh (1997) also finds that the existence of a functioning local banking system 
plays an important role in generating growth for a developing country, while stock 
markets continue to represent only a small part of the financial system.  However, when 
dealing with the problem of promoting small banks as a solution for the development of 
financial markets, she also thinks that the size of financial institutions might affect the 
optimal allocation of capital as small banks are usually very much exposed to local 
shocks which confers on them a fragility that keeps them away from the financing of 
riskier firms or new projects.  As a consequence, she proposes a two-tier banking 
system intended to achieve the goal of optimal financing within the economy. The first 
layer would consist of small financial organisations like banks and microfinance 
institutions that cover the needs of ‘subsistence’ entrepreneurs.  The second layer would 
comprise larger banks that would serve the ‘transformational entrepreneurs’, that is, 
economic agents with the potential to create jobs and hence to grow into large scale 
organisations. The difference between the two types of entrepreneur resides in their 
different propensities to take risks and their financing needs. The ‘transformational’ 
entrepreneurs are businesses that may need more sophisticated financing tools that 
could only be provided by financial institutions of an appropriate size. 
Another perspective on this matter is provided by Beck et al (2009) who 
consider that there is enough evidence for the structure of the financial systems in 
developed countries not to be replicated as such in the developing economies.  In fact, 
the appropriate form of this system is dependent on the particular conditions existing in 
the country such as the legal and political systems, as well as the type of economic 
activities prevailing in the economy.  On the other hand, Beck et al (op cit) consider that 
the focus should not be on the form of financing techniques or the size of the businesses 
that are providing the capital, but on the formation of an environment that allows for 
competition among financial institutions to encourage useful credit risk and liquidity 
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services to the ’real’ economy.  One important issue that is added here is the decision to 
make small banks in the USA the mainstay of the financial system in the first three 
quarters of the twentieth century and the lessons this process may provide.  Thus Beck 
et al (op cit) show that the policy of restricting banks from establishing branch networks 
with a view to creating lots of small banks and limiting the emergence of large banks 
generated local banking monopolies that impeded the entrance of newcomers and 
reduced the efficiency of credit allocation thereby slowing economic growth.  Local 
banks have the obvious advantage of possessing better knowledge of local firms (which 
in the case of local monopolies could also inhibit the activities of some, not preferred, 
companies) but larger banks are known to have proprietary scoring processes that gives 
them the power to diversify risks and this facilitates access to capital for even the most 
risky projects. Another conjecture deals with the fact that surveillance of large banks 
might be difficult due to their sophistication, but, on the other hand, in the case of small 
banks the process of surveillance could be problematical because of their number – 
regulators sometimes have to rely on statistical sampling in order to draw conclusions 
about the whole system. 
Zingales (2009) also provides analyses concerning the priority of the types of 
financial intermediaries to receive attention from policy makers.  His arguments follow 
the lines already mentioned by approving the improper extrapolation of the structures 
found in the developed economies to the low income countries, but he also highlights 
the difficulties of creating the legal and political infrastructure that securities markets 
require.  Because of this he proposes the creation of a sound foundation for the banking 
sector, but that this ought to take place within an environment that should also serve as a 
basis for the development of stock markets which would normally be expected to 
happen later on and be triggered by economic growth.  However, he considers that the 
present needs of an emerging market economy are better answered by the development 
of a fragmented banking system founded on the grounds of better knowledge of the 
local specifics of economic activities.  He argues that large State-owned banks are 
usually a major barrier to this achievement as they control the territory and maintain 
political consensus. 
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Another conjecture on this topic is provided by Thoma (2009) who is also in 
favour of developing small banks and microfinance companies, but also highlights the 
fact that these companies need more sophisticated financial products and services, 
including hedging instruments such as hedging price risks through futures markets, 
insuring against crop failures, purchasing farm equipment through pooling 
arrangements and managing seasonality problems. Small banks can also help in 
achieving these objectives due to their local knowledge, and can also overcome issues 
like the lack of history and information on the existence and use of the more 
sophisticated products.  On the other hand, Khwaja (2009) argues that the theoretical 
arguments that small firms succeed better in providing capital to the small companies 
because their knowledge does not wipe out the possibility for large financial institutions 
to achieve the same goal.  The empirical evidence shows that small banks usually have 
small clients, but this may be due to the fact that larger institutions have already 
attracted the larger, more reliable, borrowers. Therefore, in cases where the larger banks 
are absent, smaller banks will be able to attract these clients.  Khwaja (op cit) also 
argues that higher growth countries may create room for more banks in the sense that 
growth will produce an increase in the small bank industry and not that the existence of 
these banks will necessarily create growth.  
Looking at Latin American markets, Wright, Chrisney and Vives (1995) provide 
a structural framework for capital markets existing in the emerging markets in general.  
This framework is summarised as follows: 
 The need for complete markets. Financial markets should meet the needs of 
the real economy and this includes the provision of a wide range of choices 
available to investors.  
 The need for many maturities, from overnight to long term instruments at 
both fixed and variable rates. This can generate a longer yield curve which is 
necessary for the implementation of monetary policy, as well as for risk 
management purposes at the microeconomic level. 
 The need to provide for the temporary placement of funds through the 
operation of effective money markets. The creation of a large selection of 
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commercial paper will help alleviate the working capital problems of firms 
in an effective manner. 
 The need for listing.  Equity markets are usually characterised by reluctance 
of closely held companies to divulge information to the public and an 
unwillingness to dilute voting power and control of the firm.  However, the 
need for an exit mechanism for investors highlights the importance of listing. 
Historically bank based measures were used as key indicators to measure the 
relationship between finance and economic growth, but the focus has slowly shifted to 
stock market indicators. Levine and Zervos (1998) argue that well developed stock 
markets are able to offer different kinds of financial services than the banking system 
and may therefore provide a real alternative for investment and growth than that offered 
by a developed banking system. They specifically mention that increased stock market 
capitalisation might improve an economy’s ability to mobilise capital and diversify risk.  
Levine and Zervos (1998) further demonstrate that various measures of equity market 
activity are positively correlated with measures of real activity across different countries 
and that the association is especially strong in  developing countries. Using cross 
country regressions and data for 41 countries for the period 1976-93, Levine and Zervos 
(1998) conclude that after controlling for initial conditions and various economic and 
political factors, the measures of banking and stock market development are robustly 
correlated with the current and future rate of economic growth, capital accumulation 
and productivity improvements.  Atje and Jovanovic (1993) using a similar approach 
also find a significant correlation between economic growth and the value of stock 
market trading relative to GDP. 
Recent sustained economic growth in Eastern European Countries is shown to 
be driven both by capital accumulation and total factor productivity changes, with the 
latter making a major contribution. (Arratibel, Heinz, Martin, Przybyla, Rawdanowicz, 
Serafini and Zumer, 2007) In a setting characterised by deep product and labor market 
reforms, enterprise privatisation and banking sector restructuring and by increasing 
international trade and financial integration, strong FDI inflows are not surprisingly 
found to have played a primary role in boosting productivity and sustaining long-term 
economic growth. 
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Whilst earlier research often stressed the role of the banking sector in economic 
growth, in the past two and a half decades stock markets surged and the share of the 
emerging markets in total worldwide market capitalisation has increased considerably.  
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), Singh (1997), Levine and Zervos (1998), and 
Garcia and Liu (1999) find that stock market development plays an important role in 
predicting future economic growth. It is an integral part of a well functioning financial 
system and in this chapter we look at the development of these markets in CEE 
countries by analysing certain key indicators. 
Levine (1997) and Liu (1998) show that indirect finance provided through the 
financial intermediaries is many times more important in raising capital than raising 
direct finance through the financial markets, especially in developing countries. 
However, most of this evidence is based on bank based measures of financial 
development and the emphasis has subsequently shifted in favour of stock market 
indicators due to the increasing role of stock markets in emerging economies. For 
example, Atje and Javanovic (1993), Garcia and Liu (1999), Levine and Zervos (1998) 
and Singh (1997) show that stock market development is positively and robustly 
associated with long-run economic growth. 
2.5 The Importance of Privatisation 
It is generally acknowledged that privatisation of both large scale and small 
scale enterprises is an essential part of the transition process, along with the creation of 
an organised market to facilitate post privatisation share trading (EBRD, 1998, Young 
and Reynolds, 1995).  The ability to transfer title to ownership of existing securities is 
important in allowing securities markets to function effectively.  It is also important in 
promoting a climate likely to encourage secondary issues of securities and ultimately in 
stimulating the development of a market for corporate control (Young and Reynolds 
1995). 
The general pattern followed was to incorporate the operating procedures of 
stock markets from  the developed economies including, as soon as feasibly possible, an 
electronic order book which matches buy and sell trades as a continuous process.  The 
ultimate aim was to open up newly created stock markets to competition and this was 
72 
 
impossible until, among other developments, comparable procedures were in place and 
operating efficiently.  Markets in developed economies were already opened up to 
competition, listing of overseas companies and unrestricted trading by foreign nationals. 
Competition unleashes powerful forces that shape institutions subjected to them and to 
all intents and purposes stock markets in developed countries have become global stock 
markets rather than simply national stock markets.  The absence of the same 
competitive forces in the newly created stock markets in the transition economies meant 
that, initially at least, they would never function in anything like the same way as stock 
markets in developed countries.  However, it also became quickly apparent that 
problems emerge when market regulators try to impose a structure that has worked well 
in other countries and in effect try to regulate a stock market into existence. 
Stock markets in the transition economies were created as a consequence of the 
privatisation programmes inituiated in these economies.  Table 2.1 shows the methods 
used to privatize assets in CEE countries. 
Table 2.1 Origins of Stock Markets in the Transition Economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe 
 
Mandatory Listing after 
new Privatisations 
Voluntary Initial Public 
Offerings 
Mandatory Listing of 
Minority Packages during 
Privatisation 
Bulgaria Estonia Poland 
Czech Republic Latvia - 
Lithuania Hungary - 
Romania Poland - 
Slovak Republic Slovenia - 
 
Source: Claessens et al (2000) 
In the first group are stock markets created to transfer ownership rights among 
investors who received assets under the mass privatisation programmes.  It was 
envisaged that in this group there would be a rapid transfer of ownership and so little 
was done to put in place a strong regulatory framework so as not to impede the transfer 
of assets.  Most of the markets were small in terms of capitalisation and since, in 
general, companies in the first group had no immediate intention of raising equity funds, 
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few showed any interest in the possible implications of a stock exchange listing such as 
increased access to risk capital 
.  At first these markets listed a large number of stocks, but in the event many of 
these proved to be rather illiquid and were quickly de-listed.  There are several other 
reasons why companies were de-listed and these are summarised by Claessens et al 
(2000): “First, by listing on stock markets, corporations were less likely to avoid paying 
taxes.  Second, the cost of external credit was quite high relative to the cost of bank 
credit.  This was especially the case where large firms could lobby politicians for 
directed credit. Finally, the disclosure requirements of listed companies made it harder 
for corporations to conduct non-market based transactions.”  (pp 8)  Notwithstanding 
this, once the markets became more established through transactions on the exchanges, 
the number of stockholders fell and ownership became more concentrated. 
The second group started with a small number of stocks and certainly far fewer 
than the number which became available under the mass privatisation programmes.  All 
of the stocks in the second group were offered in traditional ways using IPOs.  
However, in this case, the number of stocks available for trade quickly increased as 
more corporations sought and were granted a listing.   
Poland alone is in the third category, not because it is the only transition 
economy that could fit into this group but because it is the only CEE country in this 
group and it is these countries that are the focus of our attention in this thesis.  Countries 
in this group had a mass privatisation programme and the plan was to develop the 
privatisation programme and the stock market in parallel.  Again the number of 
companies initially listed was far below the numbers listed under the mass privatisation 
programs, but over time the number of companies listed rose steadily. 
A number of studies use aggregate data to assess the effect of privatisation on 
economic performance. Using data from developing, as well as developed nations, 
Plane (1997) finds that privatisation has a significant positive effect on economic 
growth. Davis, Ossowski, Richardson and Barnett (2000) carried out an empirical 
investigation of the relationship between privatisation and measures of fiscal 
performance. Using macroeconomic and privatisation data from 18 countries, they find 
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that when privatisation proceeds are transferred to the budget, they tend to be saved and 
used to reduce domestic financing. 
Remarkable differences exist across the transition economies in the strategy of 
privatising large and medium-sized firms. Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar (2008) 
mention that Poland and Slovenia moved slowly in privatising State-owned enterprises, 
relying instead on ‘commercialisation’ where firms remained state-owned but were run 
by somewhat independent appointed supervisory boards rather than directly by the 
State; and on the creation of new private firms. Estonia and Hungary proceeded 
effectively with privatisation of individual State-owned enterprises by selling them one 
by one to outside owners which provided much-needed managerial skills and external 
funds for investment in the privatised firms. 
As Table 2.1 above shows, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Romania 
and the Slovak Republic opted for rapid mass privatisation gaining the advantage of 
speed, but it  led to poor corporate governance as the existing management were 
unwilling to improve efficiency. (Svenjar, 2002)  As part of this process, the Czech 
Republic, Lithuania and, to a lesser extent, the Slovak Republic carried out equal-access 
voucher privatisation whereby a majority of shares of most firms were distributed to 
citizens at large.  While this approach may have been more egalitarian and one of the 
best in terms of speed, it did not generate new investment funds.  (Svenjar 2002.)  Nor 
did it bring revenue to the government. Instead, it resulted in dispersed ownership of 
shares and, together with a weak legal framework; it simply resulted in poor corporate 
governance. The poor corporate governance often permitted managers or majority 
shareholders to appropriate profit or even assets of the firms at the expense of minority 
shareholders. (Svenjar, 2002) 
2.6 Factors Impacting on Stock Market Development in Transition Economies 
The literature on stock market development in transition economies has 
identified several factors that promote stock market development.  In a detailed account 
by Levine and Zevros (1998) several factors are set out as crucial in encouraging stock 
market development.  We discuss each in turn.  
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2.6.01 Macroeconomic Stability 
Macroeconomic stability generally, and, in particular, relatively low inflation are 
very important in promoting stock market development. In times of relatively rapid 
inflation, investors might well prefer to invest in property or foreign currency as these 
provide a superior store of value (Boyd, Levine and Smith, 2000). Alternatively, if 
inflation pushes up the return on bonds as the Fisher effect implies, funds will be 
diverted away from stocks into bonds which will provide more certain protection than 
the risky environment of equity returns since high rates of inflation might force other, 
potentially healthy firms, to close because of rising costs.  It is clear from Table 1.1 that, 
to a greater or lesser extent, the former transition economies of CEE experienced a 
collapse of output at the start of transition and, as table 1.2 illustrates, this was 
accompanied by chronic levels of inflation unimaginable in developed economies.  
These are not macroeconomic conditions that are most likely to favour stock market 
growth and development.  However, by the late 1990s, as Tables 1.1 and 1.2 illustrate, 
the countries of CEE were experiencing positive rates of growth of GDP and for most, 
inflation was down to single digit figures.  Even those still experiencing relatively high 
rates were experiencing a downward trajectory of inflation.   
 In the earlier part of the 90s, the relatively high rate of inflation left real 
returns on stock market investments in negative territory after adjusting for risk.  Of all 
the CEE countries only Hungary and Slovenia offered investors higher returns than 
those from bank deposits between 1994-99, and only in Hungary did stock market 
returns categorically outperform the return on bank deposits.  In Bulgaria, the Czech 
Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and the Slovak Republic, bank deposits yielded a 
positive, but relatively low, annual return of about two per cent in real terms. (Claessens 
et al (2000).   
2.6.02 The Legal Environment 
Another factor of major importance in stock market development is the degree 
of shareholder protection since investors will be more confident that they will not be the 
victims of some fraudulent activity or other schemes designed to unwittingly separate 
them from their savings.  Instead, they are likely to be more confident and willing to 
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accept risk because they will be protected by laws relating to securities and companies 
(Schleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
Zalewska (2008) addresses the questions about whether the emerging markets 
will ever mature, when this might happen and what the dependent factors are. She 
argues that the long-run growth of markets is strongly correlated with the development 
of the rule of the law and a country’s ability to implement it. Monitoring, regulation, 
and shareholder protection are all vital for securing efficiency of stock market 
operations and trading, and as a result to secure a lower investment risk environment. 
Emerging markets are particularly weak in this regard. There is a strong negative 
correlation between a country’s level of economic development measured in terms of its 
national wealth, and the extent of lawlessness in that country. Countries that suffer from 
corruption, poor efficiency of governmental institutions and officials, political 
instability, etc., are those that remain poor. In consequence, the development of stock 
markets in such countries is hampered and may not be possible at all. 
It is difficult to find an objective measure of the extent of a country’s 
lawlessness as there are many aspects to it, and these are themselves often difficult to 
measure since, by their very nature, they are secretive and concealed.  Zalewska (2008) 
presents six possible measures (voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption) for the eight 
geographical groups of countries globally distinguishing between countries that have 
developed stock markets, emerging stock markets and those that do not have stock 
markets. The results provide evidence of substantial differences between the developed 
stock markets and stock markets in emerging economies.  Across all four regions that 
have developed stock markets, the average scores of the developed markets in these 
regions are positive. In contrast, the emerging markets are negative with the exception 
of Central and Eastern Europe and the Caribbean. The overwhelming conclusion is that 
the emerging markets require clear regulatory characteristics and that this requirement 
needs be taken into account when the financial systems are designed and developed. 
One of the main arguments in favour of regulation is the fact that investors tend 
to prefer companies that are monitored by regulatory bodies whether these are self-
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organised or initiated by government action. This assertion comes probably from the 
hard reasoning that it is better to invest in companies that comply with some rules and 
fill reports, than with those that do not.  When monitoring is provided by government 
bodies, this argument also implies that in the event of failure there is a higher 
probability of State intervention than otherwise might be the case. In this context, 
Claessens, Lee, Zechner (2003) consider the EBRD index of financial regulation and 
effectiveness and argue that the four countries with the highest regulation indices in the 
Central and Eastern European region (Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia)  saw an 
increase of 52% in the number of firms listed between 1996 and 2002. They also saw an 
increase in their market capitalisation of 191%.  At the other end of the spectrum, the 
four countries with the lowest scores (Latvia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, and the 
Slovak Republic) experienced a decrease in the number of firms listed by 31%, and an 
increase in market capitalisation of only 11%. Notwithstanding these findings, the 
authors do not conclude that regulation necessarily generates the kind of development 
reported above since many factors impact on the dynamics and regulation is simply one 
of them. 
Poor protection of investor rights is reported by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) as a 
factor discouraging the development of financial intermediation in any country. They 
further argue that this is a consequence of the civil law type of legal system existing in 
the emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe which has determined the 
concentration of company ownership structures and given insufficient legal protection 
to minority shareholders.  On the other hand, Glaeser et al. (2000) favour the 
enforcement of strong independent government regulations to be used as compensation 
for a weak and ineffective legal system arguing that the Polish regulatory body turned 
out to be more effective than the more liberal approach adopted in the Czech Republic.  
Pistor et al. (2000), Berglof and Bolton (2002) also find that weak development of 
capital markets in transition economies is caused by poor law enforcement, rather than 
the existence of inappropriate legislation. 
Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) show that weak corporate governance in 
transition economies cannot be solved simply by radical improvements in the legal 
framework for the protection of shareholder and creditor rights. Legal reforms in these 
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areas are impressive and, indeed, many of the countries of the former Soviet Union 
which received legal technical assistance from the US can boast higher levels of 
investor rights than either France or Germany. However, it is unlikely that in the 
immediate post 2000 period, future development of the law will be matched by the 
development of financial markets and the absence of effective legal institutions will 
provide an effective constraint on enforcement of the law. 
The main conclusion of Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) is that legal 
effectiveness has overall much greater explanatory power for the level of equity and 
credit market development, than the technical quality of the law on the statute books. 
Previous research by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) shows that 
effective law enforcement does not compensate for low quality of the law. The evidence 
produced by Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) demonstrates that the reverse is also true: 
high quality laws are not a substitute for weak institutions that are unable to enforce the 
law effectively.  
The authors also show that history (or heritage) is also important for the 
effectiveness of legal institutions. They argue that the low levels of legal effectiveness 
seem to be rooted in lack of legal modernisation in pre-Soviet Russia, even though there 
is wide agreement that legal reforms matter. The reforms that were enforced in the inter-
war period set the stage for some legal institutions that continue to function even now. 
This implies that differences between countries that succeeded in laying foundations for 
a modern legal order in those years, and those that have never been exposed to this kind 
of modernisation, cannot be eliminated by issuance of laws of good quality.   
2.6.03 Institutional Investors 
Stock market development is impossible without the emergence of institutional 
investors such as investment and mutual funds, pension funds and insurance companies 
because of the funds they make it possible for firms to raise.  However, at the outset of 
transition, institutional investors were small in size and number compared to the 
financial sector in developed economies.  Indeed, the activities of institutional investors 
involved the creation of new sectors in the emerging transition economies. Institutional 
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investors were therefore relatively small participants in stock market activities at the 
outset of transition.  
 Of the three types of institutional investor identified above, the largest and 
most important in transition economies were the mutual funds.  Investment funds 
mainly emerged as a consequence of the mass privatisation funds used to transfer 
ownership of assets during privatisation.  Basically voucher privatisation kick started 
industry development by calling overnight for the creation of voucher investment funds. 
In the initial years of transition however, these hastily formed investment funds were 
only lightly regulated. This created room for abuse of small shareholders, but also 
encouraged stock market growth.  However, as the stock market grew, regulatory 
reform quickly followed in order to increase investor confidence.  Further impetus was 
given to establishing sound regulations in those countries that applied for EU 
membership in order to comply with various EU directives such as those dealing with 
governance, traqnsparency and so on. Table 2.2 gives some relevant information on the 
size of the different groups of institutional investor in 2000. 
Table 2.2: Assets (% of GDP) Held by Institutional Investors in the 
Transition Economies of CEE in 2000. 
 
Country Investment 
and Mutual 
Funds 
Pension 
Funds 
Insurance Total 
Bulgaria 5 0 1 6 
Czech Republic 8 2 9 19 
Estonia 5 0 3 8 
Hungary 12 4 3 19 
Latvia 5 0 1 6 
Lithuania 6 0 0 6 
Poland 8 2 5 15 
Romania 8 0 0 8 
Slovak Republic 6 0 4 10 
Slovenia 5 0 4 9 
 
Source; Claessens et al (2000) 
Table 2.2 shows that even by 2000, institutional investors did not play a large 
part in stock market activity compared with say the UK where institutional investors 
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held stock market assets to the value of 250 per cent of GDP.  Table 2.2 also shows that 
of all three classes of institutional investor, investment and mutual funds were 
overwhelmingly the more important in every transition economy in 2000.  Pension 
funds were the next most important group of institutional investor, though they were 
significantly less important than investment and mutual funds.  Hungary had the largest 
pension fund sector in 2000 in terms of GDP, but even here this group of institutional 
investors only accounted for 4 per cent of GDP in 2000 - despite a funded occupational 
pension scheme being introduced seven years earlier in 1993.  For comparison, the same 
group in the UK accounted for assets with a value of 10 per cent of GDP in 2000.  
Nevertheless, this category of institutional investor might be expected to grow rapidly 
as transition gathers momentum because many governments in transition economies are 
committed to giving tax incentives to encourage savers to participate in private pension 
schemes which take decades to build in size.   
The insurance industry in transition economies in 2000 developed later than 
other institutional investors.  This group of institutional investor was therefore the least 
significant in terms of the value of assets held of all the three groups.  A notable 
exception was the Czech Republic where the insurance market was relatively well 
developed.  It was also, however, dominated by foreign companies!  Ironically, progress 
in developing the insurance market was, in part, due to its success in being established.  
Indeed an major constraint on growth of the insurance market in transition economies 
was their vulnerability to competition from larger international competitors which were 
able to charge lower premiums in order to gain market share.  This, of course might not 
be relevant if foreign owned companies were willing to invest in firms to the same 
extent as domestic insurance companies. 
The emergence of a class of institutional investors is important in the 
development of stock markets for several reasons.  One important reason is that they 
usually have more funds than smaller investors which enables them to press for the 
lowest possible transactions costs thereby boosting liquidity in terms of equity turnover 
in the market.  (Bloomesteine, 1998) The effect of this is to reduce the cost of capital 
which will increase access to capital for liquidity constrained firms. Institutional 
investors, because of their power, are also likely to be instrumental in establishing and 
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promoting sound standards of corporate governance.  As Cvetanovic (2006) puts it “As 
large and diversified investors with strong preference orientation, they have the 
potential and incentive to press for value maximising firm governance” (pp2). 
Claessens et al (2000) analysed the importance of each of the factors impacting 
on stock market development discussed above.  To do this, they constructed time series 
data for the period 1994-99 for market capitalisation, market turnover, inflation, 
institutional assets and minority shareholder protection.  The main findings of Claessens 
et al (2000) are that “The simple correlation coefficients among these variables suggest 
that market capitalisation is positively correlated with single digit inflation, the size of 
institutional investor assets, and high shareholder protection – and is negatively 
correlated with triple digit inflation and low shareholder protection.  Market turnover is 
positively related to the size of institutional investor assets and is negatively related to 
triple digit inflation and low shareholder protection.  The correlation coefficients are all 
significant at the 5 per cent level.” (pp 11) 
Other studies have also confirmed the importance of the institutional framework 
and have focused on the importance of creditor rights in developing banking systems 
which, by providing financial intermediation services have, among other things, 
enhanced investment and encouraged stock market growth in transition economies.  
(See for example, La Porta et al, 1999 and Levine et al, 2000.) 
2.6.04  Market Capitalisation 
Countries with better stock market fundamentals like a stable macro economy, 
better laws and accounting rules, stronger disclosure requirements and so on, generally 
have larger stock markets measured by market capitalisation as a share of GDP. Of all 
the CEE nations only three: the Czech Republic, Estonia and Hungary had capitalisation 
to GDP ratios comparable to those of other emerging markets as shown in Table 2.3. 
The United Kingdom and USA are included for comparison. 
  
82 
 
Table 2.3: Market Capitalisation in Transition Economies, 1994–2000 (Percentage of 
GDP). 
 Year 
Country 1994 1996 1998 2000 2004 2008 2012 
Bulgaria N/A N/A 8 5 10 31 14 
Czech Republic 14 31 21 25 19 27 18 
Estonia N/A 10 28 36 44 19 9 
Hungary 3 12 29 34 23 23 13 
Latvia 0 3 6 8 11 8 4 
Lithuania 1 11 10 11 23 16 10 
Poland 3 6 13 21 22 32 30 
Romania N/A N/A 3 2 10 11 11 
Slovak Republic 8 12 5 3 4 7 26 
Slovenia 4 4 13 12 26 40 15 
UK 16 137 161 166 116 95 113 
USA 74 101 151 147 126 110 108 
        
Note: Excludes over-the-counter (OTC) traded issues. 
Source: Claessens, S. Djankov, S. and Klingebiel, D. (2000) Stock Markets in Transition 
Economies, Financial Sector Discussion paper N0 5, World Bank  and Standard and Poor’s 
Global Stock Markets Fact Book 2002 and Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
2.6.05 Market Turnover and Growth 
Market turnover, defined as the value of trading over market capitalisation, is a 
very important indicator for measuring the effect of stock markets on growth (Levine 
and Zervos 1998). Among the transition economies of CEE, market turnover was 
highest in Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland in the early years of transition (See 
Table 2.4).  Overall, markets in transition economies were less liquid than stock markets 
in developed economies and these markets trail developed countries’ markets 
significantly. This lower market turnover can mostly be attributed to ownership 
concentration, a relatively limited free float of the currency, and the international cross 
listings among large firms. Stock markets in transition economies are dominated by a 
small number of firms. As a result, the high concentration of market turnover defined as 
turnover of the top 5 percent of listed firms as a percentage of total turnover was 
relatively high in most transition economies as at March 2000. Yet at an average of 75 
percent, it was similar to that of other stock markets. Poland was the least concentrated 
market in terms of turnover at about 40 percent as Table 2.4 shows.  
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Table 2.4: Market Turnover in Transition and Comparator Economies, 1994-2000 
(percentage of market capitalisation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The share for March 2000 was annualised under the assumption that the turnover for 
the last three quarters of the year will be the same as for the first quarter. 
Source: Stock exchange websites and information departments; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Levine 1999. 
2.6.06 Foreign Financing 
Many large, publicly listed companies in transition economies had sought equity 
financing abroad.  At the end of 1999, 72 corporations from transition economies had 
American depository receipts (ADRs) listed on the New York Stock Exchange or the 
Nasdaq, and 61 corporations from transition economies were listed in London. 
Corporations listed abroad (in New York, London, and Frankfurt) accounted for an 
average of 18 percent of domestic stock market capitalisation in transition economies in 
1999 (Claessens et al, 2000). In Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, and the Slovak Republic, 
companies listed abroad accounted for about one-third of domestic market 
capitalisation. On average by the mid 2000, the value of the shares traded abroad was 
almost half of the value traded on local markets and the number of shares traded abroad 
was twice as high as the number of shares traded locally. Incentives to list abroad are 
 Year 
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Bulgaria   3 0    
Czech Rep 6 3 0 7 7 1 
Estonia   9 8 8 4 
Hungary 2 7 2 6 12 3 
Latvia  2 5 5 4 1 
Lithuania  7.3  8 6 3 
Poland 77 2 5 8 4 2 
Romania   2 3 6 8 
Slovak Rep 6 9 34 9 4 8 
Slovenia 8 1 2 1 5 8 
United 
Kingdom 
8 8 7 4 3 2 
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particularly strong in transition economies as corporations have been able to attract 
more easily funds at lower costs and better terms, and have tapped into wider investor 
bases and investors have been able to acquire and sell shares at more liquid exchanges. 
(Black and Gilson, 1999) 
This offshore migration has been especially strong among larger corporations 
with relatively high market capitalisation and many of the firms listed abroad are 
involved in resource extraction or telecommunications. But new, internet-related firms 
have also listed and raised capital abroad, especially firms from the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. The disappearance of big companies that trade only domestically, deprived 
local exchanges of liquidity which must have adversely impacted on stock market 
development. (Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000) 
2.6.07 Market Liquidity 
Liquidity simply refers to the ease and cost with which investors can trade assets 
and the most liquid markets are those that provide ease of trade at relatively low cost.  
The costs of trading include transactions costs, the time it takes to execute the trade and 
the price impact of trades.  These are usually collectively referred to as execution costs 
and the role of market design is to create the conditions that most effectively encourage 
the emergence and spread of liquidity.  Technology is clearly important in promoting 
liquidity and different trading systems can dramatically alter the execution costs of 
trades.  Size is also important in promoting liquidity because increased trading volume 
lowers transactions costs.  However, volume is encouraged by the efficiency with which 
the price discovery mechanism discharges its role of accurately reflecting the true value 
of stock traded.   
The most widely quoted theoretical argument relating liquidity and market 
returns is usually referred to as the collateral-based view.  This view argues that a major 
fall in asset prices adversely affects the value of financial intermediaries’ capital and 
increases their margin calls.  The result is that financial intermediaries' are compelled to 
liquidate their positions, thereby inducing wider bid-ask spreads and increasing the 
price response to trading.     Since net withdrawals are a function of the intermediaries’ 
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performance, when the value of assets drop the short-term inflow of funds decreases 
forcing financial intermediaries to sell, adding to the price downturn, and generating a 
spiralling fall in some liquidity measures.  (See for example, Vayanos, 2004; and 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2007.)  It follows that market liquidity is closely related to 
intermediaries’ funding requirements, and this mutually reinforcing relation can 
generate sudden spikes in illiquidity indicators. While collateral-based theories assume 
that outside capital does not enter the market during downturns, fire-sale theories 
highlight precisely the role of outside capital: lower asset prices reward liquid outside 
buyers who profit from illiquid asset holders.  (See Acharya and Schaefer, 2006 for 
several explanations.)   Fire-sales (namely, forced wide-spread selling from distressed 
funds when investors redeem their capital en masse) put downward pressure on prices 
as outside buyers demanded additional compensation for providing liquidity. 
A large literature exists on the relationship between trading activity and stock 
market returns.  For example, Benston and Hagerman (1974); Gallant, Rossi and 
Tauchen (1992); Hiemstra and Jones (1994) Datar et al.1998 Lo and Wang (2000).  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) demonstrated that common stock with lower liquidity 
yielded a significantly higher average return after controlling for risk and other factors.  
Jones (2001) and Amihud (2002) show that time series expected return is an increasing 
function of liquidity that is proxied by turnover.  Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) find that 
expected returns are cross-sectionally related to liquidity risk.  Amihud and Mendelson 
(1986) illustrate that the relative spread on stocks is negatively correlated with liquidity 
characteristics such as trading volume, the numbers of shares outstanding, number of 
market markers trading the stock and the stock price continuity. They also demonstrated 
the importance of market microstructure factors as determinants of stock returns.  
However, microstructure also focussed on the type of trading mechanism adopted. 
Traditionally trading systems are either order-driven or quote-driven.  Order-driven 
systems allow the continuous interaction of buyers and sellers who post limit orders that 
are executed by computers matching buy and sell orders within each limit price 
category.  Quote-driven systems, on the other hand, provide liquidity through the 
actions of dealers who offer buy and sell quotes and in doing so, provide liquidity to the 
market. In general, order-driven systems have replaced quote-driven systems since, by 
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allowing customers to interact, they generally reduce execution costs and increase 
liquidity. 
The bid and ask spread as used by Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is now a well-
established measure of liquidity and transparency in the market.  Market volatility as 
measured by the absolute value of the contemporaneous market return is positively 
associated with changes in the bid-offer spread and market returns are negatively 
associated with changes in the bid-offer spread. (Cordial et al. 2001)  Chordia et. al. 
(2000) also demonstrate a strong cross-sectional relationship between dollar trading 
volume and various measures of bid-ask spread and market debt.   
The ability to create liquid markets is therefore one of the most important 
functions that stock markets provide.  Investors are generally reluctant to take on the 
risk involved with many potentially relatively high return projects which require long 
term commitment of capital thus giving rise to higher default and liquidity risks. 
Consequently, without liquid stock markets, these potentially relatively high return 
projects might not attract sufficient levels of investment. In contrast, liquid stock 
markets allow investors to change their portfolios quickly and relatively cheaply making 
investment less risky and thus facilitating more profitable investments. (Levine (1991) 
and Bencivenga, Smith and Starr (1996). 
Market liquidity is measured in two ways. First, the ratio of Value Traded (VT) 
to GDP which measures the value of equity transactions relative to the size of the 
economy (GDP) will be calculated. Secondly, the ratio of total value traded to total 
market capitalisation (MC) called turnover ratio. This measures the value of equity 
transactions relative to the size of the equity market. 
These two liquidity indicators do not directly measure how easily investors can 
buy and sell securities at posted prices. However, they do measure the degree of trading 
in comparison to the size of both the economy and the market. Therefore they positively 
reflect stock market liquidity on an economy wide and market wide basis. Moreover, 
these two measures complement each other. (Garcia and Liu, 1999)  The value traded 
(VT) to GDP ratio which indicates the size of the stock market relative to GDP has 
improved significantly in all the CEE countries except for the Slovak Republic for the 
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period considered. Not surprisingly, those countries with higher MC/GDP ratios are also 
the countries with better VT/GDP ratios. Turnover ratio is consistently higher for the 
nations of Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland over the three years 
2005-2008 which suggests that these markets are highly active.  Hungary alone stands 
out as a country which has a relatively large VT/GDP ratio at19.8% and also a relatively 
active Turnover ratio of 157.3% in 200,8 followed by the Czech Republic with a 
VT/GDP of 23%, and a Turnover ratio of 115.4%). 
2.6.08 Bond Markets 
To understand fully the development of stock markets in transition economies, 
we also need to understand the forces that shaped development of the bond markets in 
these countries.  Herring and Chatusripitak (2001) argue that there are several general 
reasons for developing debt markets as part of a process of stock market development.  
They argue that the most fundamental reason is to make financial markets more 
complete by generating market interest rates that reflect the opportunity cost of funds in 
each maturity and risk category.  This is essential for efficient investment and financing 
decisions. Moreover, the existence of tradable instruments aids risk management. If 
borrowers have available to them only a narrow range of instruments (eg in terms of 
maturity, currency, etc), they can be exposed to significant mismatches between their 
assets and their liabilities. If bond markets do not exist, for instance, firms may have to 
finance the acquisition of long-term assets by incurring short term debt (or raising 
equity). As a result, their investment policies may be biased in favour of short-term 
projects and away from entrepreneurial ventures. If firms attempt to compensate for the 
lack of a domestic bond market by borrowing in international bond markets, they may 
expose themselves to excessive foreign exchange risk.   
The risks entailed by such mismatches can only be minimised by the use of 
appropriate hedging mechanisms, the availability of which depends on the range of 
financial instruments actively traded on the stock markets. Liquid markets help financial 
market participants to hedge their exposures. As risks are spread across many 
participants and not concentrated on a few, and as risks can be transferred to entities 
best placed to bear them, the costs of intermediation are reduced and the financial 
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system, along with the corporate bodies that use the financial system, are, other things 
equal, likely to become more stable. 
A second general reason for developing bond markets is to avoid concentrating 
intermediation uniquely on banks. As seen in the recent financial crisis, highly 
leveraged banks make the economy more vulnerable to crises as the recovery process is 
lengthy and the damage caused to the real economy can last for years. 
A third general reason for fostering debt markets is that such markets can help 
the operation of monetary policy which relies heavily on indirect instruments of control 
like a well functioning money market which is essential for the smooth transmission of 
policy. In addition, prices in the long term bond market give valuable information about 
expectations of likely macroeconomic developments and about market reactions to 
monetary policy moves. 
The CEE region has well established government securities markets with all 
countries heavily dependent on public sector financial requirements of local 
governments. The same cannot be said of corporate securities markets which remain 
thin throughout most of the CEE region, even as late as 2008 when the outstanding 
stock of non-financial corporate debt securities as a percentage of GDP accounted for 
less in all countries of the region than the average Latin American and Asian Emerging 
markets - and these markets remain relatively small compared to developed economies. 
(Tovar, 2005, Yoshitomi and Shirai, 2001)  Furthermore, secondary corporate bond 
market activity is limited and even in countries where primary corporate issues have 
increased at faster rates in the past few years, growth has been concentrated in a handful 
of sectors such real estate, energy and the financial sector. The market for securities 
issued by financial institutions is somewhat deeper and expanding more rapidly than the 
nonfinancial corporate securities segment. 
Table 2.5 provides a summary of the listed bonds in the major CEE stock 
exchanges. It highlights an increase in the number of listed bonds. These bonds are 
mostly of domestic origin and international bonds play a relatively minor role except on 
the Prague Stock Exchange. 
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Table 2.5 Listed Bonds-Domestic 
 
 Domestic Public 
Sector 
Domestic Non-
Public Sector 
International 
 Year Year Year 
Exchange 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Bratislava 5 3 1 8 7 11 - - - 
Bucharest 1 4 4 - - - - - - 
Budapest 2 3 2 8 0 1 - - - 
Sofia - - - 5 4 5 - - - 
Ljubljana 9 7 5 7 2 4 - - - 
Prague 7 9 9 4 6 7 7 7 5 
Warsaw 8 1 7 - - - - - - 
 
Source: FESE, European Exchange Report, 2009 
2.6.09 Development of Local Markets in CEE Countries 
Governments play a key role in providing the necessary infrastructure to support 
the development of efficient and competitive capital markets, the core of which is 
providing and enforcing a strong legal framework to protect the rights of creditors and 
shareholders, and ensuring sufficiently high disclosure standards and quality of 
information, good governance of institutional investors, and support for private and 
public institutions (Claessens, Djankov and Klingebiel, 2000; Levine, Loayza and Beck, 
2000). This section describes government debt management policy which is very 
important for the development of a liquid and complete benchmark yield curve, the 
implementation of efficient and reliable trading, and payments and settlement systems, 
enforcement of law and regulations and the role of investors. 
Governments also play a crucial role in providing the infrastructure needed to 
facilitate the flow of information and the price discovery process in order to support the 
development of efficient and competitive capital markets.  Most of the countries in the 
CEE region now (2008) have adequate infrastructure for the trading of stocks.  Namely, 
electronic trading systems, delivery versus payment (DvP), clearing and settlement 
systems. (Iorgova and Ong, 2008) 
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Regarding the bond market, firm government commitment to a set of issuance 
policies, ensuring predictable supply of government securities led to the establishment 
of a liquid government benchmark yield curve. This in turn facilitates the pricing of 
corporate securities which is the case in the Czech Republic. (IMF, 2003) The lack of 
sophistication in pricing credit risk was a major constraint on the growth of local bond 
markets in CEE. As late as 2005, benchmark yield curves remained largely incomplete 
and illiquid in many CEE countries (Iorgova and Ong, 2008).  At this time, government 
bond issues were largely clustered around the 3 – 5 year tenure. A handful of countries, 
such as Bulgaria and Romania had issued bonds up to the 15 year mark, but in CEE 
only the Czech Republic and Poland had issued 30-year bonds by the end of 2005. In 
late 2007, the Czech Republic became the first country in the region to issue a 50 year 
bond. The issuance strategy in Poland had been designed to increase liquidity while also 
extending the maturity of the government debt market. The Hungarian Government on 
the other hand had focused its issuance strategy to bring its market practices more in 
line with the eurozone. This has now changed and, from 2012 onwards, the maturity of 
bonds issued in most CEE countries was broadly in line with maturities in more 
developed European markets. 
Lack of a credible credit rating system represents another barrier to the 
development of corporate bond markets in the region.  Moreover, even in countries 
where rating agencies exist, the credit rating culture for private bond issues remains 
weak. In Bulgaria, for instance, corporate bond issuers have not felt the need to acquire 
a credit rating thus far (as at 2006) partly due to the lack of corporate defaults. (Arvai 
and Herderschee, 2007) Thus, it is unclear to what extent regulations could induce the 
use of rating agencies, or whether their credit assessments would be useful in pricing or 
allocation decisions. (See also IMF, 2003) 
Decisions that are particularly relevant to the development of a primary market 
such as choice of auction techniques and set-up of primary dealer systems can define 
the operating efficiency of both the primary and the secondary markets which in turn 
impact on the price discovery process. By enhancing market credibility and ensuring 
liquidity in the secondary market, these decisions impact crucially on the 
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implementation and continuous enhancement of efficient and reliable trading, and 
payments and settlement systems. 
2.6.10 Institutional and Foreign Investors 
Institutional investors were defined earlier on page 39 as “Specialised financial 
institutions which manage savings collectively on behalf of small investors towards a 
specific objective in terms of acceptable risk, return maximisation and maturity of 
claims. (Davis, 1996: pp. 64) Their importance for stock market development has been 
supported by theoretical reasons and empirical evidence, which clearly implies that 
institutional investors have a nontrivial impact on the process of stock market 
development.  Bodie (1990), Davis (1996) and Vittas (1998) suggest that institutional 
investors may promote stock market development through functions such as clearing 
and settling payments, pooling of funds, transferring economic resources, managing 
uncertainty, controlling risk, introducing financial innovation, using price information, 
and dealing with incentive problems. These activities will encourage increased liquidity 
and market capitalisation and, through this, will encourage decreased price volatility 
and more efficient asset pricing.  It is also possible that increased international stock 
market integration will also be promoted thus improving institutional indicators of stock 
market development. This direction of causality from institutional investors to stock 
market development is referred to as the supply-led causality relationship. (Muslumov 
and Aras, 2005) 
The decade up to 2003 saw a significant increase in trading of securities both in 
domestic and international markets, and as a result more transactions needed to be 
settled.  However, increasingly more of these transactions needed international 
settlement. (Van Cayseele and Wuyts, 2005)  Generally the associated transactions costs 
are passed on to investors and according to NERA (2004) it was euro 0.10 per 
transaction in the United States while it ranged from euro 0.35 to 0.80 in CEE.  By 
adhering to the European code of conduct for clearing and settlement, institutional 
investors can help reduce these transaction costs. (Schaper, 2007) 
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Vittas (1998) finds that this causality is bidirectional since stock market 
development leads to the diversification of financial instruments, more financial 
stability and increased efficiency. These improvements increase demand for instruments 
of risk management, financial innovation, and portfolio management functions of 
institutional investors while institutional investors may support stock market 
development in the earlier stages.  However, stock market development feeds the 
development of institutional investors in the later stages of development 
As an investor class, foreign investors are also playing an increasingly important 
role in shaping capital market development in the region.  Investment by foreigners in 
the stock markets of CEE has generally been significantly low in the region when 
compared to the mature markets of Western Europe. As at 2007, the exceptions are 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic as Table 2.6 shows.  One reason for this might be 
their relatively low market capitalisation when compared to the more mature markets of 
Western Europe.  
Table 2.6: Foreign Investor Involvement (In Million $), 2007 
Country Portfolio 
Investment 
(PI) 
Market 
Capitalis
ation 
(MC) 
Percentage of 
Foreign 
Investment 
(PIMC) 
Bulgaria 4000 21793 18.35 
Czech 
Republic 
26158 73420 35.63 
Estonia 4965 6037 82.24 
Hungary 66811 47651 140.21 
Latvia 1517 3111 48.76 
Lithuania 5694 10134 56.19 
Poland 91812 207322 44.28 
Romania 8654 44952 19.26 
Slovak 
Republic 
8258 6971 118.46 
Slovenia 5638 28963 19.47 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008-2009, IMF World Economic Outlook  
Database 2009, IMF-Portfolio Investment: Coordinated Portfolio Investment  
Survey (CPIS) Data  
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Note that Portfolio Equity includes net inflows to equity securities other than 
those recorded as direct investment and includes shares, stocks, depository receipts, and 
direct purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors. FDI is net inflows 
of investment to acquire a lasting interest in, or management control over, an enterprise 
operating in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, 
reinvested earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital, as shown in the 
balance of payments accounts. 
Even as late as 2013, FDI inflows into the countries investigated in this theseis 
was relatively low 
Table 2.7: Foreign Direct Investment (In Million €), 2013 
Country Inflow FDI Net 
Bulgaria 1092 957 
Czech 
Republic 
3760 
 
1278 
Estonia 715 447 
Hungary 2317 615 
Latvia 609 349 
Lithuania 400 324 
Poland 728 -890 
Romania 2725 2635 
Slovak 
Republic 
445 763 
Slovenia -511 -555 
 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are not srtictly comparable because they give a different data 
set in a different currency.  However, they do reveal a consistent pattern in that FDI 
remains low in CEE compared with more developed economies in the EU.  In 2013 for 
example, net FDI into Germany was over $26bn and negative €149bn in Luxemburg.  
Nevertheless, foreign investors have become an important source of demand for local 
securities and are perceived to play a key role in local market development by, for 
example, acting as a catalyst in the development of robust market infrastructure and 
improvements in governance and transparency (Mathieson and Roldos, 2004).  As of 
end-2005, foreign investors held close to 78 percent of equity market capitalisation in 
Hungary and 51 percent of equity holdings in Bulgaria as of end-2006.  
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 Similarly, foreign investors play a significant role in the bond markets with a third 
of all government bonds in Hungary held by foreigners. In Poland and the Czech 
Republic, foreign investors hold around a quarter of outstanding government bonds. 
(Iorgova and Ong, 2008) Given that investments by foreign institutional investors is 
quite a significant proportion of the total local market capitalisation, any adjustment in 
foreign holdings of the region’s assets could lead to large price movements and any 
collective action by these investors could have a potentially profound impact on local 
markets. On the other hand, foreign investors have also been credited with supporting 
market development and growth in emerging market regions by enforcing discipline on 
the corporations that they have invested in. (IMF, 2003) 
2.6.11 Corporate Governance and Transparency 
Strong corporate governance and financial transparency which  entail the 
adoption and implementation of well-developed securities and bankruptcy laws, 
credible accounting and auditing standards, enhanced regulation and supervision and 
stronger enforcement of private contracts are crucial for the development of local 
capital markets. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (2000) show that 
countries with less protection for minority shareholders have less developed markets, 
while Pajuste (2002) and Klapper and Love (2004) find that better corporate governance 
is highly correlated with higher market valuation. Proper financial disclosure has 
become even more important in a globalised environment with increasing cross-border 
activity because information needs to be made available to, and understood by, 
investors, shareholders, firms and financial analysts globally. (Dowers and Lorenzo, 
2004) 
Many emerging European markets still suffer from inadequate reporting 
standards, reporting histories, lack of credible corporate ratings and ownership 
disclosure structures. Carvajal and Elliott (2007) observe that a combination of factors, 
such as insufficient legal authority, lack of resources, political will and skills tend to 
undermine regulators’ capacity to effectively execute regulation. Zoli (2007) discusses 
areas where there is still scope for strengthening institutional reform in emerging CEE 
markets. In some cases, judicial bottlenecks and lack of capacity prevent effective 
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enforcement. For example, Berglof and Pajuste (2005) note that while the Baltic 
countries and Romania implemented strict securities market regulations relatively early 
on in the transition process, enforcement has been limited due to the lack of well-
defined legal responsibilities, resources and expertise. 
According to Berglof and Pajuste (2005), rules relating to mandatory disclosure 
in annual reports are still not sufficiently enforced and they highlight the case of Poland 
where there is less corporate disclose in annual reports than companies are legally 
obliged to disclose. This is in sharp contrast to the Czech Republic, where corporations 
are now said to disclose more in their annual reports that they are legally required to 
disclose. However, the enforcement of regulation per se may not be sufficient for 
encouraging capital market development. The regulatory process must also be efficient: 
market timing is of utmost importance to both issuers and investors, since any 
regulatory delay would be tantamount to prohibitive regulation (Luengnaruemitchai and 
Ong, 2005). By taking corporate bond market development in emerging Europe as an 
example, it can be observed that lack of sufficient corporate procedures and regulations 
in some cases, and the existence of restrictive regulations in others, has held back the 
progress of this market in the CEE region generally. (Iorgova and Ong, 2008) 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
The emergence of stock markets in transition economies is crucial to the 
progress of transition and no developed market economy could function optimally 
without a developed and efficiently functioning stock market.  The demand for stock 
markets, like the demand for financial institutions arises from the creation of markets 
for goods and services generally, but the supply of institutions like stock markets 
depends, on among other things, on the emergence of trust the dissemination of accurate 
information and laws that protect investors.  This chapter reviews the emergence of 
stock markets in the first two decades of transition in CEE with the empahasis on the 
first decade of transition when embryonic stock markets were established   There are 
positive signs, and market capitlisation, though low by international standards, is clearly 
rising.  However, it is clear that even after a decade of transition, progress has been 
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slow.  Nevertheless, reform has continued and privatisation, as well as liberalising 
markets, the very cornerstones of transition to market economy, have provided both the 
impetus and the pressing need for stock market development.    
In the transition economies of CEE, privatisation preceded the development of 
stock markets but, once privatisation proceeded, the need for a market to transfer 
ownership rights in newly privatized companies quickly emerged. One consistent 
feature across the economies of CEE is the remorselessly continued trend in 
privatisation.  Initially stock listings rose rapidly but as ever more reliable standards of 
corporate governance emerged, de-listings became more common as those companies 
which failed to comply with stock exchange regulations, the design features of which 
were imported from developed Western stock markets, were de-listed.  The raw 
numbers might create the impression that this was somehow a set-back to the 
development of stock markets in CEE. However, it is a positive sign that quality listings 
were becoming the norm in the newly created stock markets of CEE.   
Inevitably the early stages of transition were characterised by instability as 
structural changes took place in the economy and new institutions gradually replaced 
the institutions associated with Soviet economic planning.  As stability and growth 
became established features of the CEE region, this encouraged the development of 
stock markets by providing companies with access to the savings of individuals and 
especially institutional investors, which enabled them to grow by exploiting profitable 
investment opportunities.  The flow of savings to the corporate sector was also 
encouraged by the enactment of laws aimed at shareholder protection which particularly 
opened up opportunities for institutional investors and spurred the growth of these.  The 
development of bank markets similarly provided opportunities for private sector 
oganisations to access funding from investors not wishing to be equity holders.  Without 
the emergence and growth of institutional investors, transition could never have taken 
place on the scale it has.  Markets have also been opened up to foreign investors and the 
implied increase in competition on stock markets will have encouraged more efficient 
performance and increased the confidence of domestic investors. All in all, from lowly 
beginnings, stock markets in CEE slowly began to resemble those in developed Western 
economies.  
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CHAPTER 3 
MARKET EFFIEICNY AND STOCK MARKET COMOVEMENT 
3.1 Introduction to Market Efficiency  
A stock market performs much the same functions as any other market for goods, 
services, financial assets and so on.  It brings buyers and sellers of stock and bonds of 
various classes into contact with other buyers and sellers of stock and bonds.  A stock 
market thus relieves each party of the need for a long and potentially expensive search for a 
counterparty with exactly equal and opposite needs.  In performing this basic function, 
stock markets enable assets to be valued, risks to be spread, capital to be raised and the 
efficiency levels of management monitored and enhanced.    
         The inventor of a new product can form a company to raise capital by selling stock in 
that company.  This provides both funding for the project and the pooling of risks involved 
in investing in a company.  When there is transparency and appropriate governance 
mechanisms are in place, the market will value the company taking into consideration the 
expected returns it is thought will materialse.  These will be commensurate with an 
assessment of the risk involved from the projects the company is undertaking and/or plans 
to undertake.  If the market undervalues a company it will raise less capital than otherwise 
and/or capital raised will be more expensive than otherwise.  Company development will 
therefore be hampered.  Exactly the opposite will happen if the market overvalues a 
company.  Over time, perceptions will adjust and, if markets perform their role efficiently, 
information will be fully processed and company valuation will reflect this.  This will 
encourage competition among companies and will promote efficiency in the use of 
resources.  When this happens, company valuation also provides an impartial assessment of 
managerial performance and is used in assessing managerial remuneration.      
            It seems reasonable to assume that the risk of loss will encourage investors to make 
use of every piece of information relevant to the performance of the company they have 
invested in and the performance of other companies to assess their returns relative to the 
risks they undertake.  However, a fair return on investment is one that offers the investor 
just the right level of compensation for the expected risk of the investment (in addition to 
the time preference rate and an adjustment for expected inflation). This raises the obvious 
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question of why it matters whether market prices for investments in fact offer fair returns?  
It could be argued that the pricing of stock is a zero-sum game in which one player's loss is 
another's gain?  For every investor who loses by buying at the top end of the market and 
selling at the bottom end, there must be another who, by definition, profits by doing the 
opposite.  So can we argue that if a particular investment offers either an excessive or an 
inadequate return, total income and wealth are neither increased nor reduced, but merely 
redistributed among market participants? 
On the other hand, if it could be shown that markets do price investments fairly, this 
would have far reaching and quite radical implications.  It would imply that all the time and 
effort expended by investors on trying to ‘pick winners’ (that is, identify investments that 
pay excess returns) would be so much time and effort wasted. The converse argument 
would apply to organisations’ efforts to spot windows of opportunity to finance their 
operations when funds appear to be relatively cheap because stock prices are relatively high 
since this will, in fact, be illusory. The rate demanded by the market would be a fair one in 
relation to the risks involved and the expected returns and would therefore be neither 
‘expensive’ nor ‘cheap’. 
This takes us naturally to the question of whether it is it possible through the 
exercise of skill or experience, to predict the movement of share prices in such a way that 
excess returns can be earned not just occasionally, but consistently?  This is impossible in 
an efficient market where the prices of securities reflect all relevant information, react 
quickly to new information about the firm's products, its costs, its management, its dividend 
policy, its prospects as the economy changes and so on.   
In an efficient market, then, prices act as valid signals for resource allocation, both 
to investors investing in stock and to corporate managers engaged in capital formation. So, 
for example, an investor choosing among alternative stocks can have confidence that stock 
prices fairly reflect their relative values. At the same time, the corporate manager 
considering alternative investments can have confidence that funds will be available for 
those that are profitable since the market will recognize and value those profitable 
investments. As Baumol (1965) puts it, "rewards and punishments would be meted out by 
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the market and management's collective nose kept to the grindstone by anticipated future 
capital needs" (p67). 
3.2 Types of Market Efficiency 
 An all embracing definition of market efficiency is a market which instantaneously 
processes new information and generates a constantly updated set of prices such that prices 
in the market are without systematic tendencies leaving investors no opportunity for 
arbitrage.  To the extent that markets are efficient therefore, it is impossible for investors to 
earn above average returns, or, as Fama (1998) puts it “The expected value of abnormal 
returns is zero but chance generates deviations (anomalies) in both directions” (p284).  Of 
course whether potentially profitable trading opportunities exist depends on trading costs 
and the magnitude of risk adjusted returns.  Notwithstanding this, if returns above the 
market return are consistently recorded, the market is clearly not efficient.  The implication 
is that in an efficient market, competition among participants leads to a situation where, at 
any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the effects of 
information based both on events that have already occurred and on events which, as of 
now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at 
any point in time the actual price of a security will be a reliable estimate of its intrinsic 
value.  This having been said, the concept of market efficiency has three dimesions and 
each is considered below. 
 3.2.1 Strong-form Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In its strongest form, the efficient market hypothesis says a stock market is efficient if all 
information relevant to the value of a share, whether or not generally available to existing 
or potential investors, is quickly and accurately reflected in the market price of that share. 
For example, if the current market price is lower than the value justified by some piece 
of privately held information, holders of that information will exploit the pricing anomaly 
by buying the equity. They will continue doing so until this excess demand for the share 
has driven the price up to the level supported by their private information. At this point they 
will have no incentive to continue buying, so they will withdraw from the market and the 
price will stabilise at this new equilibrium level. This is strong form market efficiency. It is 
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the most satisfying and compelling form of the efficient market hypothesis in a theoretical 
sense, but it suffers from a major drawback in practice: It is virtually impossible to confirm 
empirically as those with the ability to provide the information necessary to test the 
proposition (insider dealers) have every incentive to withhold that very information.   
 Despite this, if a market is strong-form efficient the current market price is the best 
available unbiased predictor of a fair price, having regard to all relevant information, 
whether the information is in the public domain or not.  As noted above, this implies that 
excess returns cannot consistently be achieved even by trading on inside information. This 
does prompt the interesting observation that somebody must be the first to trade on the 
inside information and hence make an excess return.  Unfortunately as noted above, this 
observation, though very attractive in theory, is impossible to test in practice with any 
degree of academic rigour. 
3.2.2 Semi-strong-form Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In its semi-strong form, the Efficient Market Hypothesis says a market is efficient if all 
relevant publicly available information is quickly reflected in the market price.  This is the 
semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. If the strong form is theoretically the 
most compelling Efficient Market Hypothesis, the the semi-strong form perhaps appeals 
most to common sense.  It implies that the market will quickly digest the dissemination of 
relevant new information by moving the price to a new equilibrium level that reflects the 
change in supply and demand caused by the emergence of that information.  What it may 
lack in intellectual rigour, the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
certainly gains in empirical strength being far less difficult to test than the strong form. 
If a market is semi-strong efficient, the current market price is the best available 
unbiased predictor of a fair price, having regard to all publicly available information about 
the risk and return of an investment. The study of any public information (and not just past 
prices) cannot yield consistent excess returns. We note in passing that this is a somewhat 
more controversial conclusion than that of the weak-form Efficient Market Hypothesis 
discussed below because it implies that fundamental analysis – the systematic study of 
companies, sectors and the economy at large – cannot produce consistently higher returns 
than are justified by the risks involved. Such a finding calls into question the relevance and 
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value of a large sector of the financial services industry devoted to investment research and 
analysis. 
We also note in passing that one problem with the notion of semi-strong form 
efficiency lies with the identification of all ‘relevant publicly available information’.  The 
phrase sounds relatively tight, but the reality is less clear-cut because information does not 
arrive with a convenient label saying which shares this information will or will not impact 
upon.   
3.2.3 Weak-form Efficient Market Hypothesis 
In its third and least rigorous form (known as weak form efficiency) the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis confines itself to just one subset of public information: historical 
information about the share price itself or an index of share prices. The argument is simple.  
Since ‘new’ information cannot be related to previous information otherwise it would not 
be new, it follows that every movement in the share price (or index of share prices) in 
response to new information cannot be predicted from the last movement in price.  The 
behaviour of past prices gives no guide to future price movements and all information in 
past prices is incorporated into current prices.  The development of the price (or price 
index) assumes the characteristics of a random walk and future prices cannot therefore be 
predicted from a study of historic prices. 
If a market is weak-form efficient, there is no correlation between successive prices 
so that excess returns cannot consistently be achieved through the study of past price 
movements. Studying the behaviour of past prices in an attempt to indentify recurring 
patterns of a predictable nature in the behaviour of prices is referred to as technical analysis 
or chartist analysis because it is based on the study of past price patterns without regard to 
any further background information. 
3.3 The Importance of Market Efficiency 
Each of the three forms of the Efficient Market Hypothesis has different 
implications in the context of the search for excess returns, that is, returns in excess of what 
is justified by the risks incurred in holding particular investments.  It is therefore difficult to 
make precise observations on the importance of market efficiency since observations will 
depend on the type of market efficiency referred to.  However, some general observations 
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are possible and these are elaborated here to provide some insight into the motivation for 
this thesis.   
An immediate and direct implication of stock market efficiency is that no investor, 
nor group of investors, can constantly achieve excess returns by following a defined 
investment strategy.  Equity research with the intent of achieving accurate valuation would 
be a costly business since it would offer no benefit.  The probability of indentifying an 
undervalued stock would always be 50:50 reflecting the randomness of pricing errors.  
Furthermore, in an efficient stock market, a strategy of randomly diversifying across stocks 
or indexing to the market, carrying little or no information cost and minimal execution cost, 
would be superior to any other strategy that involved larger information and execution 
costs.  Clearly no value added could be gained by employing portfolio managers and/or 
investment strategists.  The final implication for portfolio management of market efficiency 
is that a strategy of minimising trading, that is, creating a portfolio and not trading unless 
cash is needed, would be superior to a strategy that required frequent trading or even 
minimal trading over and above that required to convert assets to cash.   
However, the implications of stock market efficiency are more far reaching and are 
not simply confined to the area of portfolio management.  Stock market efficiency is 
important because unless a stock market is informationally efficient, it will be unable to fully 
discharge its role in a functioning market economy and this will inhibit economic progress.  
Stock market efficiency therefore has clear implications for transition and economic 
development generally. In this context there is evidence that establishing appropriate 
financial and economic institutions is an important feature of successful transition from a 
centrally planned economy, to a market economy (Young and Reynolds, 1995; EBRD 1998; 
Ibrahim and Galt, 2002).  Furthermore, well-functioning financial markets are vital to a 
thriving economy because these markets facilitate price discovery, risk hedging and the 
allocation of capital to its most efficient use.  Because firms require equity as well as debt 
funds, capital markets play an important role in this process.  Mendelson and Peake (1993) 
have argued that in market economies the availability of true equity prices is important for 
the establishment of appropriate hurdle rates for capital expenditures, and to provide 
investors with the confidence that they are not being cheated.  They further argue that in 
transition economies, the sooner sound equity markets can be established, the sooner there 
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will be sound benchmarks for enterprises to be privatised.  The clear implication is that an 
efficient capital market is essential in establishing the conditions necessary for a functioning 
market economy.   
There are other issues and in a capitalist economy, prices for goods and services 
play the central role in resource allocation.  For any good or service, prices adjust to reflect 
relative scarcities and, as they do so, buying and selling decisions are revised and alter the 
allocation of resources.   The strength of capitalism therefore lies in its ability to enable 
market prices to reflect sufficient information so that resources are allocated efficiently.  
However, the markets for assets, such as the stock market, are different from the markets 
for goods and services.  In particular, if a company’s share price goes up, it is not clear that 
its access to equity capital will be altered.  This is because stock prices differ from the 
prices of goods and services in three ways: 
a) The price of equity is not a marginal value but an average value.  Stock market 
prices are secondary market prices which value an entire firm rather than a 
marginal investment.  The role played by the stock market is analogous to the 
role played by conventional markets for goods and services only in the single 
case where a newly created firm issues equity for the first time to fund its 
investment.  In this special case, if investors believe that the capital sought can 
be more effectively deployed elsewhere, or if the expected returns on the project 
are insufficient to induce enough saving, the price of equity will be insufficient 
for investment in the company to be undertaken.  However, in reality an 
insignificant amount of capital is raised in this way and therefore this latter 
possibility is of no concern to us here.   
b) Decisions about the allocation of investment funds are usually delegated to 
managers who sometimes have little or no ownership stake in the firm.  
Managers make decisions over dividend policy, leverage, the timing of new 
issues of equity and other securities and therefore have discretion over the 
amount of funding available for investing in new assets.  The principal-agent 
problem and that of designing appropriate incentives is well known, but is 
complicated by the fact that decisions managers take might have implications 
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for the long term performance of the company stretching well beyond the time 
they leave the company.  
c) The flow of information in a stock market might be bi-directional: The market 
might want to learn about the quality of the manager’s decisions, but the 
manager might also want to learn the market’s valuation of prospective 
investments.  The stock price, although intrinsically irrelevant to the investment 
decision, might be useful indirectly because it conveys information about 
prospective investment projects and cash flows.  For example, a relatively high 
stock price might signal to a manager that the market believes the firm has 
profitable investment opportunities.  The fact that managers seek to infer 
information from the price of equity implies that the price of stock differs from 
the price of goods and services since the buyers of goods and services have no 
interest in whether the market price of what they buy reflects the marginal 
utilities of other consumers or the marginal cost of making these goods and 
services available.  In these cases they need only compare the price of the 
product to their own marginal valuation.  In the stock market, managers (acting 
on behalf of shareholders) are concerned with other agents’ information as 
reflected in price, but the stock price is not the marginal cost of investment 
funds. 
These special features of the stock market raise questions about whether ‘efficient’ 
stock prices are related to the efficient allocation of resources.  However, Fama (1976) is in 
no doubt about this: “An efficient capital market is an important component of a capitalist 
system …. If the capital market is to function smoothly in allocating resources, prices of 
securities must be good indicators of value” (p133).  This view is further endorsed by the 
EBRD (1998) which has argued that “Markets tend to provide for an efficient allocation of 
resources when information about the goods or services being exchanged is widely 
available and reliable, when entry into the market by alternative providers is free, and when 
the exchange is not dependent upon an ongoing relationship between buyer and seller.  
Assuming that these preconditions are met, a securities market, like any other market, can 
deliver an efficient allocation of resources” (pp 101).  Dickinson and Muragu (1994) 
provide evidence of this in the case of Nigeria.      
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The implication is that in an efficient market, prices act as valid signals for resource 
allocation, both to investors investing in securities and to corporate managers engaged in 
capital formation. So, for example, an investor choosing among alternative stocks can have 
confidence that their prices fairly reflect their relative values. At the same time, the 
corporate manager considering alternative investments can have confidence that funds will 
be available for those invstments that offer appropriate expected returns since the market 
will recognise and value those potentially profitable investments.   
Furthermore, efficient capital markets enable manager compensation to be tied to 
stock performance thus aligning the interests of principals and agents and, through this, 
promoting efficiency in the allocation of resources.  Market inefficiency removes the 
incentive for managers to maximise a firm’s stock price and evade hostile take overs by 
corporate raiders seeking short term gains.  Bekeart and Harvey extend this notion to the 
economy and argue that “An efficient stock market can enhance growth by mitigating 
moral hazard and consequently increasing productivity” (p38) 
Typically underdeveloped capital markets are illiquid with relatively high 
transactions costs which hinder the efforts of firms to raise capital thus negatively 
impacting on growth.  (This is also likely to encourage larger enterprises to raise capital in 
overseas markets thus perpetuating thin trading and impeding stock market development.)  
Recent theoretical literature on financial development and growth identifies three 
fundamental channels through which capital markets and economic growth might be linked 
(Pagano, 1993).  One channel occurs because capital market development increases the 
proportion of savings that can be mobilised as investments.  A second channel occurs 
because capital market development is likely to increase the rate of savings and through this 
facilitate higher levels of investment. A third channel occurs because capital market 
development, as noted above, increases the efficiency of capital allocation.  Of course, a 
developed market is not necessarily an efficient capital market, but the literature 
overwhelmingly finds that developed capital markets are efficient and these channels 
operate because an efficient capital market gathers and processes information in a way that 
projects the content of that information accurately and through this provides investors with 
better opportunities for risk diversification.   
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More generally, economic growth in a modern economy hinges on an efficient 
financial sector that pools domestic savings and encourages foreign capital to the domestic 
economy.  According to Ewah et al. (2009), the rate of economic growth of any nation is 
inseparably linked to the sophistication of its financial markets and specifically to capital 
market efficiency.  Filer, Hanousek and Campos (1999) survey 70 countries and report 
evidence of a positive and significant relationship going from stock market development to 
economic growth, particularly in emerging economies.  Rajan and Zingales (1996) have 
argued that in economies where inside finance is available, the contribution of financial 
intermediaries to economic development and growth may be relatively small. However, 
they further argue that financial sector development may play a particularly beneficial role 
in the rise of new firms. If these firms are disproportionately the source of new ideas, 
financial development can enhance innovation and thus enhance economic growth in 
indirect ways.  This condition is likely to apply in transition economies which are the 
subject of this thesis because of the mass privatisation of industrial organisations and the 
creation of new commercial organisations as markets emerged and developed.  
3.4  Stock Market Comovement 
Many of the world’s stock markets are likely to be related and exhibit comovement, 
that is, simultaneous movement in stock prices with a common cause.  One obvious reason 
for such comovement is that many stocks are cross listed on different exchanges and any 
factor impacting on a stock’s price in one market will immediately impact on its price in 
other markets, otherwise arbirtrage would take place and force price adjustments to restore 
cross market equilibrium.  Moreover recent technological progress in the financial sector 
has enabled information and funds to be rapidly transmitted between financial sectors 
thereby providing investors with opportunities in world stock markets rather than just in a 
local stock market.  Also, economic activities of firms have become more international 
mostly due to falling transportation costs stemming from technological progress.  
This might have clear implications for stock market efficiency which, as Fama 
(1970) noted, implies zero unexploited excess profit given the information available to the 
public.  To understand this more fully, consider the case where one country’s stock market 
is not efficient but that that stock market is jointly efficient with another country’s stock 
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market.  This clearly implies that investors can invest in both markets to create portfolio 
diversification and arbitrage riskless gains.  Because of this, it is possible that ‘joint 
efficiency’ among several markets occurs when these markets are cointegrated.   
Since stock price data are mostly non-stationary, a stable relationship between stock 
price data in two (or more) markets implies that these markets are cointegrated.  As 
MacDonald and Taylor (1988 and 1989) point out, if stock prices in any two markets are 
cointegrated then a linear combination of stock prices must exist and this will help investors 
to predict future stock prices in one of the cointegrated markets and therefore at least one of 
the markets is not efficient.           
 Thus far our analysis suggests stock market efficiency and stock market 
comovement are linked because efficient markets process all available relevant information 
and reflect this in stock prices which, by definition, should therefore always reflect the 
underlying ‘fundamentals’.  If information impacts on foreign markets and this information 
is relevant to stock prices in the domestic economy, domestic stock prices should adjust 
instantaneously or as soon as markets open if markets are separated by time and the 
domestic market is closed when relevant information reaches the foreign market.   
 However, if one market affects the other market and the harmonisation process does 
not take place instantaneously, investors might be able to earn excess returns which runs 
counter to the efficient market hypothesis.  In this context, Crochi (2003) suggests that 
comovement and information transmission between markets can be used in tests of market 
efficiency.  Furthermore, to the extent that comovement is a measure of stock market 
efficiency and, through this, stock market development, the speed of adjustment in market 
comovement is the crucial measure of stock market development in the former transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  If adjustment between markets is instantaneous, 
comovement is consistent with an efficient market.  However, if one market leads another 
market and synchronisation of prices is not instantaneous, there is clear evidence of 
inefficiency.  
 
3.5 Importance of This Research 
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The discussion above sets the importance of stock market efficiency and the 
advantages to be gained from an efficient stock market into clear relief.  The focus of this 
research is the development of stock markets in the former transition economies of Central 
and Eastern Europe.  As former Communist countries, stock markets were extinguished 
because they had no place in a centrally planned economy where private ownership of 
assets was almost non-existent and large scale enterprises were all state owned.  
Establishing functioning stock markets from scratch, though an enormous task in itself, was 
simply a building block in the creation of a functioning market economy since a 
functioning market economy cannot exist in the absence of a functioning stock market.    
In the years of Communism, new generations, unaccustomed to the operation 
of capital markets, had grown up and viewed the newly created stock markets with 
suspicion and caution. One of the major challenges in the transition economies was 
therefore to educate investors and to explain to them the nature of risk capital. 
However, efforts to educate investors were somewhat confounded because, coupled 
with the absence of understanding, there was an absence of reliable information about 
the companies traded on the stock market. The information disclosed by companies 
was often inaccurate or incomplete and was frequently based on different accounting 
standards and reliable auditing practices were non-existent. In other words, reliable 
corporate governance structures of the type common in developed market economies 
were not in place and companies were subject to few, if any, mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  
Encompassing all of these issues was the absence of a regulatory framework to 
establish rules within which a market economy could develop. The legal systems of 
the different transition countries had to be changed substantially so as to incorporate 
rights to the ownership of private assets, to provide guarantees for investors over the 
proper use of invested funds, to create a legal base for the existence of the stock 
market, to define legally the different financial instruments traded on the stock 
market, to provide a consistent set of accounting standards, to reform laws concerning 
the tax system and so on. All of these are taken for granted in developed market 
economies and these economies therefore provided the blue print suitable for market 
realities to function. However, the process of change was far from easy since it had to 
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adapt to national peculiarities and in some formerly centrally planned economies, it 
remains unfinished even to this day. Nevertheless, several economies have now 
completed the process of transition and provide examples of a functioning market 
economy including those countries investigated in this thesis, all of which have long 
since been admitted to the EU. 
The following chapters of this thesis investigate stock market efficiency and stock 
market comovement with developed Western markets in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia.  
These countries are selected for investigation because progression towards the status of 
developed stock market in these countries that are part of Central and Eastern Europe has 
been more rapid in this group than in other transition economies.  There is therefore far 
more to investigate by way of exploring stock market efficiency and stock market 
comovement with developed Western markets from early and ambitious beginnings to their 
current state, than in exploring stock market development in any one individual country.  
Moreover, as implied above, stock markets in these countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe are more developed than in any other part of the former Soviet Union.   
 
The literature on stock market efficiency has mainly focussed on developed 
economies where stock markets have been functioning in some cases for over 300 years.  
As more data has become available, a literature has developed on stock markets in 
transition economies.  I aim to contribute to this literature by focussing on market 
efficiency and stock market comovement with the more developed economies of Western 
Europe in the former transition economies of CEE identidfied above.   
 
The papers that make up the following chapters investigate stock market 
efficiency and stock market comovement in several of the former transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe rather than targeting the stock market of a 
single country.  This wider study will be more revealing because, as previously noted, 
although stock markets faced similar problems in their development, they progressed 
at different speeds partly reflecting the extent of the internal problems different 
economies faced and the different mechanism used to address these problems.  Whilst 
110 
 
it is true that stock markets in the transition economies could import stock market 
systems (electronic trading systems etc) from the developed countries, they still 
needed to develop a basic infrastructure for the financial sector including stronger 
legal rights for creditors and shareholders, better information, greater disclosure, well-
governed institutional investors and supporting public and private institutions.  In 
these respects, many transition economies still have far to go, but those of Central and 
Eastern Europe have now completed their transition from Communism to functioning 
market economy.       
Following the collapse of Communism, transition countries attempted to put in 
place adequate corporate governance structures requiring as part of this, 
internationally accepted standards of disclosure.  Their stock markets have also been 
opened up to overseas investors and rights of ownership have been established.  
Investigations of stock market efficiency in CEE countries admitted to the EU 
overwhelmingly confirm that at the very least they exhibit weak form efficiency (Bohl 
et al (2006) Rockinger and Urga 2001, and Harrison and Paton 2005).  Given these 
developments, as well as political and economic stability and impressive rates of 
growth, these economies potentially offer investors attractive opportunities for 
portfolio diversification.  As a result of financial globalisation, interest has grown in 
the extent of stock market integration between different countries.  As noted above, 
stock markets can be considered integrated if their prices have a tendency to move 
together, or if one market leads another market and we investigate this in chapters 6-8.  
We note in passing that an understanding of the determinants of stock market 
comovement might aid understanding of the home country bias that investors exhibit 
(Lewis 1999), that is, the preference of investors for domestic investments over 
foreign investments.   
 
3.6 Research Questions 
Against this background, we investigate the emergence, growth, 
development and performance of stock markets in what are now, the former 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe.  It is clear from Mendelson 
and Peake (1993) and the EBRD (1998) that functioning stock markets are an 
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important corner stone of a functioning market economy.  But a ‘functioning stock 
market’ implies more than simply the existence of a stock market which provides 
a trading platform for the purchase and sale of equity.  In the fullest sense of the 
term, a ‘functioning stock market’ implies an informationally efficient stock 
market that is integrated into the global trading platform with equity cross listed 
on several exchanges. This thesis seeks to assess:  
1. The extent to which stock markets in our target group of countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe are developed as measured by whether they are informationally 
efficient.  We investigate this by testing for weak form efficiency using a battery 
of different statistical tests. 
2. The extent to which our target stock markets in Central and Eastern Europe are 
cointegrated with the developed stock markets in the EU as a further test of their 
efficiency and development.  We test this by investigating comovement between 
the developed stock markets of London and Frankfurt with the stock markets of 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RANDOM WALKS AND MARKET EFFICIENCY IN CENTRAL AND 
EAST EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS 
4.1 Introduction 
In an efficient stock market, arbitrage ensures that, on average, the full effects of 
new information on the intrinsic value of stock prices will be instantaneously reflected 
in actual prices.  However, the implications of new information will not always be 
perfectly understood instantaneously and so stock prices might over-react to new 
information as often as they under-react.  Moreover, the lag in the complete adjustment 
of actual prices to successive new intrinsic values which reflect informationally fair 
value prices, will itself be a random variable.  When an event is anticipated, these 
changes will occur before the event which is the underlying cause of the change in 
intrinsic values; whilst with other events which are unexpected, stock prices will adjust 
following the event.   This tells us that the ‘instantaneous price adjustment’ component 
of an efficient stock market implies that successive price changes in individual 
securities will be independent.  This is important because where successive price 
changes are independent, the market follows a random walk.   
The random walk model implies that all information contained in previous stock 
prices is incorporated into the current price of the stock and therefore previous stock 
prices cannot be used to predict the future price of stock.  The future path of a stock 
market index is no more predictable than the path of a series of cumulative random 
numbers and therefore knowledge of the past behaviour of the index cannot be used to 
make profits from any short or long trading strategy.  More specifically, if successive 
price changes for a stock market index are independent, there is synchronisation 
between the timing of sales and purchases of securities traded on that market.  One way 
to assess whether stock markets are efficient is therefore to test whether their returns 
follow a random walk.   
As well as being of crucial importance to investors, stock return processes have 
important implications for traders, fund managers and, in a wider sense, for asset 
pricing models and financial and economic development as a whole.  Worthington and 
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Higgs (2004) have argued that trading strategies differ when returns are characterised 
by random walks or by positive autocorrelations (or persistence) over short horizons 
and negative autocorrelations (or mean reversion) over long horizons. This implies that 
as the investment horizon lengthens, an investor would invest more (less) in stocks if 
the relative risk aversion is greater (less) than unity than if the returns were serially 
independent.  In the absence of a random walk, stock returns can be predicted from the 
historical sequence of returns.  In general, an efficient market, characterised by the 
existence of a random walk with respect to stock prices, implies that equity is at its 
equilibrium level where capital and risk are appropriately priced.  This is likely to 
increase confidence among investors favourably impacting on domestic savings and 
increasing the ability of stock markets to attract both domestic and foreign investment.  
All of this has serious implications for the allocation of capital within an economy and 
hence overall economic development. (Worthington and Higgs, 2004) 
A number of studies have been carried out testing for random walks in the world’s 
stock markets. Fama (1970) and later Fama (1991) survey stock returns for early 
departures from random walks. More recently, the focus has been on individual markets 
and these include studies of random walks in Korea (Ayadi and Pyun, 1994; Ryoo and 
Smith, 2002), China (Lee et al., 2001), Hong Kong (Cheung and Coutts, 2001), 
Slovenia (Dezlan, 2000), Spain (Regulez and Zarraga, 2002), the Czech Republic 
(Hajek, 2002), Portugal (Manuel et al. 2002), the United Kingdom (Poon, 1996) and 
Turkey (Zychowicz et al., 1995; Buguk and Brorsen, 2003). Quite a few studies have 
been carried out on markets in Asia (Huang, 1995; Groenewold and Ariff, 1998), Latin 
America (Urrutia, 1995; Ojah and Karemera, 1999; Grieb and Reyes, 1999; Karemera et 
al., 1999), Africa (Smith et al. 2002; Appiah-Kusi and Menyah, 2003) the Middle East 
(Abraham et al., 2002) and Harrison and Moore (2012). 
However, comparatively very little attention has been paid to European equity 
markets and especially Central and East European (CEE) markets in investigating the 
presence of random walks in these stock markets. Apart from the more usual benefits 
resulting from the understanding of random walk behaviour and market efficiency, 
Worthington and Higgs (2004) note that this is an important omission for two critical 
reasons. First, capital provision in Europe in general, and in the newly expanded 
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European Union in particular, relies upon a relatively large number of smaller 
developed markets and an increasing proportion of emerging markets. Knowledge of 
random walks and market efficiency in this instance yields valuable insights into the 
ability of these markets to provide appropriately priced and efficiently allocated equity 
capital, especially for the purposes of national (regional) development in the smaller EU 
Member States. Secondly, there has been increasing pressure for the consolidation of 
European equity markets over the past decade or so. Given that market liquidity, 
breadth and depth are thought to be closely associated with market efficiency, the 
failure to attain some nominal level of efficiency in a given market provides a strong 
rationale for technological and regulatory reform and the creation of institutional 
linkages in the form of collaborative partnerships, even mergers of stock markets in 
different countries. 
This chapter tests for the presence of random walks in stock returns of the ten CEE 
countries identified. We test for a random walk over the entire sample period, but we 
also test for a random walk after EU enlargement in 2004 to explore the possibility that 
this might have impacted on market efficiency.  There are reasons to believe that closer 
economic integration might promote, or at least encourage, stock market efficiency not 
least because stocks will be cross listed, standards of governance will converge to 
Western standards and foreign investors will enhance liquidity and market 
capitalisation, all of which impact on market efficiency (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; 
and Jacoby, Fowler and Gottesman, 2000).   
4.2 Description and Properties of Data 
The data used in this chapter consist of market value-weighted equity indices for 
ten CEE equity markets, comprising of Bulgaria (SOFIX), the Czech Republic (PX), 
Estonia (OMX Tallinn), Hungary (BUX), Latvia (OMX Riga), Lithuania (OMX 
Vilnius), Poland (WIG), Romania (BET), the Slovak Republic (SAX) and Slovenia 
(SBI20). All the data are obtained from Thompson Reuters Datasteam and each series 
starts from the time that daily data become available for the target markets.  Because of 
this, the series’ encompass dissimilar sampling periods given the varying times these 
indexes have started to operate (Table 4.1). The end data for all the series will be the 
115 
 
last working day of the respective stock markets in the CEE region as at December 
2008.  Closing prices at the end of trading on 2009 for Bulgaria and Romania are 
December 23rd, for the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and the 
Slovak Republic closing prices as at December 30th, are used and for Hungary and 
Slovenia closing prices as at December 31st are used.  The closing dates are used 
because they represent the latest date available at the time our tests were carried out.  
Omitting the years of the financial crisis had little impact on mean returns implying that 
the stock markets investigated here were not, at the time, major players on the global 
stage.   
Daily closing prices of each stock exchange index are used to calculate the natural 
log of the relative price for the daily intervals. This is done to produce a time series of 
continuously compounded returns, such that: 
𝑟௧ = log (
௣೟
௣೟షభ
),  
Where: 𝑝௧ and 𝑝௧ିଵ represent the stock index closing price at time t and t-1, 
respectively. Table 4.1 provides a descriptive summary of statistics of the daily returns 
of the ten markets in the CEE region. Sample means, standard deviations, skewness, 
kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics and p-values are listed. The lowest mean returns are 
in Lithuania (0.00021), the Czech Republic (0.00025) and Estonia (0.00027), while the 
highest mean returns are in the Slovak Republic (0.0030), Poland (0.00076) and 
Bulgaria (0.00062) with the remainder falling in between these outer values.  The 
standard deviations of the returns range from 0.0098 for Lithuania to 0.1615 for the 
Slovak Republic. On this basis, of the ten markets in CEE region, the Slovak Republic, 
Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary are the most volatile; while Lithuania, Slovenia and 
Latvia are the least volatile.  It is important to note that higher mean returns in one 
market compared to another market does not necessarily imply that the market with 
higher mean returns offers more profitable investment opportunities.  Return must be 
counter-balanced with the risk involved and so on. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of CEE Stock Market Returns. 
 
Market Start End Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
JB p- 
Value Observations 
          
Bulgaria Oct-20-2000 JUL-31-2009 0.000585 0.019187 -0.617222 24.8903 5.28E+04 0.001 2172 
Czech Republic Sep-07-1993 JUL-31-2009 0.000302 0.015655 0.3633939 14.90357 3.48E+04 0.001 3825 
Estonia June-3-1996 JUL-31-2009 0.000282 0.015891 -1.306206 25.71097 1.07E+05 0.001 3867 
Hungary Dec-31-1990 JUL-31-2009 0.000615 0.017441 -0.647351 11.79577 3.20E+04 0.001 4633 
Latvia Jan-1-2000 JUL-31-2009 0.000323 0.014442 -0.975795 19.65032 4.66E+04 0.001 2942 
Lithuania Jan-4-2000 JUL-31-2009 0.000226 0.010078 -0.826355 18.83834 4.20E+04 0.001 2921 
Poland Apr-16-1991 JUL-31-2009 0.000796 0.020655 -0.645522 13.67241 3.51E+04 0.001 4476 
Romania Sep-19-1997 JUL-31-2009 0.000462 0.019043 -0.333651 5.43083 3.67E+03 0.001 2954 
Slovak Republic Jul-03-1995 JUL-31-2009 0.000155 0.013063 -0.308070 9.259049 1.22E+04 0.001 3417 
Slovenia Jan-11-1993 JUL-31-2009 0.000453 0.013258 0.1627322 20.10598 6.95E+04 0.001 4138 
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By and large, the distributional properties of all ten return series appear non-
normal. All markets except the Czech-Republic, the Slovak-Republic and Slovenia are 
negatively skewed indicating greater probability of large decreases in returns than 
increases, while the remaining stock markets in the sample are positively skewed 
implying a greater likelihood of increases in returns than decreases - especially in the 
Slovak Republic (56.68). The kurtosis in all market returns is also relatively large, 
ranging from 5.602 (Romania) to 3233.162 (the Slovak Republic) implying leptokurtic 
distributions. Finally, the Jarque-Bera statistic and corresponding p-values in Table 4.1 
are used to test the null hypotheses that the daily distribution of CEE market returns is 
normally distributed. All p-values are smaller than the 0.05 level of significance 
implying rejection of the null hypothesis of normality in all of the return series’. The 
overall implication of the descriptive statistics is that none of the returns are well 
approximated by the normal distribution. 
4.3 Empirical Methodology 
4.3.1 Random walk hypothesis 
Consider the following random walk with drift process: 
 Pt = Pt-1 + β+ εt                                                        (1)                                                                                      
or 
 rt = ΔPt = β + εt                                (2)                                                                                                                             
(where pt is the price of the index observed at time t, β is an arbitrary drift parameter, rt 
is the change in the index and εt is a random disturbance term satisfying E(εt) = 0, 𝜎ఌ೟
ଶ  is 
constant and E(εt, εt-g ) = 0, g ≠ 0, for all t. Under the random walk hypothesis, a market 
is weak form efficient if the most recent price contains all available information about 
past prices such that the best predictor of future prices is the current price.  
Within the random walk hypothesis, there exist three successively ever more 
restrictive sub-hypotheses with sequentially stronger tests for random walks (Campbell 
et al., 1997).  The least restrictive of these is where the returns in a market conforming 
118 
 
to this standard of random walk are serially uncorrelated, thus corresponding to a 
random walk hypothesis with dependent, but uncorrelated, increments.  
Next we have a market where returns are serially uncorrelated, in line with the 
random walk hypothesis, but with increments that are independent and not identically 
distributed. This is possible if information on the variance of past prices can be used to 
predict the future volatility of the market. Finally, if it is not possible to predict either 
future price movements or volatility on the basis of information from past prices, such a 
market then complies with the most restrictive notion of a random walk. In this market, 
returns are serially uncorrelated and conform to a random walk hypothesis with 
independent and identically distributed increments. 
Given this, a number of complementary testing procedures for random walks can be 
used as a way of testing for weak-form market efficiency. To start with, a serial 
correlation test of independence and the non-parametric runs test can be used to test for 
serial independence in the series.  Further, the trend non-stationary condition for the 
series to follow random walk can be tested with unit root tests. Finally, multiple 
variance ratio tests can be carried out to focus on the uncorrelated residuals in the series 
under the assumption of both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic random walks. 
4.3.2 Tests of serial independence 
Testing for serial independence in the returns, which correspond to the test that E(εt, 
εt-g ) = 0 in Equations (1) and (2) is done by two approaches. First, the serial correlation 
coefficient test that is employed to test the relationship between returns in the current 
period and those in the previous period, is employed. If no significant autocorrelations 
are found, the series are assumed to follow a random walk. Second, the non parametric 
runs test is used to determine whether successive price changes are independent. 
Observing the number of ‘runs’, that is, the sequence of successive price changes with 
the same sign, in a sequence of price changes tests the null hypothesis that the series is 
random. In this approach, each return is classified according to its position with respect 
to the mean return. In this test a positive change implies that the return is greater than 
the mean, a negative change implies that the return is less than the mean and zero 
change implies that the return equals the mean. 
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To perform this test, a value A is assigned to each return that equals or exceeds the 
mean value and a value B is assigned to those items that are below the mean. Let nA and 
nB be the sample sizes of items A and B respectively. The test statistic is U, the total 
number of runs in the test. For a relatively large sample size, that is where both nA and 
nB are greater than twenty, the test statistic is approximately normally distributed 
(Berenson et al., 2002). The results of these tests are discussed in the following section. 
𝑍 = ௎ିఓೆ
ఙೆ
                                                                 (3)                                                                                     
(Where  𝜇௎ =  
ଶ௡ಲ௡ಳ
௡
+  1 ,  𝜎௎= ට
ଶ௡ಲ௡ಳ(ଶ௡ಲ௡ಳି௡)
௡మ(௡ିଵ)    and n = 
nA+ nB 
4.3.3 Unit root tests 
Two different procedures are used to test the null hypothesis of a unit root. These 
correspond to the test that E (εtεt-g) = 0, but 𝜎ଶ(𝜀௧𝜀௧ି௚) is not constant in Equations (1) 
and (2). They are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) 
test. To start with, the well-known ADF unit root test of the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity is conducted in the form of the following regression equation: 
Δ𝑝௨ =  𝛼଴ + 𝛼ଵ𝑡 +  𝜌଴𝑝௨ିଵ +  ∑ 𝜌௜
௤
௜ୀଵ Δ𝑝௜௧ିଵ + 𝜀௜௧                                 (4)                                      
where it p denotes the price for the i-th market at time t, Δ𝑝௜௧  =  𝑝௜௧ −  𝑝௜௧ିଵ, ρ are 
coefficients to be estimated, q is the number of lagged terms, t is the trend term, α1 is 
the estimated coefficient for the trend, α0  is the constant, and ε is white noise. 
MacKinnon’s critical values are used in order to determine the significance of the test 
statistic associated with ρ0. The Phillips Peron test incorporates an alternative 
(nonparametric) method of controlling for serial correlation when testing for a unit root, 
by estimating the non-augmented Dickey-Fuller test equation and modifying the test 
statistic so that its asymptotic distribution is unaffected by serial correlation. 
4.3.4 Multiple variance ratio tests 
The multiple variance ratio (MVR) test proposed by Chow and Denning (1993) is 
used to detect autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the returns. This corresponds to 
the test that E (εtεt-g) = 0 and 𝜎ଶ(𝜀௧𝜀௧ି௚)  is constant or ε୲~ iid in Equations (1) and (2). 
Based on Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) earlier single variance ratio (VR) test, Chow and 
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Denning (1993) adjust the focus of the tests from the individual variance ratio for a 
specific interval to one more consistent with the random walk hypothesis by covering 
all possible intervals. As shown by Lo and MacKinlay (1988), the variance ratio statistic 
is derived from the assumption of linear relations in an observation interval with respect 
to the variance of increments. If a return series follows a random walk process, the 
variance of a qth-differenced variable is q times as large as the first-differenced variable. 
For a series partitioned into equally spaced intervals and characterised by random 
walks, one qth of the variance of (p୲ − p୲ି୯) is expected to be the same as the variance 
of (p୲ − p୲ିଵ): 
        Var (𝑝௧ − 𝑝௧ି௤) = q Var(𝑝௧ − 𝑝௧ିଵ)                             (6)                                                              
Where q is any positive integer. The variance ratio is then divided by: 
VR(q) = 
భ
೜ ௏௔௥(௣೟ି ௣೟ష೜)
௏௔௥(௣೟ି ௣೟షభ)
= ఙ
మ(௤)
ఙమ(ଵ)
                                            (7)                                                                       
such that under the null hypothesis VR(q) = 1. For a sample size of nq + 1 
observations (p0, p1… pnq), Lo and Mackinlay’s (1998) unbiased estimates of 𝜎ଶ(1) and  
𝜎ଶ(𝑞) are computationally denoted by: 
𝜎ොଶ(1) =  
∑ (௣ೖି ௣ೖషభି ఓෝ)మ
೙೜
ೖసభ
(௡௤ିଵ)
            (8)                                                                                                            
and 
 
  𝜎ොଶ(𝑞) =  
∑ (௣ೖି ௣ೖష೜ି ௤ఓෝ)మ
೙೜
ೖస೜
௛
                                                    (9)                                                            
Where ?̂? = 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝑜𝑓 (𝑝௧ − 𝑝௧ିଵ) 𝑎𝑛𝑑: 
h = 𝑞(𝑛𝑞 + 1 − 𝑞)(1 − ௤
௡௤
)                                                              10)  
Lo and Mackinlay (1988) produce two test statistics, Z(q) and Z*(q), under the null 
hypothesis of homoskedastic increments random walk and heteroskedastic increments 
random walk respectively. If the null hypothesis is true, the associated test statistic has 
an asymptotic standard normal distribution. With a sample size of nq + 1 observations 
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(p0, p1, …,pnq) and under the null hypothesis of homoskedastic increments random 
walk, the standard normal test statistic Z(q) is: 
𝑍(𝑞) =  ௏ோ
෢ (௤)ି ଵ
ఙబෞ(௤)
                                                                   (11)                                                                      
where 
𝜎଴ෞ(𝑞) =  ቂ
ଶ(ଶ௤ିଵ)(௤ିଵ)
ଷ௤(௡௤)
ቃ
భ
మ                                                   (12)                                                                        
The test statistic for a heteroskedastic increments random walk, Z*(q) is: 
𝑍∗(𝑞) =  ௏ோ
෢ (௤)ି ଵ
ఙ೐ෞ(௤)
                                                        (13)                                               
where 
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మ                                                        (14)                                                         
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In tests of the random walk hypothesis, the serial correlation and runs tests are used 
to determine if the return series are uncorrelated; the unit root tests are used to detect if 
the return series are identically distributed; and the multiple variance ratio tests are 
employed to determine if the return series are both independent and identically 
distributed. Since the multiple variance ratio tests encompass both conditions, they are 
regarded as being more powerful and more useful in testing the random walk hypothesis 
(Smith et al., 2002). 
4.4 Empirical Results 
Table 4.2 provides two sets of test statistics. The first set includes the statistics and 
p-values for the tests of serial independence, namely, the parametric serial correlation 
coefficient and the nonparametric one sample runs test. The null hypothesis in the 
former is for no serial correlation while in the latter it is the random distribution of 
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returns. The second set of tests is unit root tests and comprises the ADF and PP t-
statistics and p-values where the null hypothesis of a unit root is tested against the 
alternative of no unit root (stationarity). 
          Turning first to the tests of independence, the null hypotheses of no serial 
correlation for all of the CEE markets are rejected at the 0.05 level except for the Slovak 
Republic where the null hypothesis of no serial correlation cannot be rejected. The 
significance of the autocorrelation coefficient indicates that the null hypothesis of weak-
form market efficiency may be rejected for all other markets in the sample, with stock 
prices failing to follow a random walk.   
In terms of serial correlation, the coefficient is negative only for Bulgaria (-0.029), 
indicating mean reversion in returns. For the remaining markets the positive serial 
correlation coefficients are indicative of return persistence, with persistence being 
higher in Poland (0.2493), Romania (0.2343), the Czech Republic (0.2188) and Estonia 
(0.2083). Only for Bulgaria therefore do we have any evidence of weak form efficiency 
in terms of serial correlation tests. 
For the runs tests, the estimated z-values are significant at the 0.05 level for all 
markets except Latvia and the Slovak Republic. The negative z-values for all the 
markets implies that the actual number of runs falls short of the expected number of 
runs under the null hypothesis of return independence, which therefore implies the 
existence of positive serial correlation. The Slovak Republic is then weak form efficient 
under both tests, while Latvia is efficient under the runs test. All remaining markets do 
not follow random walks and therefore cannot be presumed to be weak form efficient. 
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    Table 4.2: Serial Correlation Runs and Unit Root Tests for CEE Equity Markets. 
Notes: 95 % confidence interval considered for all the tests. For Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests hypotheses are H0: unit root, H1: Notes: 95 % 
confidence interval considered for all the tests. For Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests hypotheses are H0: unit root, H1: no unit root (stationary). The lag 
orders in the ADF equations are determined by the significance of the coefficient for the lagged terms. The Phillips-Peron (PP) unit root test hypotheses are 
H0: unit root, H1: no unit root (stationary). Intercepts only in the series 
Market Coefficient p-value 
Cases < 
Mean 
Cases 
>= 
Mean 
Total  
Cases 
Number  
of Runs 
Runs Z 
 
Value p-value 
ADF t- 
Statistic 
ADF p-
value 
PP t- 
statistic 
PP p-
value 
             
Bulgaria -0.0113 5.77E-15 1071 1101 2172 972 -4.9068 9.05E-07 -47.3261 1.00E-03 -47.3255 1.00E-03 
Czech- 
Republic 0.218 0 1906 1919 3825 1656 -8.3114 8.52E-17 -49.4964 1.00E-03 -49.4599 1.00E-03 
Estonia 0.2072 0 2138 1729 3867 1618 -9.5759 9.21E-22 -50.3767 1.00E-03 -50.4005 1.00E-03 
Hungary 0.0862 1.23E-13 2337 2296 4633 2125 -5.6373 1.70E-08 -62.4137 1.00E-03 -62.4139 1.00E-03 
Latvia 0.0359 0 1741 1201 2942 1378 -1.6771 0.0935 -52.4068 1.00E-03 -52.4051 1.00E-03 
Lithuania 0.1504 0 1669 1252 2921 1176 -9.6433 4.96E-22 -46.4325 1.00E-03 -46.4093 1.00E-03 
Poland 0.25910 0 2178 2038 4216 1962 -4.4463 8.68E-06 -49.8713 1.00E-03 -50.4846 1.00E-03 
Romania 0.2141 0 1480 1474 2954 1279 -7.3055 2.55E-13 -43.6932 1.00E-03 -43.7191 1.00E-03 
Slovak 
Republic -0.00440 0.1329 1816 1601 3417 1697 -0.1799 0.8573 -58.689 1.00E-03 -59.1346 1.00E-03 
Slovenia 0.1901 0 2091 2047 4138 1657 -15.6196 1.57E-55 -53.0784 1.00E-03 -53.0799 1.00E-03 
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The unit root tests in Table 4.2 also s to support the hypothesis that most Central 
and Eastern European equity markets are weak form efficient in 2009. The ADF and PP 
t-statistics reject the null hypotheses of a unit root at the 0.05 level implying that all of 
the return series examined are stationary. As a necessary condition for a random walk, 
the ADF and PP unit root tests reject the requisite null hypothesis in the case of all ten 
CEE markets.  There is therefore no conclusive support for the hypotheses of weak form 
efficiency for any of the CEE markets examined from the unit root tests. 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the multiple variance ratio tests of returns in the ten 
CEE equity markets investigated. The sampling intervals for all markets are 2, 5, 10 and 
20 days, corresponding to one-day, one week, one fortnight and one month periods. For 
each interval, Table 4.3 presents the estimates of the variance ratio VR(q) and the test 
statistics for the null hypotheses of homoskedastic, Z(q) and heteroskedastic, Z*(q) 
increments random walk. Under the multiple variance ratio procedure, only the 
maximum absolute values of the test statistics are examined and the critical value for 
these test statistics is 2.49 at the 0.05 level of significance. For each set of multiple 
variance ratio tests, an asterisk denotes the maximum absolute value of the test statistic 
that exceeds this critical value, and thereby indicates whether the null hypothesis of a 
random walk is rejected. 
Table 4.3: Multiple Variance Ratio Tests for CEE Equity Markets. 
 
Market Statistics q=2 q=5 q=10 q=20 
      
Bulgaria VR(q)  0.98951153 1.113114536 1.239887085 1.561466026 
 Z(q) -0.488812229 2.406177772 *3.311191908 5.265079291 
 Z*(q) -0.172144218 1.036004389 1.680732884 *2.888678701 
Czech Republic VR(q)  1.217866662 1.511502048 1.627557879 1.84200519 
 Z(q) *13.47430889 14.43917824 11.49521452 10.47808727 
 Z*(q) *4.373391409 4.962486564 4.333563669 4.367168189 
Estonia VR(q)  1.207709999 1.407591764 1.570637153 1.981665696 
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 Z(q) *12.91648936 11.56889469 10.50980612 12.28293701 
 Z*(q) *5.704158102 4.383415514 4.169379654 4.979144395 
Hungary VR(q)  1.08660693 1.133489171 1.177856216 1.382599757 
 Z(q) *5.894999765 4.147215161 3.585483869 5.239952664 
 Z*(q) 2.474828878 1.925445782 1.804751654 *2.769325161 
Latvia VR(q)  1.036591039 1.164449666 1.282313938 1.410366077 
 Z(q) 1.984705497 *4.071305684 4.535249957 4.478620981 
 Z*(q) 0.669439309 1.5171801 1.752482644 1.799460772 
Lithuania VR(q)  1.150954193 1.376010003 1.706787908 2.358933247 
 Z(q) *8.158512031 9.275654391 11.31364282 14.77799195 
 Z*(q) 2.389291707 *2.823239707 3.735410238 5.494184894 
Poland VR(q)  1.259386054 1.453138634 1.61824767 1.826843179 
 Z(q) *16.84212647 13.42952877 11.88941163 10.80251736 
 Z*(q) *7.613485655 6.288212311 5.790436575 5.574493211 
Romania VR(q)  1.214702923 1.374641802 1.504515335 1.699593671 
 Z(q) *11.66925694 9.29396132 8.12133063 7.650725866 
 Z*(q) *6.310472338 5.289822046 5.057661636 5.126685306 
Slovak Republic VR(q)  0.996167853 0.996446177 1.077972399 1.266490274 
 Z(q) -0.224008553 
-
0.094819496 1.349929108 *3.134406915 
 Z*(q) -0.182153672 
-
0.07357888 1.04104731 *2.493899977 
Slovenia VR(q)  1.190520344 1.364730679 1.570947602 1.936664892 
 Z(q) *12.25565708 10.70895072 10.87774994 12.12358353 
 Z*(q) *4.033688156 4.18998172 4.995000745 6.358809495 
Notes: VR(q) – variance ratio estimate, Z(q) - test statistic for null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic increments random walk, Z* (q) - test statistic for null hypothesis of 
heteroskedastic increments random walk; the critical value for Z(q) and Z*(q) at the 5 
percent level of significance is 2.49, asterisk indicates significance at this level; 
Sampling intervals (q) are in days.  
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For example, if we consider the Czech Republic, the null hypothesis that daily 
equity returns follow a homoskedastic random walk is rejected at Z(2)=13.294.  
Rejection of the null hypothesis of a random walk under homoskedasticity for a 2-day 
period is also a test of the null hypothesis of a homoskedastic random walk under the 
alternative sampling periods and we may therefore conclude that the equity returns in 
the Czech Republic do not follow a random walk. However, rejection of the null 
hypothesis under homoskedasticity could result from heteroskedasticity and/or 
autocorrelation in the return series. After a heteroskedastic-consistent statistic is 
calculated, the null hypothesis is also rejected at Z*(2) = 4.108. The heteroskedastic 
random walk hypothesis is thus rejected because of autocorrelation in the daily 
increments in returns on the Czech Republic stock market. We may conclude that the 
Czech Republic equity market is unambiguously weak form inefficient, along with 
Estonia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, which display similar results to the Czech 
Republic. 
Further, Lo and MacKinlay (1988) show that for q=2, estimates of the variance 
ratio minus one and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient estimator of daily price 
changes are asymptotically equal (the Czech Republic serial correlation coefficient in 
Table 4.2 is 0.2188).  On this basis, the estimated first order autocorrelation coefficient 
is 0.2192 corresponding to the estimated variance ratio 𝑉𝑅෢ (2) of 1.2192 (i.e. 1.2192 - 
1.0000).  Further, where 𝑉𝑅෢ (2) <1 a mean reverting process is implied, whereas when 
𝑉𝑅෢ (2)  >1 persistence is suggested. This indicates that there is positive autocorrelation 
(or persistence) in the Czech Republic equity returns over the long horizon.  
By observing the results for the Slovak Republic, the hypothesis that it is weak 
form efficient as at none of the sampling intervals are the test statistics for the null 
hypotheses of homoskedastic, Z (q) and heteroskedastic, Z*(q) random walks greater 
than the critical value of 2.49.  Alternatively in the case of Latvia, the null hypothesis of 
a homoskedastic random walk is rejected [Z (5) =4.657], but the null hypotheses of 
heteroskedastic random walk is not [Z*(q) =0.765]. This is also true for Bulgaria and 
this rejection of the null hypotheses of a homoskedastic random walk could at least in 
part be due to heteroskedasticity in the returns and not exclusively due to 
autocorrelation in returns. The null hypotheses of homoskedastic and heteroskedastic 
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random walks in stock market returns for Hungary and Lithuania are rejected and these 
markets can be classified as inefficientat at the end of the period investigated.  This 
result for Hungary contrasts with both Rockinger and Urga (2004), and Worthington 
and Higgs (2004) who find weak form efficiency in this market.  From the evidence so 
far from our serial correlation test, runs test and multiple variance ratio test, the Slovak 
Republic appears strongly to have achieved weak form efficiency in its stock market, 
followed by Latvia which derives evidence from our runs tests and heteroskedastic 
random walk in its stock returns. 
4.5 Tests for Random Walk after the European Union Enlargement in 2004 
After establishing ever closer trading links with the EU, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia joined 
the EU in 2004. In its World Economic Outlook of 2004, the IMF noted that progress 
towards EU Membership has caused a strong stimulus for financial integration for CEE 
economies through convergence. In addition, Lane (2001) notes that the entire process 
has also been supported by foreign direct investment inflows that followed 
corresponding trade linkages, and that convergence in the real economy also caused 
convergence of corporate cash flows, financial market risk premia and the overall cost 
of capital, resulting in increased integration of financial markets.  
Lane (2001) also argues that joining the EU will make the region substantially less 
risky from the point of view of domestic and foreign investors. EU membership greatly 
constrains arbitrary trade and indirect tax policy changes. It also locks in well-defined 
property rights, competition policy and State-aid policy. By securing open capital 
markets and rights of establishment, membership assures investors that they can invest 
and withdraw funds without difficulty.  Finally, EU membership guarantees that 
regional products have full access to the EU28 markets. On the macro side, membership 
put the region on a possible path to eventual monetary union and thus provides a solid 
hedge against inflation spurts. These two aspects of membership are mutually 
reinforcing and will raise investor confidence in the region.  Given these observations, it 
seems natural to break our data and test the CEE stock markets for weak form efficiency 
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after 2004 following the 2003 Treaty of Accession which came into force on 1st May 
2004. 
Descriptive statistics for the data, starting on 1st May 2004 and running until 31st 
July 2009, the latest date for which data was available at the time the tests were 
conducted, are given in Table 4.4 The null hypothesis of no serial correlation (Table 
4.5) for all ten markets in the CEE region is rejected at the 0.05 level of significance, 
implying that all markets are inefficient over the sample period. Results for the ADF 
and PP t-statistics are also reported in Table 4.5 and reject the null hypotheses of a unit 
root at the 0.05 level since all of the return series examined are stationary thus implying 
that all the CEE markets investigated are inefficient. Similar results are reported for the 
serial correlation tests, which reinforces this conclusion  
For the runs tests, the estimated z-values reported in Table 4.5 are significant at 
0.05 level for all markets with the exception of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia 
and Poland, implying that these markets are weak-form efficient. Table 6 presents our 
results for the multiple variance ratio tests of returns in the ten CEE equity markets at 
sampling intervals 2,5,10 and 20 days, corresponding to one-day, one week, one 
fortnight and one month periods respectively. As indicated in the earlier test, an asterisk 
denotes the maximum absolute value of the test statistic that exceeds the critical value 
of 2.49 at the 0.05 level of significance and thereby indicates whether the null 
hypothesis of a random walk is rejected. The results show that we can reject the 
hypothesis that the ten CEE markets investigated here are weak form efficient under 
homoskedastic conditions. However, both the Czech Republic and Hungary fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of heteroskedastic random walk, implying that these markets are 
weak-form efficient under heteroskedastic conditions for the sample period.  
. 
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   Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics of CEE Stock Market Returns. 
                  
Market Start End Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque- 
Bera 
JB p-
value Observations 
          
Bulgaria MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 -0.00017 0.014886 -1.23156 8.870848 6.97E+01 0.001 1388 
Czech Republic MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 0.000339 0.017516 -0.6352 14.45047 1.22E+04 0.001 1404 
Estonia MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 2.8E-05 0.011083 -0.67662 7.807993 3.88E+03 0.001 1494 
Hungary MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 0.000424 0.018117 -0.20849 7.033073 2.87E+03 0.001 1401 
Latvia MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 -7.3E-05 0.012656 -0.19426 6.549172 2.64E+03 0.001 1481 
Lithuania MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 7.16E-05 0.012037 -0.59418 13.74381 1.15E+04 0.001 1460 
Poland MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 0.000348 0.014116 -0.45042 3.396849 7.39E+02 0.001 1449 
Romania MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 0.000395 0.019818 -0.6773 5.41962 1.80E+03 0.001 1394 
Slovak Republic MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 0.000374 0.01119 -0.0242 17.37101 1.70E+04 0.001 1359 
Slovenia MAY-01-2004 JUL-31-2009 4.42E-05 0.011603 -0.77721 10.55315 6.55E+03 0.001 1392 
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           Table 4.5: Serial Correlation Runs and Unit Root Tests for CEE Equity Markets. 
 
  
Notes: 95 % confidence interval considered for all the tests. For Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests hypotheses are H0: unit 
root, H1: no unit root (stationary). The lag orders in the ADF equations are determined by the significance of the coefficient for the 
lagged terms. The Phillips-Peron (PP) unit root test hypotheses are H0: unit root, H1: no unit root (stationary). Intercepts only in the 
series. 
 
Market Coefficient p-value Cases 
< 
Mean 
Cases 
>= 
Mean 
Total 
Cases 
Number 
of Runs 
Runs Z 
Value 
p-value ADF t-
statistic 
ADF p-
value 
PP t-
statistic 
PP p-
value 
Bulgaria 0.1758 0 644 744 1388 586 -5.6626 1.421E-08 -31.5017 1.00E-03 -34.543 1.00E-03 
Czech Republic 0.0837 7.687E-07 655 749 1404 671 -1.5207 0.1283 -34.4462 1.00E-03 -34.3609 1.00E-03 
Estonia 0.1916 0 749 745 1494 617 -6.7545 1.274E-11 -32.1614 1.00E-03 -34.3538 1.00E-03 
Hungary 0.1054 2.0373E-09 681 720 1401 685 -0.8269 0.4083 -33.6911 1.00E-03 -33.5336 1.00E-03 
Latvia 0.0109 0.00016985 689 792 1481 739 -0.0304 0.9759 -38.3609 1.00E-03 -38.9494 1.00E-03 
Lithuania 0.1684 0 727 733 1460 643 -4.581 4.513E-06 -32.557 1.00E-03 -35.3701 1.00E-03 
Poland 0.0917 0.0125 725 724 1449 727 0.0526 0.9581 -34.7994 1.00E-03 -35.0495 1.00E-03 
Romania 0.1342 3.9248E-07 674 720 1394 623 -3.9558 7.525E-05 -32.7277 1.00E-03 -33.1295 1.00E-03 
Slovak Republic 0.0431 2.82E-07 785 574 1359 604 -3.3157 0.0009192 -35.637 1.00E-03 -36.6371 1.00E-03 
Slovenia 0.2427 0 665 727 1392 535 -8.6035 5.637E-18 -29.2085 1.00E-03 -29.5101 1.00E-03 
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Table 4.6: Multiple Variance Ratio Tests for CEE Equity Markets. 
 
Market Statistics q=2 q=5 q=10 q=20 
      
Bulgaria VR(q)  1.17724212 1.587756 1.98746 2.782865 
 Z(q) *6.60330991 9.994737 10.89586 13.36487 
 Z*(q) *2.88511408 4.339357 4.957701 6.588574 
Czech-Republic VR(q)  1.08377602 1.006937 1.029689 1.12809 
 Z(q) *3.13908656 0.118645 0.329474 0.96572 
 Z*(q) 1.17771126 0.044955 0.130779 0.400053 
Estonia VR(q)  1.19224144 1.539981 1.90315 2.524745 
 Z(q) *7.43057294 9.526496 10.3391 11.85834 
 Z*(q) *3.50863949 4.724967 5.57152 6.794994 
Hungary VR(q)  1.10682558 1.080678 1.121713 1.121255 
 Z(q) *3.9984743 1.378336 1.349289 0.913207 
 Z*(q) 1.91739458 0.704463 0.714611 0.492217 
Latvia VR(q)  1.01219381 1.059149 1.25772 1.607382 
 Z(q) 0.4692638 1.038968 *2.937464 4.703177 
 Z*(q) 0.21511206 0.491368 1.466763 *2.512325 
Lithuania VR(q)  1.16959589 1.424333 1.820271 2.631245 
 Z(q) *6.48024977 7.400528 9.282853 12.54143 
 Z*(q) 1.95416526 2.311076 *3.14441 4.792931 
Poland VR(q)  1.09131388 1.188214 1.280897 1.3686 
 Z(q) *3.47592957 3.270129 3.166863 2.823199 
 Z*(q) *2.87803773 2.538517 2.326037 2.054033 
Romania VR(q)  1.13552544 1.181719 1.289537 1.590488 
 Z(q) *5.06001983 3.096782 3.201715 4.436025 
 Z*(q) *2.81866093 1.781474 1.976496 2.893782 
Slovak Republic VR(q)  1.04448722 1.188613 1.397955 1.777141 
 Z(q) 1.6400045 *3.173665 4.345011 5.764496 
 Z*(q) 1.42924729 *2.685982 3.731174 5.000563 
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Slovenia VR(q)  1.24448628 1.35266 1.411285 1.807777 
 Z(q) *9.12166478 6.005587 4.544748 6.064046 
 Z*(q) *3.57332966 2.392543 1.974851 2.90443 
 
Notes: VR(q) – variance ratio estimate, Z(q) - test statistic for null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic increments random walk, Z* (q) - test statistic for null hypothesis of 
heteroskedastic increments random walk; the critical value for Z(q) and Z*(q) at the 5 percent 
level of significance is 2.49, asterisk indicates significance at this level; Sampling intervals 
(q) are in days.  
The Slovak Republic, which showed signs of weak-form market efficiency (runs test 
and serial correlation test) in the longer sampling period, fails to replicate this finding after 
EU enlargement in 2004 on the multiple variance ratio test shown in Table 4.6.  One 
reason for this somewhat surprising result might be the unprecedented situation caused by 
the financial turmoil beginning in 2008 and the coordinated response of the individual 
central banks caused the target group of stock markets to move together (comovement of 
stock markets). Further testing would be necessary to assess whether the Slovak Republic 
stock market is indeed efficient, as the earlier test results imply, and that the later result 
simply arises because of unusual circumstances.  On the other hand, this begs the question 
of why the stock markets of the Czech Republic and Hungary showed signs of weak form 
efficiency after accession (runs test and serial correlation test), despite the financial crisis. 
One possibility is that these markets are characterised by relatively high market 
capitalisation and turnover compared to the market in the Slovak Republic and other 
markets in the region as shown.  (See Table 4.7.) 
  
133 
 
 
Table 4.7 Market Capitalisation and Turnover as a Percentage of GDP in Selected CEE 
Countries in 2005. 
 
 
Country Market 
Capitalisation (% 
GDP in 2005) 
Market Turnover 
(% GDP in 2005) 
Bulgaria 8 26 
Czech Rep 39 96 
Estonia 41 49 
Hungary 46 102 
Latvia 12 41 
Lithuania 13 20 
Poland 38 79 
Romania 15 78 
Slovak Rep 17 71 
Slovenia 24 64 
 
  Source: Stock Market websites 
4.6 Conclusions  
This chapter tests for weak form market efficiency in ten CEE equity markets by 
employing three different tests on daily returns from these stock markets. These tests are 
(i) the parametric serial correlation coefficient and nonparametric runs test which tests for 
the presence of serial correlation; (ii) the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
unit root tests to test for non-stationarity as a necessary condition for a random walk and 
(iii) multiple variance test statistics to test for random walks under distributional 
assumptions of homoskedasticity and heteroskedasticity. These tests are carried out on the 
historical data of all the indices. 
The results of our tests for serial correlation conclusively reject the presence of 
random walks in daily returns for all markets except the Slovak Republic for the entire 
sample period considered, while the presence of random walks for all ten CEE markets is 
rejected for the data following EU accession of the countries in our sample. Similarly, the 
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unit root tests conclude that unit roots, as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a 
random walk, are absent from all the markets under both the time periods considered. 
Finally, the multiple variance ratio procedure also rejects the presence of random walks in 
all the CEE countries except for the Slovak Republic and Latvia for the longer duration, 
and the Czech Republic and Hungary for the period after EU enlargement in 2004.  Our 
analysis implies that there are only limited grounds for suggesting that any of the markets 
in the CEE region were efficient by the end of 2008. Our tests for a random walk provides 
the most encouraging results for the Slovak Republic with our serial correlation test and 
our variance ratio procedure both implying that security prices follow a random walk on 
the Bratislava stock market.  However, these findings are not confirmed by our runs test 
and no firm conclusions can therefore be drawn about market efficiency in the Slovak 
Stock Market.  Even less encouraging results are reported for the other stock markets in 
our investigation and the implication is that potentially profitable trading opportunities 
exist in these markets over and above the market return.  Of course, whether potentially 
profitable trading opportunities exist depends on trading costs and the magnitude of risk 
adjusted returns.  Notwithstanding this, if returns above the market return are recorded, the 
market is clearly not efficient. 
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CHAPTER 5 
TESTING MARKET EFFICIENCY IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN 
EQUITY MARKETS: A PANEL DATA APPROACH 
5.1 Introduction 
Ever since Fama (1970) there has been a growing body of literature investigating 
stock market efficiency.  An efficient market instantaneously processes new information 
and generates a constantly updated set of prices such that prices in the market are without 
systematic tendencies leaving investors no opportunity for arbitrage.  To the extent that 
markets are efficient therefore, it is impossible for investors to earn above average returns, 
or, as Fama (1998) puts it, “the expected value of abnormal returns is zero but chance 
generates deviations from zero (anomalies) in both directions” (p284).  Of course, whether 
potentially profitable trading opportunities exist depends on trading costs and the 
magnitude of risk adjusted returns.  Notwithstanding this, if returns above the market 
return are consistently recorded, the market is clearly not efficient. 
Most investigations into stock market efficiency have tested the weak form hypotheses 
where past information on asset prices is contained in the current price of the asset.   Until 
the late seventies, studies overwhelmingly confirmed that in developed markets at least, 
stock markets were informationally efficient.  Subsequent evidence began to question this 
finding and a growing number of studies indicated that anomalies sometimes exist 
offering investors the prospect of abnormal returns by adopting a trading strategy based on 
historical data and publicly available information.   
Stock market efficiency is important for a variety of reasons.  Fair pricing of equity is 
essential if investors are to be encouraged to trade and hold equity.  If equity is not fairly 
priced, investors might feel no confidence that the resale value of equity at the time of sale 
would reflect the fundamental value of the firm.  To the extent that this is the case, equity 
would fail to offer a return commensurate with the risk investors are exposed to by 
supplying risk capital to the private sector.  The implication is that the private sector 
would find it difficult to raise risk capital and this would impede economic growth.  To 
encourage savings to be diverted into equity, investors need to know that the market is a 
‘fair game’.  Market efficiency is also important to company managers aiming to 
maximise shareholder wealth.  In an efficient market, equity prices will accurately reflect 
wealth generating decisions by managers who will see their success signalled to 
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shareholders through rising equity prices. In this way, an efficient market provides 
feedback (positive or negative) on managerial decisions and encourages the pursuit of 
wealth creating strategies.  Harrison and Moore (2012) have argued, there are also wider 
implications for the economy as a whole and this implies that stock market efficiency also 
matters to policy makers.  Accurate and reliable price signals from the stock market are 
crucial in promoting allocative efficiency as noted by the EBRD - “Markets tend to 
provide for an efficient allocation of resources when information about the goods and 
services being exchanged is widely available and reliable, when entry into the market by 
alternative providers is free, and when the exchange is not dependent upon an ongoing 
relationship between buyer and seller. Assuming that these preconditions are met, a 
securities market, like any other market, can deliver an efficient allocation of resources.” 
(pp. 101)   
5.2 Methodology 
Weak form of information efficiency of a financial market implies that the behaviour 
of its index (the market portfolio) is described by a random-walk model of the following 
kind: 
𝑃௧ = 1 ⋅ 𝑃௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧,       (1) 
where 𝑡 = 1 … 𝑇, implying that the current value of the market index 𝑃௧  depends 
only on its previous value 𝑃௧ିଵ (the 1st lag) and a non-systematic stochastic term 𝜀௧  - a 
white-noise stochastic process with zero mean and constant variance). 
To test the hypothesis of the weak form of information efficiency of a market, we 
need first to estimate the following econometric specification: 
𝑃௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝑃௧ିଵ + 𝜀௧,      (2) 
After estimating Eq.(2), we then test the joint null hypothesis 𝐻଴: 𝛼 = 0, 𝛽 = 1. 
Two principal points are emphasised here. First, it is usually the case that market index 
time-series are non-stationary, which implies that market index returns should be 
calculated in order to avoid inference problems (see Granger and Newbold (1974)). We 
run the appropriate non-stationarity tests in the following section. 
     Secondly, since the focus of this research is on the newly emerged stock markets 
Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) all of which have 
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followed a similar transition to market economy stsus, it is reasonable to study the extent 
to which these stock markets are weak form efficient as part of a wider issue of stock 
market development in these countries.  To assess this, we adopt a panel model approach.   
We begin by taking logarithms of the market indices and transforming Eq.(2) into the 
following basic panel model specification: 
𝑟௜௧ = 𝛼௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ ,      (3) 
where 𝑖 = 1 … 𝑁 is the country index; 𝑟௜௧ = [ln(𝑃௜௧) − ln(𝑃௜,௧ିଵ)] ⋅ 100% =
𝛥ln(𝑃௜௧) ⋅ 100% is the time-series of returns of the 𝑖-th market portfolio. By introducing th 
subscripts 𝑖𝑡 to the intercept term 𝛼, we explicitly show that this parameter is (potentially) 
allowed to change both over the objects (countries) and the time-moments. 
Numerous studies in the field have confirmed that market returns are often 
autocorrelated and if neglected, this might introduce inference problems. For this reason 
and following, for example, from Dockery and Kavussanos (1996), we amend Eq.(3) by 
including an autoregressive term to obtain the final specification:  
𝑟௜௧ = 𝛼௜௧ + 𝜙ଵ ⋅ 𝑟௜,௧ିଵ + 𝜀௜௧.    (4) 
      which we test later. 
We have the following observations on the parameters of Eq. (4). With respect to 
panel data, if the parameter 𝛼 is only allowed to change across countries (denoted as 𝛼௜), 
but 𝜙ଵ remains constant, then the corresponding model is the so called fixed effects panel 
model (or FE-model). If the parameter 𝛼 varies both over countries and time (denoted as 
𝛼௜௧), but 𝜙ଵ remains constant, then the corresponding model is the so called random effects 
panel model (or RE-model). If parameter 𝛼 is constant across countries and time (no 
subscripts specified), then the corresponding naive panel model is the so called the pooled 
model and basically represents the idea that all of the observations are homogeneous and 
there is no need to consider the panel structure in its entirety. 
In the context of Eq.(4), the implication is that both of the parameters 𝛼[௜௧] and 𝜙ଵ 
should be zero (technically, the corresponding estimates should not be statistically 
significant) if the market is weak form efficient. To facilitate this, we first identify the 
appropriate panel specification (pooled, FE-, or RE-model) for our dataset by running the 
usual tests (the F-test, the Breusch-Pagan test and the Hausman test).  If our tests of the 
model’s parameters are statistically significant, there is evidence of weak form 
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inefficiency in the corresponding markets.  Before we do this, we outline the dataset used 
in this chapter. 
      5.3 Data 
In this chapter we consider 10 Central and East European markets (the codes for 
their market indices are given in parentheses after the country names): Bulgaria (bulx), the 
Czech Republic (czex), Estonia (estx), Hungary (hunx), Latvia (latx), Lithuania (litx), 
Poland (polx), Romania (romx), the Slovak Republic (slvax), and Slovenia (slvex). 
Daily values of the corresponding market indices were collected from Datastream for 
the period from 6th January 2012 – 29th July 2015.  The choice of sample is a little 
arbitrary but we wanted to allow sufficient time for our target markets to settle after the 
financial crash of 2007-2009 (post 2012) and yet still have a meaningful dataset of 9290 
observations. 
5.3.1 Descriptive analysis of the index levels 
Figure 5.1 shows the graphs of the index levels of the financial market indices 
investigated in this chapter. This allows a first visual identification of the non-stationary 
behaviour of the indices.  However, behaviour of the idicies must be interpreted with caution 
since it is stationarity of the returns which indicates market efficiency or its absence. 
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Figure 5.1 Daily index levels of Central and East European Markets 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics of the different index levels 
  Mean Median Max. Min. SD Skew Kurtosis 
Bulx 442.636 457.590 622.850 287.650 97.634 -0.107 -1.262 
Czex 976.996 982.140 1066.140 852.900 43.918 -0.598 -0.049 
Estx 764.222 792.880 892.970 545.250 87.816 -0.830 -0.482 
Hunx 18534.622 18387.990 22850.530 15686.690 1373.116 1.248 1.901 
Latx 420.036 420.830 487.090 362.530 28.440 0.106 -0.805 
Litx 412.057 414.920 504.290 303.670 57.666 -0.198 -1.243 
Polx 48446.592 50338.710 57379.450 36653.280 5157.532 -0.455 -0.993 
Romx 6018.467 6036.040 7608.020 4303.570 936.890 -0.037 -1.322 
Slvax 206.831 200.420 267.510 178.650 20.144 1.114 0.476 
Slvex 675.626 643.510 839.400 501.270 98.158 0.137 -1.349 
Table 5.2 Normality and non-stationarity test results for the different index levels 
  Jarque-Bera test ADF-test (w/o trend) ADF-test (w/trend) 
 Ho: Yt ~ N Ho: Yt ~ I(1) Ho: Yt ~ I(1) 
Bulx 63.036** -1.309 -0.283 
Czex 55.652** -3.074** -3.388 
Estx 115.716** -2.181 -1.990 
Hunx 383.203** -1.437 -1.866 
Latx 26.537** -1.755 -1.912 
Litx 65.553** -0.902 -2.514 
Polx 70.013** -1.810 -2.871 
romx 67.539** -0.946 -2.974 
Slvax 201.823** -0.512 -2.669 
Slvex 73.016** -1.220 -2.317 
 
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics of the index levels used in this investigation, 
while Table 5.2 provides the results of the Jarque-Bera normality test (with the null of 
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normality of the tested data; see Jarque, Bera(1981)) and the non-stationarity Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller test (with and without the linear trend component in the test equation; see 
Dickey, Fuller (1979)). The null hypothesis of the ADF-test is that the time series tested is 
non-stationary.   
Non-zero skewness and kurtoses of the time-series give a clear indication of non-
normality in the distribution of the observations. The formal results suggest that the null 
hypothesis of normality of the index levels is rejected in all cases, a finding typical of data 
on stock market returns.  The results of the ADF-test show that all the time-series are non-
stationary with one technical exception of czex index (test specification is without trend) 
which may be considered as a statistical aberration since the graph of czex clearly 
indicates a random walk, that is non-stationary, behaviour. 
5.3.2 Descriptive analysis of the index returns 
Fig. 5.2 presents the graphs of the index returns. The visual analysis of the graphs 
tentatively suggests that the time-series displayed are expected to be stationary since in all 
cases they appear to fluctuate around constant means. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of the index returns 
  Mean Median Max. Min. SD Skew Kurtosis 
r.bulx 0.044 0.000 5.638 -4.737 0.839 -0.044 5.186 
r.czex 0.014 0.007 3.358 -3.964 0.915 -0.149 0.896 
r.estx 0.050 0.001 5.298 -2.179 0.636 0.723 6.659 
r.hunx 0.034 0.000 4.969 -4.918 1.095 0.173 1.509 
r.latx 0.016 0.000 3.293 -5.880 0.778 -0.623 5.061 
r.litx 0.054 0.006 2.910 -3.844 0.499 -0.153 7.203 
r.polx 0.035 0.000 2.882 -5.354 0.867 -0.514 3.371 
r.romx 0.060 0.022 3.413 -4.297 0.820 -0.416 3.779 
r.slvax 0.017 0.000 9.118 -9.329 1.094 0.023 13.047 
r.slvex 0.024 0.000 3.420 -5.314 0.975 -0.218 2.104 
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Figure 5.2 Daily Index Returns of the Central and East European Markets
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Table 5.4 Normality and non-stationarity test results for the index returns 
  Jarque-Bera test ADF-test (w/o trend) ADF-test (w/trend) 
 Ho: Yt ~ N Ho: Yt ~ I(1) Ho: Yt ~ I(1) 
r.bulx 1048.301** -21.517** -21.588** 
r.czex 35.110** -22.104** -22.091** 
r.estx 1808.608** -20.969** -21.042** 
r.hunx 93.869** -20.909** -20.937** 
r.latx 1058.412** -24.573** -24.567** 
r.litx 2024.313** -23.399** -23.412** 
r.polx 484.538** -21.455** -21.464** 
r.romx 584.016** -18.763** -18.756** 
r.slvax 6623.765** -25.516** -25.587** 
r.slvex 180.603** -21.097** -21.087** 
 
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide summary statistics and normality and non-stationarity test 
results for the returns of the indices. The reported values for skewness and kurtosis again 
suggest non-normality of the return distributions, a finding supported by the formal 
Jarque-Bera test which rejects the null of normality in all cases. However, the ADF-test 
now shows that all the time-series of returns are stationary (both with and without a linear 
trend in the test equations) which allows us to continue working with the returns without 
potential inference problems in the panel regression models. 
     5.4 Panel regression results 
In this section we consider the results of choosing and interpreting an appropriate 
panel specification (as described by Eq.(4)) for our dataset. In this chapter, we follow a two 
step approach.   
1. From our specifications above (pooled, FE-model and RE-model) we select an 
appropriate model based on the F-test, the Breusch-Pagan test, and the Hausman test. 
2. We then test the validity and interpret the estimates of the model selected in 
order to assess whether the markets investigated are consistent with weak form efficiency. 
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To select the appropriate model, we estimate Eq.(4) using the three specifications. 
 
Table 5.5 Pooled model coefficient estimates 
  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.03493 0.009031 3.868 0.0001106 
ret.1 -0.001632 0.01037 -0.1574 0.8749 
 
Table 5.6 FE-model coefficient estimates 
  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
ret.1 -0.001969 0.01037 -0.1899 0.8494 
 
Table 5.7 RE-model coefficient estimates 
  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept) 0.02796 0.0004953 56.44 0 
ret.1 0.203 0.0101 20.11 4.542e-88 
Tables 5.5-5.7 provide the formal estimates of our panel specifications. These are 
interpreted so as to select the most appropriate model for testing our panel dataset.   
5.5 Choosing the appropriate panel specification 
 To select the appropriate panel specification, we make three comparisons: 
1. Compare the pooled model to the FE-model using the standard F-test for panel  
data. 
2. Compare the pooled model to the RE-model using the Breusch-Pagan test (see  
Breusch and Pagan (1980)). 
3. Compare the RE-model to the FE-model using the Hausman test (see  
Hausman, Taylor (1981)). 
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5.5.1 Pooled vs. FE-model: the F-test 
The null hypothesis of the F-test is that the pooled model is adequate, while the 
alternative hypothesis is that the FE-model (with fixed individual effects) is the best choice. 
Table 5.8 Results of the F-test for the panel model choice 
 Test statistic df1 df2 P value Alternative hypothesis 
0.3408 9 9279 0.9615 significant effects 
Table 5.8 above reports the results of this test. Since the p-value of 0.9615 is greater 
than the 5% level of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis and preliminarily 
choose the pooled model. 
5.5.2 Pooled vs. RE-model: the Breusch-Pagan test 
The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan test is that the pooled model is adequate, 
while the alternative hypothesis is that the RE-model (with random individual effects) is the 
best option. 
 
Table 5.9. Results of the Breusch-Pagan test for the panel model choice 
Test statistic df P value Alternative hypothesis 
2.405 1 0.121 significant effects 
 
Table 5.9 above reports the results of this test. Since the p-value of 0.121 is greater 
than the 5% level of significance, again we cannot reject the null hypothesis and once 
again preliminarily choose the pooled model. 
5.5.3 RE- vs. FE-model: the Hausman test 
Finally, we run the Hausman test which null hypothesis is about the adequacy of the 
RE-model, while the alternative hypothesis is about the adequacy of the FE-model. 
Table 5.10. Results of the Hausman test for the FE- and RE-models 
Test statistic df P value Alternative hypothesis 
7504 1 0 * * * RE-model is inconsistent 
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Table 5.10 above summarises the results of this test. Since the p-value of 0 is less than 
the 5% level of significance, we reject the null hypothesis in favour of the alternative thus 
concluding that out of these two models the FE-model is the better choice. 
5.6 Selecting the final model 
Our results might seem somewhat surprising and formally suggest that we have to 
work with the pooled model. As noted earlier, both 𝛼[௜௧] and 𝜙ଵ (in Eq.(4)) should be zero 
(the corresponding estimates should not be statistically significant) for the market to be 
weak form efficient. This implies that if our suggestion is true and the true parameters are 
actually zeroes, then the results of both the F-test and the Breusch-Pagan test are as expected 
because in this specific case the FE- and RE-models (with zero 'true' values of the 
parameters) look exactly the same as the pooled model with these parameters. In other 
words, neither of our tests is able to distinguish between the pooled model and the panel 
models.  We should, nevertheless, expect the presence of individual effects in the data 
because of differences in each of the markets that make up our panel of markets. Thus, we 
continue working with a panel model and the results of the Hausman test clearly suggest 
that the preferred choice in our case is the FE-model.  
5.7 The FE-model: adequacy testing and coefficient interpretation 
Since in our dataset we have as many as 929 daily observations for each market in our 
sample, but only 10 markets, it is crucially important for the estimated FE model to test 
for serial correlation in the residuals. To do this, we use the Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge 
test for serial correlation in panel data (see Breusch (1978); Godfrey (1978) and 
Wooldridge (2002)). 
Table 5.11. Results of the panel Breusch-Godfrey/Wooldridge serial 
correlation test for the FE-model 
Test statistic df1 df2 P value Alternative hypothesis 
1.737 1 9288 0.1876 serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors 
Table 5.11 above summarises the results of this test. Since the p-value of 0.1876 is 
greater than the 5% level of significance, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation in the FE-model which implies that the model is correctly specified.  Having 
estimated (Table 5.6) and appropriately tested the FE-model, we now focus on testing 
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information efficiency in those markets investigated in this chapter.  To assess this, we 
again test whether both 𝛼௜ and 𝜙ଵ in Eq.(4) are zero in which case the estimates are 
statistically insignificant. 
Our estimate of 𝜙ଵ is -0.0019689 with the p-value 0.8494. Since the p-value is less 
than the 5% level of significance, we conclude that the estimate of 𝜙ଵ is statistically 
insignificant which preliminarily supports the hypothesis of weak market efficiency. 
We turn now to the intercept terms 𝛼௜ reported in Table 5.12.  
Table 5.12 Intercept term estimates in the FE-model 
  Estimate Std. Error t-value Pr(>|t|) 
r.bulx 0.04439 0.02855 1.555 0.1200 
r.czex 0.01397 0.02854 0.4894 0.6246 
r.estx 0.04967 0.02855 1.74 0.0819 
r.hunx 0.0344 0.02855 1.205 0.2282 
r.latx 0.01648 0.02855 0.5774 0.5637 
r.litx 0.05416 0.02855 1.897 0.0579 
r.polx 0.03516 0.02855 1.232 0.2181 
r.romx 0.05971 0.02855 2.091 0.0365 
r.slvax 0.01715 0.02855 0.6009 0.5479 
r.slvex 0.02429 0.02855 0.851 0.3948 
In all cases, except the Romanian stock market, the coefficients are statistically 
insignificant (the corresponding p-values are greater than the 5% level of significance). 
Thus, for all stock markets investigated except Romania, we find support for these 
markets being weak from informationally efficient.  However, in other research not 
included in this thesis, Harrison and Paton (2005 and 2007) find evidence that the 
Romanian Stock Market is informationally efficient. 
 5.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigate weak form efficiency in a group CEE markets using 
daily data from 6th January 2012 – 29th July 2015.  The choice of dates is somewhat arbitrary 
but the period selected allows markets to settle down after the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009 whilst still allowing for the creation of a meaning dataset. 
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There is strong evidence that well-functioning and efficient markets are important 
in promoting growth and development within an economy.  However, efficient markets also 
ensure that investors engage in a fair gamble when buying equity in companies with nothing 
to enable other investors to make gains by strategic decision based knowledge of regular 
patterns in return indices.  This is likely to encourage the development and growth of 
markets. 
We apply a panel data model and from the range of models available and on the 
basis of the usual test we select the fixed effect panel model.  The panel data model is a 
considerably more sophisticated approach than that adopted in chapter 4 and is therefore 
likely to yield more reliable results.  We also use a longer data set to test whether market 
efficiency has evolved since the earlier tests were carried out.  Our results from testing our 
panel data model show that for the period investigated, most markets in our target group are 
weak form efficient.  The exception is Romania which still shows signs of market 
inefficiency.  However, other studies find the Romanian Stock Market weak form efficient 
and there is therefore, at the very least, some ambiguity about this result which suggests the 
need for further testing using a different methodology.  We take our findings as providing 
supportive evidence that CEE markets are well-developed – a theme we explore more fully 
in chapters 6-8 using a different approach to stock market development. 
  
150 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS FROM LONDON AND FRANKFURT TO CENTRAL AND 
EAST EUROPEAN STOCK MARKETS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
One approach to testing for stock market development is to test for stock market 
comovement.  The literature overwhelmingly confirms that the stock markets of developed 
economies are cointegrated.  (See for example, Aggarwal, Lucey, and Muckley, 2003 Ben 
Zion et al 1996, Dickinson 2000, Floros  2005, Koch and Koch 1991, Longin and Solnik 
2001, Meric and Meric 1989 and Bessler and Yang 2003).  There have been fewer 
investigations into stock market linkages among emerging economies with most focussing on 
Asia and Latin America.  (See for example, Koutmos and Booth 1995, Chen, Firth, and Rui 
2002, Manning, 2002, Ng, 2002 and Fujii 2005). Only a few studies have investigated 
comovement between the emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
developed markets of Western Europe.  In contrast linkages between developed markets and 
emerging markets appears to be relatively weak.  Bekeart and Harvey (1997) and Wong et al 
(2004).  It is therefore legitimate to test for stock market development in the CEE markets 
investigated here with developed Western markets.  By implication, the greater the degree of 
comovement CEE markets and developed Western markets the greater the evidence of stock 
market development in CEE countries. 
All of the former planned economies of CEE have now completed their transition to 
market economy status and all have functioning stock markets organised along conventional 
lines with electronic trading systems and the usual stock exchange departments (trading, 
registry, clearing and settlement etc).  Studies have generally shown that stock markets in the 
CEE countries are efficient (see for example Harrison and Paton 2005, Ajayi, Mehdian and 
Perry 2004, and Rockinger and Urga 2001) and the recent enlargement of the EU to include 
ten countries from CEE (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia) therefore provides a unique opportunity 
to investigate the extent of stock market comovement in the enlarged EU.   
An accurate assessment of the degree of comovement between international stock 
markets is important for several reasons.  For investors there are benefits from international 
portfolio diversification only if returns from international stock markets are not significantly 
correlated.  If returns are highly correlated, diversifying a portfolio internationally offers no 
significant advantages over a well diversified domestic portfolio.  Stock market comovement 
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is also of considerable interest to policy makers because, to the extent that investors hold 
internationally diversified portfolios, highly correlated international returns have a different 
impact on wealth than returns that are either uncorrelated or only weakly correlated.  Through 
the wealth channel, the impact on expectations and the dissemination of equity market shocks, 
the differing levels of stock market comovement imply different effects on the macro 
economy and this has important implications for the planning of monetary policy and the 
timing of monetary intervention.  Such policy makers are also interested in whether stock 
markets exhibit comovement because in a world of increasingly liberalised capital flows, the 
degree of stock market comovement can impact on the stability of the international monetary 
system.  For example, if comovement is weak a downturn in one stock market might lead to 
capital flight from that country to other countries and this could impact on exchange rates. 
There are good reasons for believing that stock markets in CEE might be increasingly 
integrated with the developed stock markets of Western Europe and, if these linkages do exist, 
they are likely to be strongest between those countries from CEE which have been granted 
EU Membership, especially with those that have adopted the euro (the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria and 
Romania) and Frankfurt and London, the latter being the dominant exchanges in the area.  As 
full members of the EU, these CEE countries are establishing stronger economic ties with 
other EU Members through trade, cross-border investments and policy coordination.  The 
Maastricht Criteria establishes rules for entry into EMU which are designed to promote 
economic convergence. Studies by Asprem (1989), Bodurtha et al (1989) and Canonova and 
de Nicolo (1995) have shown the relevance of common factors in international stock market 
linkages.  Nasseh and Strauss (2000) demonstrate that stock prices in European countries are 
determined by domestic economic variables and by German economic variables for the period 
1962-1995.  Fratzscher (2002) has shown that increasing integration in European equity 
markets in the 1990s was due mainly to the drive towards EMU.   
More recently, Phengpis et al (2004) have investigated the impact of economic 
convergence on stock market returns in four stock markets in the Eurozone (France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and one stock market in the EU (the UK).  They find that 
economic convergence is an important factor contributing to returns in the countries 
investigated with the exception of Germany implying that Germany plays some role as policy 
leader in relation to the other countries.  Kim et al. (2005) find that the introduction of the 
euro caused a regime switch among participating country stock markets and deepened stock 
market linkages both within the EU and between the EU and Japan and the US.   
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Of more relevance for our purposes in this chapter is the study by Chelley-Steeley 
(2005).  The study, comparing the periods 1994-96 and 1996-98, finds comovement between 
the stock markets of Hungary and Poland and, to a lesser extent, the market in the Czech 
Republic, with the markets in Germany and the UK, as well as other developed markets.  
Importantly, using a variance decomposition methodology, this study shows that nearly 40 per 
cent of the variation in equity market returns in Hungary and Poland are explained by non-
domestic factors in the latter period compared with about 10 per cent in the earlier period.  
Little difference was reported for the Czech Republic between the two periods.   
Since the study by Chelley-Steely (2005), the economies of CEE have become 
increasingly more integrated with Western European economies.   Ten are now full EU 
Members and five countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) 
one country (Slovenia) have adopted the euro.  Membership of the EU comes with a 
commitment to adopt the euro when the necessary conditions are fulfilled.  The ten countries 
in this study are therefore, by implication, committed to the Maastricht Criteria and to this 
extent share certain macroeconomic aims.  In this chapter we extend the work of Chelley-
Steely (2005) by including an increased number of countries in our sample and by providing a 
time-varying assessment of comovement between the exchanges.  In addition, estimates of 
mean and variance spillover effects are provided.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 analyses the 
observations on stock market returns for CEE countries and Section 3 outlines the three 
approaches employed to evaluate stock market comovement.  In Section 4 we detail our 
empirical results and Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
6.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
In this chapter we use daily data on the stock market indices for 10 CEE countries 
(Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Romania, Hungary and Poland) and the two biggest European stock exchanges (Frankfurt and 
London).  The data were obtained from Datastream.  Table 6.1 provides summary statistics 
for the daily returns between  2001 and 2014.  Daily returns are calculated as 
, , , 1( / )*100
i i i
t d t d t dr ln p p  , where ,
i
t dp is the stock market index of i-th country, in year t  on 
trading day d .  The highest mean returns were in Romania (0.069 percent) and Estonia 
(0.049 percent).  In addition, mean daily returns are generally higher across the stock markets 
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for the CEE countries than for either the DAX or the FTSE; the average daily returns for CEE 
countries is 0.032 percent compared to 0.012 and 0.002 for the DAX and FTSE, respectively. 
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Table 6.1: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns of CEE and European Stock Exchanges 
  
 
Mean Median Max. Min. 
Std. 
Dev. Skew Kurt. 
Jarque–
Bera p-value 
Germany (DAX)  0.012 0.047 10.797 -8.875 1.549 -0.016 4.858 3463.547 0.000 
United Kingdom (FTSE) 0.002 0.000 9.384 -9.266 1.234 -0.153 6.830 6856.565 0.000 
Czech Rep. (CZEX) 0.021 0.017 12.364 -16.185 1.437 -0.521 13.840 28252.562 0.000 
Estonia (ESTX) 0.049 0.030 12.094 -7.046 1.135 0.144 8.746 11231.459 0.000 
Hungary (HUNX) 0.024 0.000 13.178 -12.649 1.561 -0.092 6.613 6420.903 0.000 
Latvia (LATX) 0.030 0.000 10.180 -14.705 1.456 -0.724 16.793 41665.534 0.000 
Lithuania (LITX) 0.046 0.012 11.001 -11.938 1.083 -0.334 18.255 48937.361 0.000 
Poland (POLX) 0.008 0.000 8.155 -8.443 1.519 -0.150 2.664 1055.302 0.000 
Romania (ROMX) 0.069 0.014 14.576 -13.117 1.643 -0.228 9.467 13177.778 0.000 
The Slovak Republic 
(SVAX) 
0.023 0.000 11.880 -14.810 1.161 -0.936 18.570 51085.770 0.000 
Bulgaria (BULX) 0.034 0.000 10.935 -15.620 2.517 -0.103 6.279 1499.493 0.000 
Slovenia (SVEX) 0.013 0.000 8.358 -8.431 1.087 -0.500 8.529 9021.357 0.000 
 
Despite the larger daily returns available on CEE exchanges, volatility was not 
significantly higher on these equity markets than in London and Frankfurt.  The average 
volatility across the CEE countries (measured by the standard deviation of daily returns) is 
1.460 compared to 1.549 for the DAX and 1.234 for the FTSE.  Of the CEE countries 
investigated, returns in Estonia, Lithuania and Slovenia are the least volatile possibly 
implying that being part of the eurozone impacts on stability in the stock markets of these 
countries.  Corroborating evidence regarding the volatility of CEE exchanges can also be 
obtained by examining Figure 6.1 which provides a plot of the daily returns. 
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Figure 6.1: Daily Returns of CEE and European Stock Exchanges  
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 Although stock exchanges in CEE countries have been created in different ways, 
they have generally experienced similar problems during development. (See Claessens et al., 
2000.) Initially, liquidity of newly established stock markets was relatively low and trading 
was thin with the result that in the early days at least, markets tended to be open for only a 
few hours a day and only one or two days a week. Consequently stock prices were volatile 
compared with developed stock markets and it seems likely that this inhibited the growth of 
trading activity because of the increased risk.  In addition, in the early days there was an 
absence of reliable information about the companies traded on these emerging stock markets. 
The information disclosed by companies was often inaccurate or incomplete, and was 
frequently based on different accounting standards and practices. In other words, reliable 
corporate governance structures of the type common in developed market economies were not 
in place and companies were subject to few, if any, mandatory disclosure requirements. (See, 
for example, Kawalec and Kluza, 2001.) 
 In addition to the relatively higher level of volatility in CEE countries, the 
distribution of returns also seems to be non-normal.  With the exception of the equity market 
in Estonia, most of the returns (including the DAX and the FTSE) are negatively skewed.  
The measure of excess kurtosis for all the exchanges deviates significantly from that expected 
from returns drawn from a normal distribution.  In particular, the Czech Republic, Latvia, 
Lithuania and the Slovak Republic all displayed kurtosis significantly above 3.  The non-
normality of the data is confirmed by the significance of the Jarque-Bera statistic. 
 
6.3. Methodology 
This chapter uses three approaches to evaluate stock market comovement in the daily 
returns of the European stock exchanges investigated: (1) time-varying realised correlation 
ratios; (2) time-varying cointegration statistics, and; (3) a multivariate GARCH model.  The 
first two approaches utilise a two step technique.  The first step consists of estimating a 
common factor model of stock markets in CEE countries.  Let ity denote a vector of stock 
market indicators for country 1...10i   for period 1...t T .   The common factor ( tf ) 
approach assumes that there is an unobservable variable (the factor) that accounts for the 
correlations among the stock exchanges: 
 
1
r
it ij jt it
j
y f 

             (1) 
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where ij  are the factor loading coefficients associated with each of the z  common factors and 
it  is a well-behaved error term.  The common factors are obtained using principal 
component analysis and therefore account for the maximum portion of the variance present in 
the stock exchanges in CEE countries.  (See Johnson and Wichern, 2002, for more details on 
principal component analysis.) 
Following Andersen, et al. (2003), the authors define daily returns as: 
, , , 1( / )*100
i i i
t d t d t dr ln p p  , where ,
i
t dp is the stock market index of i-th country, in year t  on 
trading day d .  A consistent estimate of annual index volatility is obtained using the sum of 
the squared returns, 2 2, ,
1
( )
tD
i
t i t d
d
r

 , and a measure of realised covariance between the annual 
stock returns of country i  and country j :  
 
,
,
i j
i j t
t i j
t t

 


           (2) 
where ,i j  is the realised correlation ratio.  Compared to standard coefficients of correlations, 
the realised correlation approach improves the accuracy of the measure of association 
between the two exchanges under consideration (Andersen et al., 1999).  Pairwise realised 
correlations are estimated for each of the ten countries investigated relative to the DAX and 
the FTSE (All Shares) and for 13 years of data (2001 to 2014).  
The realised correlation coefficients are only able to evaluate co-movements in the 
returns of CEE countries and Europe, but can provide misleading inferences during periods of 
significant volatility (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).  To address this shortcoming, we use the 
Hansen and Johansen (1992) recursive cointegration method with a rolling window.  The 
recursive approach is adopted since traditional cointegration tests over the entire sample 
period would tend to reject the hypothesis that the series are cointegrated if equity prices are 
in the process of converging.  The time-varying cointegration technique allows for changes in 
the relationship between the variables in a system.  To obtain time-varying measures of 
convergence, the step size is set at 20k   with rolling daily 3 year sub-samples and the 
number of observations employed to calculate each unit root statistic is therefore
3 3(262) 20 806D k    , where D  is the number of trading days in a year.  The eigenvalue 
statistics are scaled by the critical values at the 5 percent significance level and plotted in the 
next section.  
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The third, and final, approach employs a multivariate GARCH model to assess 
comovements in CEE countries and European Stock Exchanges.  Similar to Liao and 
Williams (2004), and the Baba et al. (1990) model formulation, commonly referred to as the 
BEKK GARCH, is used in this study.  This approach is chosen since it provides estimates of 
informational spillover effects in the mean and variance.   
Assume that the conditional expected return equation can be written as: 
 1t t tR AR               (3)  
where tR  is an 1n  vector of daily returns for each market and 1| ~ (0, )t t tI N H  .  The 
elements of the A  matrix provide measures of the own and cross-mean spillovers.  The 
BEKK approach assumes that tH  depends on the squares and cross products of the 
innovations, t  and the lagged volatility for each market: 
 1 1t t t tH B B C C G H G                 (4) 
where B  is a matrix of constants, C  is a matrix of the degree of innovation from market i  to 
j , and G provides estimates of the persistence in conditional volatility from market i  to j . 
The model is estimated using the BHHH algorithms and the econometric programme Eviews 
6. 
 6.4    Results 
6.4.1 Rolling Realised Correlation Ratios and Cointegration Statistics 
In this section, we apply the principal components approach to a dataset of daily 
closing values for the stock exchanges for 10 CEE countries over the period 2001 to 2014.  
Table 6.2 summarises the eigenvalues and the proportion of total variance explained.  Two 
factors are generated: the first uses data on the eight countries (group 1) that have 
observations for the entire sample period (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic), while the other factor employs 
observations on all the countries investigated. Table 6.2 shows that the first principal 
component for group 1 countries accounts for 88.23 percent of the total variance, while for 
the group containing all countries the first principal components account for 54.81 percent of 
the total variation.  To further evaluate the goodness-of-fit of the factors, Table 6.3 presents 
the bivariate correlation ratios (between the stock market for country i  and the first principal 
component) with associated test statistics, while Figure 6.2 plots the evolution of the common 
factor and stock price indices for each country.  Table 6.3 shows that most of the correlation 
ratios in Group 1 are at least 0.90 and are significant at standard levels of testing. 
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Table 6.2: Principal Component Analysis  
 
 Group 1  All countries 
Value Eigenvalue % of total variance  Eigenvalue % of total variance 
1 7.058 88.23  5.481 54.81 
2 0.572 7.15  2.800 28.00 
3 0.181 2.26  0.851 8.51 
4 0.104 1.29  0.366 3.66 
5 0.029 0.36  0.168 1.68 
6 0.028 0.35  0.114 1.14 
7 0.017 0.21  0.084 0.84 
8 0.011 0.14  0.064 0.64 
9 -- --  0.044 0.44 
10 -- --  0.026 0.26 
 
 
Table 6.3: Correlation with Principal Component  
 
Country Group 1 All countries 
Czech Republic 0.974 -0.763 
 (256.732) (-35.472) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Estonia 0.910 -0.661 
 (130.334) (-26.513) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Hungary 0.957 -0.690 
 (194.852) (-28.701) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Latvia 0.954 -0.766 
 (189.227) (-35.881) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Lithuania 0.971 -0.843 
 (241.230) (-47.073) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Poland 0.965 -0.806 
 (217.543) (-40.897) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Romania 0.987 -0.857 
 (357.076) (-49.999) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
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Slovak Republic 0.779 -0.443 
 (73.701) (-14.883) 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Slovenia -- -0.587 
 -- (-21.815) 
 -- [0.000] 
Bulgaria -- -0.874 
 -- (-54.193) 
 -- [0.000] 
Note:  (1) t-statistics are given in parentheses 
   below correlation ratio. 
(2) p-values are provided in square  
     brackets below t-statistics. 
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Figure 6.2: Evolution of Common Factor and Stock Markets in CEE Countries  
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Given that the common factors provide an adequate representation of stock market 
fluctuations in CEE countries, Figure 6.3 plots the rolling realised correlation ratios between 
group 1 countries and two European stock exchange indexes: the DAX and the FTSE.  Figure 
6.3 shows that the realised correlation ratio fluctuated around 0.05 for most of the sample 
period.  There was, however, a rise in the realised correlation ratio from the middle of 2007 
until the end of 2008 (during the period of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009).  The 
results from using the common factor generated from the full sample of CEE countries are 
somewhat similar (Figure 6.4).  The implication is that although there is correlation between 
CEE and Western European exchanges, the degree of comovement remains quite weak. 
Figure 6.3: Comovement between Group 1 CEE Countries and European Exchanges 
(Rolling Realised Correlation Coefficients) 
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Figure 6.4: Comovement between All CEE and European Exchanges (Rolling Realised 
Correlation Coefficients) 
 
 
To evaluate equity price comovement, Figure 6.5 presents the rolling cointegration 
tests for the selected group of CEE countries and the two European exchanges.  The 
eigenvalue statistics are standardised at the 5 percent critical value, so that values above 1 
suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be accepted.   
Figure 6.5: Convergence between Group 1 CEE Countries and European Exchanges 
(Rolling Eigenvalue Statistic) 
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Looking first at the results for the DAX, Figure 5.5 shows that the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration could not be rejected for the period of the world financial crisis of 2007-2009 
and later from 2012 to 2014.  From  2004 to 2007 and from 2010 to the end of 2011, the 
standardised eigenvalue statistic was generally significant at the 5 percent level of testing.  
This suggests that there was a common stochastic trend between CEE countries and the 
Frankfurt exchanges.  When the FTSE is employed in the bivariate cointegrating equation, the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration was rejected for the periods of 2004-2006 and 2009-2011. 
When the full sample of countries is employed, the rolling eigenvalue statistic is only 
available from the beginning of 2011 onwards.  However, Figure 6.6 shows that the findings 
are quite similar.  The common factor for CEE countries is generally cointegrated with the 
FTSE and DAX for most of the restricted sample period. This is especially true for the FTSE  
However, there seems to have been a break in the relationship with the DAX since April, 
2014.  
Figure 6.6: Convergence between All CEE and European Exchanges (Rolling 
Eigenvalue Statistic) 
 
 
6.4.2 Multivariate GARCH  
 
One of the drawbacks of the rolling cointegration approach is that it does not allow 
one to consider both mean and variance transmission across exchanges.  As a result, it cannot 
inform investors whether investing in CEE countries provides avenues for mean or volatility 
diversification.  To test this, we estimate the MGARCH model outlined in Section 3 using 
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observations on stock market returns for three of the larger CEE countries (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland) as well as the DAX and FTSE.  The restricted sample of CEE 
countries was chosen since observations on these exchanges are readily available for the 
entire sample period and daily returns for these three countries are highly correlated with 
those on other CEE exchanges.   
The estimated coefficients and standard errors for the conditional mean return 
equations are provided in Table 6.4.  The results suggest that there are mean spillover effects 
that is, events in one stock market impact on other markets, between European equity markets 
impact on CEE markets and vice versa between European and CEE equity markets,.  In the 
Czech Republic, lagged returns on the DAX significantly influence current returns while the 
FTSE had an insignificant impact on returns in this country.  In contrast, there were no 
statistically significant mean spillover effects from the FTSE and the DAX on the Hungarian 
Exchange.  The results also suggest that Poland experiences positive mean spillover effects 
from the DAX  exchange.  The mean spillover effects are not homogenous for CEE countries.  
For example, while a 1 percent increase in the DAX would increase daily returns on the 
Czech Republic Exchange by 0.067 percent, in Poland market returns would only rise by 
0.058 percent.  In general, the DAX seems to have larger mean effects on the Czech 
Exchange, while the FTSE has a relatively stronger (though, statistically insignificant) impact 
on the exchange in Poland.  The leading role that the DAX exchange plays in CEE countries 
is consistent with our findings that its own mean spillover effects are insignificant. This is not 
generally true for the FTSE index and the implication is that the FTSE has no significant 
influence on CEE stock exchanges.        
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Table 6.4: Estimated Coefficients for Conditional Mean Return Equations 
 
 Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 DAX (i = 1)  FTSE (i =2 )  
ω 0.091 0.017** 0.055 0.014** 
ai1 0.042 0.026 0.057 0.019** 
ai2 -0.115 0.030** -0.158 0.025** 
ai3 -0.011 0.019 -0.002 0.015 
ai4 -0.029 0.015* -0.009 0.013 
ai5 0.038 0.016* 0.029 0.012* 
 CZEX (i = 3)  HUNX (i = 4)  
ω 0.083 0.017** 0.088 0.021** 
ai1 0.067 0.022** 0.034 0.025 
ai2 -0.016 0.029 -0.012 0.032 
ai3 -0.040 0.020* -0.016 0.021 
ai4 0.014 0.015 -0.019 0.019 
ai5 0.039 0.016* 0.029 0.018 
 POLX (i = 5)    
ω 0.071 0.021**   
ai1 0.058 0.025*   
ai2 -0.028 0.032   
ai3 -0.049 0.022*   
ai4 -0.027 0.019   
ai5 0.021 0.019   
 
 
Note: ** and * indicates significance at the 5 and 10 percent level of testing. 
There is also some evidence of intra-regional spillover effects with lagged returns for 
the Czech Republic significantly (and negatively) influencing returns in Poland, while the 
Czech Republic exchange has positive mean spillover effects from Poland.  These mean 
spillover effects are, however, quite small.  In the case of Poland, a one percent increase in 
returns on the stock exchange in the Czech Republic would only lead to a 0.049 decrease in 
returns on the equity market in Poland. 
There is some evidence of mean return feedback effects from CEE countries to 
European Stock Markets.  In the case of the DAX, returns on the stock exchange in Hungary 
and Poland are statistically significant predictors of performance on this market.  The 
magnitude and directional impact are, however, different; while positive returns on the Polish 
exchange are associated with higher mean returns for the DAX.  The opposite is the case for 
the Hungarian Exchange.  In the case of the FTSE, only the Polish Exchange has statistically 
significant feedback effects, though the positive sign on the coefficient implies that Poland 
could not be used as a vehicle for diversification for FTSE investors.  The magnitude of these 
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feedback effects however remains quite small: a one percent increase in returns on the Polish 
Exchange increases returns on the DAX and FTSE by 0.038 and 0.029, respectively. 
In addition to mean spillover effects, it is also probable that there could be volatility 
transmission between European and CEE exchanges.  To investigate this possibility, the 
estimated conditional variance-covariance equations are presented in Table 6.5.  The b’s are 
the intercepts in the GARCH equation, the c’s provided estimates of the ARCH effects or the 
degree of innovation transmission, while the g’s are the GARCH effects and provide 
estimates of the persistence in conditional volatility transmission.
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Table 6.5: Estimated Coefficients for Variance-Covariance Equations  
 DAX (i = 1)  FTSE (i = 2)  CZEX (i = 3)  HUNX (i = 4)  POLX (i = 5) 
Coefficient Standard Error  Coefficient Standard Error  Coefficient Standard Error  Coefficient Standard Error  Coefficient Standard Error 
bi1 0.025 0.003**  0.016 0.002**  0.016 0.002**  0.018 0.003**  0.012 0.002** 
bi2 0.016 0.002**  0.015 0.002**  0.013 0.002**  0.013 0.002**  0.010 0.001** 
bi3 0.016 0.002**  0.013 0.002**  0.049 0.005**  0.024 0.003**  0.018 0.002** 
bi4 0.018 0.003**  0.013 0.002**  0.024 0.003**  0.055 0.006**  0.019 0.003** 
bi5 0.012 0.002**  0.010 0.001**  0.018 0.002**  0.019 0.003**  0.022 0.003** 
               
ci1 0.060 0.004**  0.055 0.003**  0.035 0.003**  0.036 0.003**  0.028 0.003** 
ci2 0.055 0.003**  0.061 0.004**  0.039 0.003**  0.036 0.003**  0.031 0.002** 
ci3 0.035 0.003**  0.039 0.003**  0.076 0.005**  0.039 0.004**  0.036 0.003** 
ci4 0.036 0.003**  0.036 0.003**  0.039 0.004**  0.057 0.004**  0.031 0.003** 
ci5 0.028 0.003**  0.031 0.002**  0.036 0.003**  0.031 0.003**  0.038 0.003** 
            
gi1 0.922 0.004**  0.926 0.004**  0.935 0.005**  0.934 0.006**  0.954 0.004** 
gi2 0.926 0.004**  0.922 0.004**  0.931 0.005**  0.934 0.006**  0.949 0.004** 
gi3 0.935 0.005**  0.931 0.005**  0.887 0.007**  0.922 0.007**  0.935 0.005** 
gi4 0.934 0.006**  0.934 0.006**  0.922 0.007**  0.911 0.007**  0.943 0.005** 
gi5 0.954 0.004**  0.949 0.004**  0.935 0.005**  0.943 0.005**  0.948 0.004** 
 
 
Note: ** and * indicates significance at the 5 and 10 percent level of testing. 
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Own-volatility spillover effects in all the countries are larger and significant indicating 
the presence of important ARCH effects.  In the CEE countries, the own-volatility spillover 
effects range from  0.038 in Poland to 0.0076 in the Czech Republic.  In terms of the 
transmission of volatility from Europe to CEE countries, both the DAX and the FTSE are 
significant and the effects on all three markets are quite similar.  However, the own-volatility 
spillover effects are larger than the cross-volatility spillover effects indicating that past 
volatility in CEE countries is a more important predictor of future volatility in these markets. 
Volatility persistence in the CEE countries is very high.  The lagged volatility 
persistence ranges from 0.887 to 0.948.  In the case of the CEE countries, the DAX and the 
FTSE had relatively similar effects on future volatility persistence, although these effects 
were somewhat larger for Poland.  Overall volatility persistence is highest in Poland with its 
own-volatility persistence at 0.948 compared to 0.911 in Hungary and 0.887 in the Czech 
Republic.  Most of the volatility persistence in CEE countries therefore seems to emerge from 
within the foreign markets. 
The MGARCH model is only consistent when the standardised residuals are 
independently and identically distributed.  Therefore the Ljung-Box statistic is calculated for 
each country and the results are provided in Table 6.6. At the 5 percent level of testing, the p-
values suggest that the test statistic is insignificant implying that the conditional mean return 
equation is correctly specified.
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Table 6.6: Tests for Randomness of Standardised Residuals 
 
 DAX FTSE CZEX HUNX POLX 
L–B statistic 2.138 2.389 0.001 0.353 0.563 
p-value 0.144 0.122 0.993 0.552 0.453 
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6.5 Conclusions 
This study uses daily data on the stock market indices for 10 CEE countries (Slovenia, 
the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, 
Hungary and Poland) and two European stock exchanges to measure the extent of stock 
market comovement between these exchanges.  The chapter uses three approaches to evaluate 
stock market comovement in the daily returns of European stock exchanges: (1) time-varying 
realised correlation ratios; (2) time-varying cointegration statistics, and; (2) a multivariate 
GARCH model.  The first two approaches utilise a two step technique to evaluate the issue of 
stock market comovement.  The first step estimates a common factor model of stock markets 
in CEE countries, while the second step uses realised correlation and time-varying 
cointegration analysis to examine the relationship between this common factor for CEE 
countries and principle stock exchanges in Europe (Germany and the UK).   
The rolling realised correlation ratios fluctuated around 0.05 for most of the sample 
period, with an increase in the ratio in the middle of 2007 until the end of 2008 (during the 
period of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009).  Using the time-varying cointegration 
approach, the null hypothesis of no cointegration of stock returns could not be rejected for the  
period of the world financial crisis 2007-2008 and from the beginning of 2012 onwards.  
However,  for the early part of the sample (2001-2007) and during 2010-2011, the 
standardised eigenvalue statistic was generally significant at the 5 percent level of testing, 
suggesting that there was a common stochastic trend between CEE countries and those in 
Europe perhaps influenced by converging rates of inflation.  The results presented in this 
chapter show that there are linkages between stock exchanges in CEE countries and those in 
Europe, and this relation has been augmented since the period of the world financial crisis 
2007-2009.   However, the degree of comovement between these exchanges is not, as yet, 
sufficiently strong to raise issues for monetary policy or international financial stability 
stemming from symmetrical changes in wealth or inflation that well developed comovement 
implies.  Nevertheless, our results do suggest that policy makers need to continue to monitor 
evolving developments in this area because, as noted earlier, if comovement becomes 
apparent this has implications for the conduct of monetary policy in all countries exhibiting 
comovement.   
One of the drawbacks of the rolling cointegration approach is that it does not allow 
one to consider both mean and variance transmission across exchanges.  To take account of 
this, we  also estimate a MGARCH model using observations on stock market returns for 
three of the larger CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) as well as the 
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DAX and FTSE.  The results suggest that there are mean spillover effects between European 
and CEE equity markets.  The mean spillover effects are, however, not homogenous across 
CEE countries.  The DAX seems to have larger mean effects on the Czech Republic, while 
the FTSE has no statistically significant influence on any of the CEE exchanges investigated.    
Only relatively small (though, negative) mean spillover effects from one CEE country to 
another are reported suggesting that investors may diversify their portfolios within the three 
CEE exchanges only (without considering the DAX and FTSE exchanges). 
Own-volatility spillover effects in all the countries are larger and significant indicating 
the presence of important ARCH effects.  In terms of the transmission of volatility from 
Europe to CEE countries, both the DAX and the FTSE are significant and the effects on all 
three markets are quite similar.  However, the own-volatility spillover effects are larger than 
the cross-volatility spillover effects indicating that past volatility in CEE countries is a more 
important predictor of future volatility in these markets.  Most of the volatility persistence in 
CEE countries seems to emerge from within the foreign markets.   However, it is important to 
be aware that these conclusions are partly the result of the methodology used where we have 
assumed linear causality.  This cannot be guaranteed and in the following chapter we run tests 
using a non-linear methodology to see how our results compare with those reported in this 
chapter. 
As a final remark, our results suggest only limited stock market development on the 
comovement criteria  
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CHAPTER 7 
 
NON-LINEAR STOCK MARKET COMOVEMENT IN CENTRAL AND EAST 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIES 
 
7.1 Introduction 
As a result of financial globalisation, interest has grown in the extent of stock 
market integration between different countries.  Stock markets can be considered 
integrated if their prices have a tendency to move together, or if one market leads 
another market.  The results of such investigations have important implications for 
portfolio diversification along international lines.  In particular, significant 
comovement of international stock markets increases the exposure of domestic 
investors to foreign shocks and therefore offers very limited scope for gains from 
international diversification.   Also, an understanding of the determinants of stock 
market comovement might aid understanding of the home country bias that investors 
exhibit (Lewis 1999), that is, the preference of investors for domestic investments 
over foreign investments.   
A great number of studies have investigated possible linkages between the 
world’s developed markets and in particular major US and European Stock Markets 
or major US and Japanese Stock Markets (see for example, Koch and Koch 1991; 
Kasa, 1992; Georgoustsos and Kouretas, 2001; Aggarwal, Lucey, and Muckley, 2003; 
Bessler and Yang, 2003; Fraser and Oyefeso, 2005).  There have been fewer 
investigations into stock market linkages among emerging economies, with most 
focussing on Asia and Latin America (Ghosh et al., 1999; Koutmos and Booth, 1995; 
Chen, Firth, and Rui, 2002; Johnson and Soenen, 2002; Manning, 2002; Ng, 2002; 
Fujii, 2005). 
Since the collapse of Communism at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of 
the 1990’s, the economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have established 
functioning stock markets as part of the transition process.  For those economies 
admitted to the EU (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia) these stock markets have been 
modelled along similar lines to those in developed market economies.  These 
countries have also attempted to put in place adequate corporate governance 
structures, requiring as part of this internationally accepted standards of disclosure.  
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Their markets have also been opened up to overseas investors and rights of ownership 
have been established.  Investigations of stock market efficiency in CEE countries 
admitted to the EU overwhelmingly confirm that at the very least they exhibit weak 
form efficiency (Bohl et al 2006 Rockinger and Urga 2001, and Harrison and Paton 
2005).  Given these developments, as well as political and economic stability and 
impressive rates of growth, these economies potentially offer investors attractive 
opportunities for portfolio diversification.   
Linne (1998) was the first to investigate long run linkages between East 
European markets (the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary Poland and Russia) 
with the developed economies of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Switzerland, the US 
and the UK.  For investors seeking to diversify their portfolios this early study 
provided encouraging results, finding that only the Slovak Republic Stock Market 
exhibited comovement with all of the developed markets.  Similarly Gilmore and 
McManus (2003) found only weak short run correlations and no long run correlations 
between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland with US Stock Markets.  These 
results are supported by Egert and Kocenda (2007), who report no robust 
cointegrating relationship between the relatively new markets of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland and the developed markets of Frankfurt, London and Paris.   
A problem with these studies is that their standard methodology is static 
cointegration developed by Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) and, 
consequently, they give very little information about processes that are time varying.  
Phylaktis and Ravazzolo (2002) have shown that for Pacific Basin countries, financial 
integration is accompanied by economic integration at both real and financial levels.  
This has important implications for financial integration for countries admitted to the 
EU.  Furthermore, in the case of our target countries there are good reasons for 
believing that stock markets in CEE might be increasingly integrated with the 
developed stock markets of Western Europe.  As full members of the EU, these CEE 
countries are establishing stronger economic ties with other EU Members through 
trade, cross-border investments and policy coordination.  The Maastricht Criteria 
establish rules for entry into EMU which are designed to promote economic 
convergence.  Studies by Asprem (1989), Bodurtha et al (1989) and Canonova and De 
Nicoló (1995) have shown the relevance of common factors in international stock 
market linkages.  Nasseh and Strauss (2000) demonstrate that stock prices in 
European countries are determined by domestic economic variables and by German 
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economic variables for the period 1962-1995.  Fratzscher (2002) has shown that 
increasing integration in European equity markets in the 1990s was due mainly to the 
drive towards EMU.   
 More recently, Phengpis et al (2004) have investigated the impact of economic 
convergence on stock market returns in four stock markets in EMU (France, 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands) and one stock market in the EU (the UK).  They 
find that economic convergence is an important factor contributing to returns in the 
countries investigated, with the exception of Germany, implying that Germany plays 
some role as policy leader in relation to the other countries.  Phengpis and Apilado 
(2004) further demonstrate that stock market returns of a group of five non-EMU 
countries are driven by their own unique stochastic trends and are not cointegrated 
with each other or with any EMU or US Stock Market.  They further showed that 
stock market returns for a group of five EMU member countries were strongly 
cointegrated, suggesting that economic interdependence encourages stock market 
comovement.  Kim et al (2005) find that the introduction of the euro caused a regime 
switch among participating country stock markets and deepened stock market 
linkages, both within the EU and between the EU and Japan and the US.  This finding 
is contradicted by Syriopoulos (2007) who detects no impact due to EU membership.  
He suggests that this might be because macroeconomic policies have already been 
adjusted to support convergence with the EU.  Importantly for our purposes, he 
demonstrates the existence of major linkages between the stock markets of Poland, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and the Slovak Republic with Germany and the US.  
Aggarwal and Kyaw (2005) investigate the impact of the formation of the NAFTA on 
stock markets within member countries and find that after the formation of NAFTA, 
stock markets in the NAFTA region became more integrated.   
It is now widely acknowledged that a wide range of tests is needed to assess 
the complex nature of financial integration, especially since this process might be 
time varying (Kearney and Lucey 2004).  An important paper by Gilmore et al (2008) 
applies various static and dynamic methodologies to examine the comovements of the 
major CEE equity markets (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) with those of 
London and Frankfurt for the period 1995–2005.   The authors also investigate the 
time varying properties of comovement using a rolling-window approach.  The results 
of this investigation provide encouraging news for investors seeking to diversify their 
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portfolios along international lines. Static cointegration tests find no evidence of any 
long run relationship between the CEE markets investigated and Frankfurt or London.  
Dynamic tests do reveal periods of cointegration as well as instances where short-run 
behaviour overpowers the long-run equilibrium relationship, but the authors conclude 
that any relationship is episodic and on the whole there is little evidence of any steady 
increase in comovement among the markets investigated.  
In this chapter we extend the work of Gilmore et al (2008) by providing a 
time-varying assessment of non-linear comovement using an enhanced database of 
CEE countries.  The non-linear tests for time-varying comovement employed in this 
study, unlike traditional approaches to testing for cointegration, encompass a number 
of alternative forms of non-linearity.  In addition, because sample dependency can 
distort results when a series is converging, we test whether our results are robust to 
data gathered using daily data.  Our data set includes the ten CEE countries that have 
become full EU Members since, as indicated above, there is increasing evidence that 
economic integration might promote stock market comovement.   Investigating this 
group of countries is timely because five of these countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) have adopted the euro and the remaining 
countries remain committed to adopting the euro when they satisfy the entry 
conditions as in the Maastricht Criteria.  To this extent they share certain 
macroeconomic aims and common goals.   
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 2 analyses the 
observations on stock market returns for CEE countries and Section 3 outlines the 
three approaches employed to evaluate stock market comovement.  In Section 4 we 
detail our empirical results and Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
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7.2. Data and Summary Statistics 
The study uses data on stock market indices for 10 CEE countries (Bulgaria, 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak 
Republic and Slovenia) and two Western European stock exchanges (Frankfurt and 
London).  We express stock price indices in their national currencies, since this 
restricts any change in index values exclusively to stock price movements and so 
avoids distortions resulting from the numerous currency devaluations that have taken 
place in CEE countries (Voronkova, 2003).  
The data were obtained from Datastream.  Following Voronkova (2004) and 
Lagoarde-Segot and Lucey (2007), we use daily data to incorporate the information 
on market interactions contained in high-frequency series and Table 7.1 provides 
summary statistics for daily returns between  2001 and 2014.  Daily returns are 
calculated as , , , 1( / )*100
i i i
t d t d t dr ln p p  , where ,
i
t dp is the stock market index of i-th 
country, in year t  on trading day d .  The highest mean returns are in Romania (0.069 
percent) and  Estonia (0.049 percent).  In addition, mean daily returns are generally 
higher across the stock exchanges for the CEE countries than for either the DAX or 
the FTSE; the average daily returns for CEE countries is 0.032, percent compared to  
0.012 per cent and 0.002 per cent for the DAX and FTSE, respectively.   
Table 7.1: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns of CEE and European Stock 
Exchanges 
 
 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. Skew Kurt. 
Jarque–
Bera 
Germany (DAX)  0.012 0.047 1.549 -0.016 4.858 3463.547 
United Kingdom (FTSE) 0.002 0.000 1.234 -0.153 6.830 6856.565 
Czech Rep. (CZEX) 0.021 0.017 1.437 -0.521 13.840 28252.562 
Estonia (ESTX) 0.049 0.030 1.135 0.144 8.746 11231.459 
Hungary (HUNX) 0.024 0.000 1.561 -0.092 6.613 6420.903 
Latvia (LATX) 0.030 0.000 1.456 -0.724 16.793 41665.534 
Lithuania (LITX) 0.046 0.012 1.083 -0.334 18.255 48937.361 
Poland (POLX) 0.008 0.000 1.519 -0.150 2.664 1055.302 
Romania (ROMX) 0.069 0.014 1.643 -0.228 9.467 13177.778 
The Slovak Republic 
(SVAX) 
0.023 0.000 1.161 -0.936 18.570 51085.770 
Bulgaria (BULX) 0.034 0.000 2.517 -0.103 6.279 1499.493 
Slovenia (SVEX) 0.013 0.000 1.087 -0.500 8.529 9021.357 
Note: All Jarque-Bera statistics are significant at normal levels of testing. 
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Despite the larger daily returns available on CEE exchanges, volatility was not 
significantly higher on these equity markets relative to those in London and Frankfurt.  
The average volatility across the CEE countries (measured by the standard deviation 
of daily returns) is 1.459 compared to 1.549 for the DAX and 1.234 for the FTSE.  Of 
the CEE countries investigated, Lithuania, Slovenia and Estonia are the least volatile 
and it is interesting to note that all three have adopted the euro.   
 As expected the summary statistics shown in Table7.1 show that the 
distribution of returns also seems to be non-normal.  With the exception of the equity 
market in Estonia, other returns (including the DAX and the FTSE) are negatively 
skewed.  Except for Poland, the measure of excess kurtosis for all other exchanges 
deviate significantly from that expected from returns drawn from a normal 
distribution.  In particular,  the Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania and the Slovak 
Republic all had measured excess kurtosis significantly above 3.  The non-normality 
is confirmed by the significance of the Jarque-Bera statistic. 
 
7.3. Methodology 
Let 
tP  represent the stock market index in a given CEE country and *tP  the 
stock market index of the benchmark exchange, in this case London (FTSE) or 
Frankfurt (DAX).  If the two series are integrated of order one, (1)I , then in the 
model: 
 *
t t tP P u           (1) 
where tu  is normally assumed to be (1)I .  If ~ (0)tu I , however, there exists a 
bivariate cointegrating relationship between the variables and therefore some linkage 
between the CEE country index and benchmark index. 
Tests for a linear cointegrating relationship of the type given in Equation (1) 
have been developed by Johansen and Juselius (1990).  The maximum eigenvalue 
statistic tests the null hypothesis that there exists at most r cointegrating vectors.  The 
test statistic is computed as: 
 
0m a x 0 1
( ) lo g (1 )rL R r T      
for 0,1, , 1r k K  where   are the eigenvalue statistics and asymptotic critical 
values can be found in Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
In fact, the relationship between the two series may not always be linear.  Li 
(2006) shows that the cointegrating relationship between two exchanges may be log-
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linear and deterministic, log-linear and stochastic or non-linear in the price indices, 
depending on whether the risk premium is a linear or non-linear function of domestic 
and foreign risks.  Equation (1) may therefore be rewritten as: 
 *( ) ( )t t tg P f P e          (2) 
where (.)g  and (.)f  are monotonically increasing functions.  If ~ (0)te I , then there 
exists a non-linear cointegrating relationship between the two exchanges.   
The functions (.)g  and (.)f  are not observed, but Breitung (2001) has 
developed tests of non-linear cointegration based on the ranks of the observed series, 
[ ( )] ( )T t T tR g P R P  and * *[ ( ) ] ( )T t T tR f P R P .  Breitung (2001) computes two test 
statistics: 
 1 supT t
t
T d          (3) 
and 
 3 2
1
T
t t
i
T d 

           (4) 
where *( ) ( )t T t T td R P R P   and sup t
t
d  is the maximum value of td  over
1, 2, ...,t T .  The null hypothesis tested is that of no (non-linear) cointegration and is 
rejected if the test statistics are too small.  Breitung (2001) provides critical values for 
the test statistics in Table 7.2.  One of the main advantages of Breitung’s (2001) tests 
is that they encompass a number of other alternative forms of non-linearity.  
Therefore, rather than testing one type of non-linearity, which might not necessarily 
be the correct form, the statistics are able to evaluate whether or not there exists some 
long-run association between two or more variables.  
Because cointegration tests are usually sample dependent (Stephon and 
Larsen, 1991) the authors employ time-varying cointegration tests with a rolling 
window.  To obtain time-varying measures of the cointegration statistics, the step 
size,k, is set at 20 for daily series.  Rolling 3-year sub-samples are therefore generated 
using 3D k  observations, where D  is the number of trading periods.  The test 
statistics in each case are then scaled by the critical values at the 5 percent level.  To 
overcome the problem of non-synchronous trading days, some authors employ weekly 
or monthly data which sidesteps the problem, but at the expense of lost information 
(see Miller et al 1994).  Testing for cointegration at each frequency of observation 
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allows the authors to investigate the possible implications this might have on stock 
market integration.  Despite this, we do not test at these frequency levels here and 
thus overcome the problem posed by non-synchronous trading days.  
Breitung’s (2001) test, although able to detect the presence of cointegration, 
does not indicate whether the relationship is linear or nonlinear.  Using the following 
equation: 
 * * *0 1 ( )t t t tP P f P v            (5) 
the null hypothesis of linearity * *( ) 0tf P   for all t  and )0(~ Ivt  can be tested.  
Since * *( )tf P is unknown, a multiple of the rank transformation is used instead, that is,
* * *( ) ( )t T tf P R P  .  Breitung notes that if 
*
tP  is exogenous and 2~ (0, )tv N   a score 
statistic 2TR  from the least squares regression: 
 * * *0 1 3 ( )t t t tv P f P      
)        (6) 
where tv
)
 are the residuals under the null hypothesis.  The test statistic is distributed 
as 2 with one degree of freedom. 
7.4. Results 
7.4.1 Full Sample 
 
Before testing for cointegration, unit root tests are conducted for all the stock 
market indices expressed in level terms.  The results are given in Table 7.2.  The tests 
were done with and without a trend, as recommended by Engle and Granger (1987) 
and Breitung and Gouriéroux (1997).  The tests suggest the null hypothesis of a unit 
root in the level series cannot be rejected in all cases.1 
  
                                                 
1 Lag lengths were chosen using the Schwarz Bayesian criterion. 
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Table7.2: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns of CEE and European Stock 
Exchanges 
Series tested ADF Breitung 
 Without trend With trend Without trend With trend 
Levels     
DAX -0.464 -2.574 0.055 0.005 
FTSE -1.667 -2.776 0.032 0.004 
CZEX -1.488 -1.168 0.031 0.019 
ESTX -1.196 -1.225 0.051 0.010 
HUNX -1.699 -1.572 0.047 0.016 
LATX -1.634 -1.391 0.022 0.015 
LITX -1.095 -1.103 0.042 0.013 
POLX -1.545 -1.669 0.037 0.014 
ROMX -1.509 -1.378 0.035 0.015 
SVAX -1.408 -1.139 0.022 0.021 
BULX -1.705 -2.272 0.050 0.016 
SVEX -1.027 -1.438 0.022 0.015 
Returns     
RDAX -43.002** -43.033** 0.000** 0.000** 
RFTSE -28.743** -28.765** 0.000** 0.000** 
RCZEX -42.962** -42.977** 0.000** 0.000** 
RESTX -37.502** -37.527** 0.000** 0.000** 
RHUNX -28.277** -28.289** 0.000** 0.000** 
RLATX -29.950** -29.975** 0.000** 0.000** 
RLITX -16.521** -16.534** 0.000** 0.000** 
RPOLX -42.139** -42.133** 0.000** 0.000** 
RROMX -40.629** -40.697** 0.000** 0.000** 
RSVAX -41.752** -41.892** 0.000** 0.000** 
RBULX -23.595** -23.580** 0.000** 0.000** 
RSVEX -36.967** -37.020** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
Note: ** indicates significance at the 1 percent level of testing. 
 
In contrast, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the alternative series is rejected 
in all cases.  The stock market price indices for CEE countries as well as the DAX and 
FTSE are (1)I , stationarity is achieved after first differencing the level series.  As a 
preliminary investigation of stock market linkages in Europe, bivariate tests for 
cointegration are provided in Table7.3.  These tests are conducted using daily 
observations for the full sample period. 
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Table7.3: Johansen’s Tests for Cointegration (Full Sample) 
 
Country 𝐻଴: 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 = 𝑝 Without trend With trend 
DAX    
CZEX 𝑝 = 0 7.369 11.490 
 𝑝 = 1 1.484 5.767 
ESTX 𝑝 = 0 9.489 12.927 
 𝑝 = 1 6.108 4.225 
HUNX 𝑝 = 0 6.651 10.073 
 𝑝 = 1 2.124 5.109 
LATX 𝑝 = 0 4.748 12.797 
 𝑝 = 1 2.310 2.636 
LITX 𝑝 = 0 6.080 11.526 
 𝑝 = 1 3.573 1.799 
POLX 𝑝 = 0 5.840 9.551 
 𝑝 = 1 1.941 5.687 
ROMX 𝑝 = 0 6.257 12.459 
 𝑝 = 1 2.385 2.462 
SVAX 𝑝 = 0 3.338 13.220 
 𝑝 = 1 0.861 1.929 
BULX 𝑝 = 0 13.182 14.815 
 𝑝 = 1 1.345 5.219 
SVEX 𝑝 = 0 7.145 22.323* 
 𝑝 = 1 0.925 4.285 
FTSE    
CZEX 𝑝 = 0 4.666 12.512 
 𝑝 = 1 3.663 3.626 
ESTX 𝑝 = 0 16.944* 16.857 
 𝑝 = 1 3.673 1.607 
HUNX 𝑝 = 0 7.672 11.569 
 𝑝 = 1 3.591 3.450 
LATX 𝑝 = 0 9.255 16.865 
 𝑝 = 1 2.716 1.963 
LITX 𝑝 = 0 13.827 15.408 
 𝑝 = 1 3.143 1.229 
POLX 𝑝 = 0 6.480 11.030 
 𝑝 = 1 2.840 2.868 
ROMX 𝑝 = 0 12.346 16.061 
 𝑝 = 1 2.771 1.949 
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SVAX 𝑝 = 0 3.948 15.133 
 𝑝 = 1 2.293 2.332 
BULX 𝑝 = 0 10.703 13.929 
 𝑝 = 1 1.881 5.877 
SVEX 𝑝 = 0 9.487 25.203* 
 𝑝 = 1 3.294 5.124 
Note: * indicates significance at the 5 percent level of testing. 
 
Given that the variables are (1)I , we employed the Johansen and Juselius 
(1990) maximum eigenvalue statistic to test for linear cointegration between each 
CEE country exchange and the DAX and FTSE.  The results are given in Table7.3 
and are conducted with and without a trend.  Looking first at the results for the DAX, 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is only rejected in 1 out of the 10 countries 
studied: Slovenia.  However, these results should be treated with caution, given the 
lower predictive power of the full-sample maximum eigenvalue statistic when there 
are structural breaks in the sample period (Andrade et al 2005).  Moore and Wang 
(2007), investigate the volatility of stock exchanges in new EU member States 
between 1994 and 2005 using a Markov switching model and find that in the early 
stage of transition, stock returns are usually in the high volatility regime.  The authors 
note that this volatility is primarily due to the spillover effects from crises in Asia in 
1997 and Russia in 1998.   
The results may also be due to non-linearity in stock price data, as a result of 
diversity in agents’ beliefs, heterogeneity in investors’ objectives, herd behaviour and 
endowment switches between high and low economic growth (Sarantis, 2001).  Table 
7.4 therefore provides Breitung’s non-linear test for cointegration using the full 
sample of data. Quite similar to Johansen’s cointegration tests, there is no evidence of 
cointegration between stock exchanges in CEE countries and the DAX and FTSE 
(except for only several statistically significant kappa-statistics for DAX-Estonia, 
DAX-Poland, DAX-Bulgaria, FTSE-Estonia, and FTSE-Poland, implying that we 
reject the null hypothesis of no non-linear cointegration.  These results are similar to 
those obtained by Égert and Kocenda (2007) who analyse comovement among three 
stock markets in Central and Eastern Europe and their interdependence with Western 
Europe.  The authors find no robust cointegration for any of the stock index pairs or 
for any of the extended specifications.  Similarly, Chelley-Steeley (2005), using 
smooth transition analysis, notes that during the recent history of the CEE countries, 
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their markets were heavily segmented.  This segmentation has, however, declined 
significantly over time.  These findings suggest that testing for stock market 
comovement over the entire sample of data could provide misleading results since the 
exchanges may have been in the process of converging.  This therefore provides 
important support for the use of time-varying econometric tests. 
 
Table7.4: Breintung’s Tests for Cointegration (Full Sample) 
 
 T  T  
DAX   
CZEX 0.597 0.079 
ESTX 0.663* 0.036 
HUNX 0.589 0.062 
LATX 0.679 0.070 
LITX 0.651 0.052 
POLX 0.489* 0.044 
ROMX 0.692 0.057 
SVAX 0.799 0.130 
BULX 0.677* 0.041 
SVEX 0.806 0.168 
FTSE   
CZEX 0.695 0.073 
ESTX 0.803* 0.034 
HUNX 0.722 0.061 
LATX 0.822 0.056 
LITX 0.693 0.045 
POLX 0.604* 0.040 
ROMX 0.834 0.048 
SVAX 0.842 0.127 
BULX 0.711 0.051 
SVEX 0.857 0.149 
 
Note:  * indicates significance at the 5 percent level of testing. 
 
As further evidence of the need to take into account the time-varying 
properties of stock exchanges in CEE countries, Figure 7.1 plots the scaled tests for 
non-linearity recommended by Breitung (2001).  As a result, values above the unit 
line indicate that we cannot accept, at normal levels of significance, the null 
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hypothesis of no non-linearity. Indeed, Figure 7.1 suggests that there are periods 
where linear models of stock market comovement are unlikely to adequately represent 
the dynamics in CEE countries.  The findings presented in this section are therefore 
instructive and suggest that comovement in Europe is likely to be non-linear and time-
varying.  As a result, the following section addresses both of these issues.   
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Figure 7.1: Tests for Non-Linearity 
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7.4.2 Time-Varying Results 
Given that the evidence so far suggests that stock markets in CEE countries 
are to a large extent segmented from those in the rest of Europe, the authors utilise 
time-varying cointegration techniques to investigate if this hypothesis holds for 
various sub-periods. The three cointegration test statistics ( maxLR  denoted by EIG, T  
denoted by KAPR, and t  denoted by XI) are calculated using rolling three-year sub-
samples and the step size is set so that the test statistics are obtained for each month in 
the sample period.  The acronyms for each of the test statistics are affixed at the front 
of each figure to denote which test is used.      
Figure 7.2 presents the results from using the DAX as the benchmark index 
and therefore tests the null of no cointegration between the given CEE exchange and 
the DAX.  Since the scaled test statistics are plotted, all values above 1 (the horizontal 
straight line) indicate the null hypothesis is rejected at normal levels of testing.  The 
statistics are obtained using daily observations and the results are provided in Figure 
6.2.  As suggested by Stephon and Larsen (1991), the maximum eigenvalue statistic is 
highly dependent on the sample period under investigation.  Relative to Breitung’s 
non-linear cointegration statistics, the maximum eigenvalue statistic has a greater 
degree of volatility.  In general, however, all three cointegration statistics suggest that 
stock market comovement tends to be episodic.  However, the maximum eigenvalue 
statistic tends to over-reject the null, particularly during periods of high volatility. 
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Figure 7.2: Time Varying Linear and Nonlinear Tests for Cointegration between 
the DAX and CEE Countries’ Exchanges (daily data) 
 
Maximum eigenvalue test 
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The results also indicate that comovement between stock exchanges in CEE 
countries and those in Western Europe is heterogeneous.  In the case of Slovenia, the 
non-linear cointegration statistics suggest that the null hypothesis of no cointegration 
could not be rejected for most of the sample period.  After 2006, however, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected up until 2008, when there is a slight dip in 
the cointegration statistics.  The increased capital market integration probably reflects 
the removal of foreign investment restrictions following the enactment of the 
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country’s Foreign Exchange Act.  This has enhanced portfolio diversity by 
incorporating foreign securities (Andritzky, 2007).  In contrast, the slight dip in the 
statistic for 2006 could reflect growing investor risk aversion towards emerging 
markets during the year.     
In the Slovak Republic, test statistics suggest that there exists a relationship 
between the domestic stock exchange and those in Germany and the UK.  This result 
is somewhat surprising since trading activity is mainly done as pre-negotiated trades 
and the market is fairly small and illiquid.  However, Herrmann and Jochem (2003) 
note that money markets in the Slovak Republic display a high degree of international 
integration in the euro area.  In addition, this association has strengthened since 1999.  
The findings for Estonia are quite similar, but with a pronounced upward shift in the 
cointegration test statistics in 2002, 2003 and 2004.  Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) 
note that the Eastern enlargement was characterised by a substantial, positive 
anticipation effect in the period prior to the announcement and the formal 
establishment of each of the integration steps.  This anticipation effect could explain 
the significant jump in the statistics observed between 2002 and 2004. 
Given that stock markets in Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria were only recently 
re-established relative to other CEE countries, the cointegration statistics for these 
nations are only available from 2002 onwards.  The results for the three exchanges are 
quite similar.  The Johansen maximum eigenvalue statistic suggests that the linear 
comovement between the stock markets in these countries and those in Western 
Europe was, at best, episodic.  However, Breintung’s non-linear cointegration 
statistics suggest that there was some degree of comovement between stock markets 
in these countries and those in the rest of Europe from 2002.  These results suggest 
that despite their relatively late start, market returns in these countries are fairly 
integrated (although non-linearly) with the rest of Europe.  Encouragingly, our results 
are in line with those reported by Mateus (2004).  Set in an unconditional asset-
pricing framework, Mateus attempts to measure the impact that global risk factors 
have on excess returns in emerging countries.  The author finds that global risk factors 
have high predictive power for Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Hungary, 
while local risk factors were more important in the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland 
and Slovenia.      
The cointegration statistics suggest that comovement between the stock 
markets in the Czech Republic and Romania and those in Western Europe seem to be 
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rising over time.  These results are similar to those obtained by Schotman and 
Zalewska (2006), Chelley-Steeley (2005) and Mateus (2004) and seem to be driven 
by greater financial integration in the Czech Republic (Herrmann and Jochem, 2003).  
In the case of Hungary and Poland, the cointegration test statistics have been rising 
over time.  However, for most of the sample period until 2002, the null hypothesis of 
no cointegration could not be rejected.  This result could be due to the insignificance 
of global risk factors on excess returns in Poland (Mateus, 2004) and the greater 
influence of Mediterranean countries on Hungary relative to Western Europe 
(Brüggerman and Trenkler, 2007).  
The results presented in this section suggest that the Johansen cointegration 
test statistic can provide misleading inferences if there is non-linearity in the 
relationship between the variables.   Breintung’s cointegration test statistic suggests 
that there is some comovement between stock exchanges in CEE countries and those 
in Western Europe.   
 
7.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter, we have explored the possible comovement of Central and 
Eastern European stock markets with those of the UK and Germany by testing for the 
existence of a cointegrating relationship between pairs of stock market indices. Using 
the full-sample data, the standard cointegration test by Johansen revealed very little 
evidence of cointegration between either the FTSE or the DAX and a CEE stock 
market indices. Testing for the possibility of a nonlinear cointegrating relationship 
using Breintung's (2001) test revealed even less evidence of cointegration.  
Mindful of the fact that the CEE stock markets are highly volatile relative to 
those of the UK and Germany, and the Johansen test is sensitive to data volatility as 
well as the sample period considered, we proceeded to test for cointegration by using 
a rolling window approach.  Our results suggest that comovement between CEE and 
developed European exchanges are heterogeneous.  In general, we find evidence of 
comovement with Western exchanges in Slovenia and the Slovak Republic.  Using 
linear cointegration techniques we find limited evidence of comovement between the 
stock markets in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria with those of Western Europe.  
However, we find stronger evidence of comovement between these exchanges and 
Western Europe using Breintung’s non-linear cointegration statistic.  We also find 
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evidence that while comovement between the Czech Republic, Hungary Poland and 
Romania with Western Europe is limited, it seems to be increasing over time.   
In summary, we find that Johansen’s cointegration test statistic can provide 
misleading inferences if there is non-linearity in the relationship between the relevant 
stock market indices.  Breintung’s cointegration test statistic provides more reliable 
results and suggests that there is some comovement between stock exchanges in CEE 
countries and those in Western Europe.  We find no evidence that the frequency of 
observations has any effect on our results.  Our results affirm the importance of using 
non-linear tests when investigating stock market comovement.  This is hardly 
surprising given the dynamic nature of transition and the evolution and development 
of stock markets in CEE countries.  In the last two and half decades, these countries 
have experienced unprecedented economic upheaval and structural change, most 
recently powered forward by increasing economic integration with Western Europe 
both before and after EU Accession, and these changes have had far reaching 
implications for investigations into stock market comovement which linear tests  
might fail to capture. 
In trems of the implications of our results for stock market development, non-
linear cointegration techniques are clearl;y superior to standard tests of cointegration 
and give more encouraging reults that our target group of stock markets are becoming 
increasingly cointegrated with Europe and, in that sense, are becoming more 
developed. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DO SPILLOVERS FROM DEVELOPED STOCK MARKETS 
IMPACT ON THE VOLATILITIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPEAN STOCK MARKETS? 
 
8.1 Introduction 
When Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15th 2008, 
many commentators allege that this was the first major sign that a financial crisis 
was about to erupt and engulf markets across the globe.  Earlier, in 2007, the 
financial stress experienced by Bear Sterns failed to exert any restraining influence 
on financial markets which continued their gallop upwards.  However, the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers sent shock waves which reverberated across global markets.  
Earlier in the year, the Dow Jones had peaked in May 2008 at 13191.49, but on 
15th September, it closed at 10917.51.  Taking the year as a whole, the Dow Jones 
opened on January 2nd at 13,043.96, but on the same day a year later it stood at 
only 9,034.69.  Other markets quickly reflected the impact of contagion and the 
FTSE-100 fell 31 per cent opening the year at 6456.90 and closing at 12.30 on 
New Year’s Eve at 4434.17.  In Frankfurt, the Dax-30 ended 2008 down 40% - the 
index's second-worst annual performance in its 20-year history.  Japanese shares 
also suffered their biggest yearly decline with the Nikkei dropping 42%.  The 
worst performance of all was recorded in China where the Shanghai Stock Index 
(SEE Composite Index) posted a drop in stock prices on the year of some 65 per 
cent.  This might indicate some degree of comovement between stock markets and 
if markets exhibit comovement, the benefits of international portfolio 
diversification disappear at the time they are most needed.  It is therefore 
important to understand the process of contagion and to test for its occurrence 
across markets.   
In recent decades, stock markets have become more integrated as the 
global economy has become more integrated and this pattern is replicated among 
countries in the same geographic region.  (See for example Harrison and Moore 
(2009, 2010 and 2011.)  One possibility is that spillover effects between markets 
are amplified by economic shocks that reverberate across markets as contagion 
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spreads.  One channel through which this might happen is that a crisis in one 
country adversely impacts on the liquidity of market participants forcing them to 
sell their holdings of assets in countries not affected by the crisis so as to meet 
margin calls etc in the country where the crisis occurs.  Be that as it may, this 
possibility cannot explain the turbulence unleashed on stock markets, both in 
developed and emerging economies, during the financial of crisis of 2008-09.  A 
more general explanation of this turbulence is that lessons learned when the shock 
broke in the USA were transferred to other countries with similar financial 
structures where the balance sheets of banks were strikingly similar and therefore 
contained the seeds of financial collapse.   
8.2 A Review of the Related Literature 
The time-varying behaviour of comovements in stock markets has attracted 
considerable attention in the literature.  The results from the relatively extensive 
empirical literature on contagion in equity markets tends, with some exceptions, to 
support the idea of contagion across markets.  Following the global stock market 
crash of 1987, King and Wadhwani (1990) were one of the first to investigate how 
shocks are transmitted across borders to stock markets in different countries. They 
find evidence of an increase in cross market correlation coefficients between the 
stock markets of the USA, the UK and Japan.  This finding is confirmed by 
Hamao et al (1990) who use an ARCH methodology to assess the extent of price 
volatility between New York, Tokyo and London following the 1987 crash; and 
by Lin et al (1994) who use a GARCH methodology to estimate correlations 
between returns and volatilities of stock market indices in New York and Tokyo.  
Lee and Kim (1990) increase the number of countries to twelve major markets and 
find that average weekly cross market correlations increase from 0.23 before the 
crash of 1987 to 0.39 after the crash. 
The empirical findings of early investigations, including those cited above, 
into the effects of the 1987 stock market crash on cross country contagion 
universally find evidence of increased contagion during the crash. Hon et al (2006) 
find that major global events such as a financial crisis impact on cross country 
correlation of assets  This finding is reaffirmed by Longin and Solnik (2001) who 
find that correlation between markets is not associated with volatility, but with the 
trend of the market.  They conclude that while correlations increase in bear 
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markets, they do not increase in bull markets.  They further argue that it is difficult 
to test the hypothesis that in periods of stock market volatility the correlation 
between markets increases and that because of this, erroneous results have been 
reported many times as a consequence of the spurious relations between 
volatilities and correlations. Similarly Forbes and Rigobon (2002) question the 
contagion results presented in earlier studies.  They argue that correlation 
coefficients are conditional on market volatility that can be ascendant in times of 
crisis, representing a normal reaction based on natural economic relations.  
In their seminal paper, Dees et al (2007) investigate inter-country 
contagion.  They use a GVAR model to investigate the spillover effects between 
26 countries in the euro area and find that financial shocks are transmitted rapidly 
from the USA to the euro area and that equity markets (and bond markets) are 
highly synchronous.  In addition, they find that euro area equity prices react 
quickly to a US equity market shock, though there may be some signs of an over-
reaction.  Chordia et al (2005) argue that in times of shocks such as a financial 
crisis, a positive relationship between correlations and volatilities in equity and 
bond markets arises.  Using daily returns for the NSDAQ and T-bonds for ten 
years and for thirty years they argue that a negative shock might cause a “flight to 
quality as investors substitute safe assets for risky assets” (p68).  A GVAR 
approach is also employed by Galesi and Sgherri (2009), who find that equity 
markets are more synchronous than banking systems, and that asset prices are the 
main channel through which financial shocks are transmitted globally. 
Several studies have focused on Asian markets.  Baig and Goldafin (1998) 
investigate contagion between Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea and the 
Phillapines following the Asian currency crisis of 1997.  They find correlations in 
currency markets and sovereign spreads increase significantly during the crisis 
period.  Equity markets, on the other hand, offer mixed results.  The authors 
construct a set of dummy variables using daily news to capture the impact of own 
country and cross border news on the markets.  Once this is done and after 
allowing own country news and other fundamentals,. The authors find evidence of 
cross border contagion in both currency and equity markets. Obstfeld (1996) 
Krugman (2000) and Goldstein and Pauzer (2004) explain contagion following the 
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Asian financial crisis in terms of herding behaviour, perhaps caused by a 
potentially negative wealth effect. 
Cappiello et al (2006) investigate 21 developed stock markets to test the 
behaviour of international equity and bond markets.  Among their other findings, 
they report that annualized average volatility for European countries participating 
in EMU, American and Australasian equities show linkages between periods of 
financial turmoil such as the stock market crash of 1987, the beginning of the Gulf 
War and the Asian financial crisis. Analyzing 60 countries in the period 2008-
2011, Beirne and Gieck (2012) consider the existence of contagion for different 
categories of assets (bonds, stocks, and currencies) and find dissimilarities 
between assets and market linkages.   
Fewer studies have investigated contagion in Central and East European 
(CEE) stock markets.  In an early study Macdonald (2001) finds evidence of 
cointegration between CEE stock markets and the developed markets of London, 
Frankfurt and New York.  Syriopolous (2006) finds that international 
cointegration linkages are stronger than intraregional linkages among stock 
markets in CEE countries.  In a more recent study, Syllignakis and Kouretas 
(2011) demonstrated a significant growth of spillover effects between CEE stock 
markets and those from Germany and the US.  In the same study, they also 
demonstrated increased spillovers between CEE stock markets in times of 
financial crisis.  They conclude that contagion effects within stock markets are 
most pronounced in Latin America and the emerging markets of Asia.  They also 
find evidence of contagion from global bond markets, regional stocks in CEE and 
the Middle East and Africa. 
Other studies have found contrary findings and Gilmore and McManus 
(2002) find that CEE stock markets are neither cointegrated individually nor as a 
group with the US.  Similarly Yuce and Simga-Mugan (2000) find no evidence of 
cointegration between CEE countries individually and only limited evidence of 
international cointegration with developed stock markets.   
Renatas and Pierdzioch (2011) investigate whether the uniform collapse of 
stock markets in three CEE countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland) 
during the financial crisis was due to international linkages of deteriorating 
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fundamentals or international spillovers of speculative bubbles.  They find that 
long run linkages vary over time but that long run linkages with the US Stock 
Market strengthened in terms of both fundamentals and speculative bubbles during 
the financial crisis reflecting both a transatlantic deterioration of fundamentals and 
contagion effects due to international spillover of speculative bubbles that 
originated in the US Stock Market.  This finding is important in terms of our 
research because the authors also find that “Transatlantic cointegration linkages 
with the US and US speculative bubbles strengthened to a much more significant 
extent than continental cointegration linkages and speculative bubbles estimated 
for Germany and the United Kingdom” (pp 154).  The relationship between 
Australia and emerging markets was investigated by Gupta and Mollik (2008) who 
conclude that correlations between the stock markets investigated are unstable and 
change over time. 
Our objective is to investigate the dynamics of the newly emerged markets 
of the Central and Eastern European region with respect to their dependence on 
the dynamics of global stock markets.  Using a methodology that relies on panel 
data analysis, we investigate the extent to which the correlations of log returns of 
stock indices from the CEE region influence the dynamics of their volatilities over 
the time interval from January 2008 until July 2015, both as a whole and in a 
dynamic manner, using rolling windows of approximately six months. 
 
8.3 Data and Methodology 
Our data covers closing prices of ten Central and Eastern European stock 
market indices (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and daily values 
of the stock market indices for the developed countries in our study (the US, UK, 
Germany and Japan) from January 2008 until July 2015, representing 1977 
observations for each index. A brief presentation of the statistical properties of the 
log-returns for the CEE data is presented in Table 8.1. We note the usual relatively 
high value of kurtosis and, in general, the relatively low skewness which is 
negative for almost all countries. This is an interesting early result because 
negative skewness is generically considered a statistical feature of developed 
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markets, but is not generally a characteristic feature of emerging or frontier 
markets. However, given the fact that our data cover the period representing the 
most recent financial crisis, we acknowledge these phenomena but do not read too 
much into them – though in terms of investigating stock market development as 
measured through cointegrating relationships, this might be an encouraging early 
result. 
Table 8.1: Summary Statistics of Daily Returns of CEE and European Stock 
Exchanges 
  Mean  Max.  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Skew  Kurt.  Jarque-Bera 
 p-
value 
BULGARIA -0.001 0.073 -0.114 0.013 -1.026 13.608 9611.188 0 
CZ. REP. 0.000 0.124 -0.162 0.016 -0.493 18.088 18824.037 0 
ESTONIA 0.000 0.121 -0.070 0.012 0.306 12.485 7438.330 0 
HUNGARY 0.000 0.132 -0.126 0.017 -0.018 10.465 4588.049 0 
LATVIA 0.000 0.102 -0.079 0.013 0.205 10.068 4126.848 0 
LITHUANIA 0.000 0.110 -0.119 0.012 -0.364 24.866 39407.774 0 
POLAND 0.000 0.061 -0.083 0.013 -0.462 7.418 1677.708 0 
ROMANIA 0.000 0.106 -0.131 0.017 -0.651 12.430 7460.607 0 
THE 
SLOVAK 
REPUBLIC 0.000 0.119 -0.148 0.012 -1.367 28.538 54312.371 0 
SLOVENIA -0.001 0.405 -0.404 0.018 -0.037 282.861 6448513.035 0 
 
In terms of methodology, the analysis focuses on the construction of panels 
for the indices representing the countries in our sample. For this panel data 
structure we developed two types of investigations: one that covers the full sample 
and one that investigates the dynamics of the statistical properties of the panel 
data.   To do this, we estimate the variances of all our indices using a simple 
GARCH(1,1) model and we also compute the dynamic conditional correlations 
(via a standard DCC-GARCH(1,1) model) of each of the CEE stock market 
returns with the log-returns for the indices from the most developed countries.   
The resulting statistics were then settled into a panel data set through which we 
analyse the dependence of the variances of the CEE log-returns on their 
correlations with the developed markets log-returns. To facilitate this we estimate 
the following relationship: 
𝜎௜,௧ = 𝛼 +  𝛽ଵ𝜌ଵ,௜,௧ + 𝛽ଶ𝜌ଶ,௜,௧ + 𝛽ଷ𝜌ଷ,௜,௧ + 𝛽ସ𝜌ସ,௜,௧ + 𝑢௜,௧ 
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Where 𝑖 counts the ten series of log-returns for the CEE stock market 
indices, 𝑡 is the time index, 𝜎 is the volatility of our indices estimated using the 
GARCH(1,1) model and 𝜌ଵ..ସ represent the correlations of each CEE stock index 
with each of the four developed market indices which were estimated using a DCC-
GARCH(1,1) model as explained above. 
In keeping with the standard panel analysis algorithm, we use the Hausman 
test to investigate the proper estimation method (fixed effects versus random 
effects) and we then show the results of the panel regressions performed.  
 
8.4 Results 
Our analysis relies on a panel variable that covers the volatilities (the series 
of standard deviations) of the stock market indices from the CEE region which 
represents our dependent variable and on four panel variables representing the 
correlations of these stock market index log-returns on the log-returns of the S&P 
500, FTSE, DAX and Nikkei indices. We therefore have a set of five panel 
variables for which we first investigate the panel unit root properties using the 
usual set of unit root tests. 
Table 8.2: Unit Root Statistics for the log-returns of CEE Stock Market 
Indices 
Levin, Lin, Chu t-stat p-value     
 -148.958 0   
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin Ztbar p-value Wtbar p-value 
 -122.741 0 -147.528 0 
Fisher's type Maddala and Wu Choi 
 PMW p-value ZMW p-value 
  119.7344 5.51E-14 12.99863 0 
 
The results exhibited in Table 8.2 suggest that the log-returns for the CEE 
stock market indices are suitable for a panel analysis as these panels are stationary 
according to all the tests employed here. However, our focus is on the dynamics of 
the volatilities and the manner in which they are influenced by the correlations of 
the CEE indices with the developed stock market indices. 
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Figure 8.1 shows the statistical properties of the volatilities in CEE 
markets computed using a simple GARCH(1,1) model for each series of log-
returns in our sample.  It therefore provides a graphical representation of our panel 
of volatilities. We notice that the indices for Poland and the Slovak Republic and, 
to a lesser extent, Latvia, are relatively stable. 
Figure 8.1: The Panels of Volatilities for the log-returns of CEE Stock Indices 
Figure 8.2 shows the same information for each of the international 
benchmark capital market indices in our study, alongside the volatilities of the 
CEE markets.  In the upper left side of the chart we can see the statistical 
properties of the correlations of the log-returns of each CEE stock market index 
with the log-returns of the DAX index for the whole sample period. We notice a 
large spectrum of distributions, with relatively low correlations for the Slovak 
Republic index and relatively large correlations for the Polish and the Czech 
Republic indices. The means of these correlations are generally positive, but quite 
diverse. A relatively lower diversity is observed in the correlations with both the 
S&P 500 and  the Nikkei. The Romanian log-returns show a relatively large set of 
outliers with the S&P 500 and are generally negative even though the average and 
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the largest part of the correlations are positive. However, the Polish index is again 
highly correlated with the S&P 500, which provides tentative evidence of greater 
integration of this capital market with our benchmark markets for the whole 
sample.  
The panel of correlations with the FTSE seems more diverse than for the 
S&P 500 and the Nikkei, with positive and relatively large correlations for the 
Polish, the Czech Republic and Romanian indices with a weaker, and at times 
negative correlation reported for the Slovak Republicn index. 
Figure 8.2: Panels of Correlations for the log-returns of CEE Stock Indices 
with the Developed Stock Market Indices 
 
 
In order to develop our panel analysis of the connections between the 
volatilities of these indices and the correlations with the international benchmarks, 
we first provide the results of the unit root tests for each panel variable. 
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Table 8.3: Unit Root Statistics for the Volatilities of log-returns for the CEE 
Stock Markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.3 shows the results of these tests for the set of volatilities. We 
notice that the panel is stationary for all the tests we have used, with p-values that 
are virtually zero in all the cases. 
  
Levin, Lin, 
Chu t-stat p-value     
 -123.15 0   
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin Ztbar p-value Wtbar p-value 
 -12.017 0 -11.73 0 
Fisher's type Maddala and Wu Choi 
 PMW p-value ZMW p-value 
  83.57 9.64-10e 10.051 0 
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Table 8.4: Unit Root Statistics for the Correlations of log-returns for the CEE 
Stock Markets with the Developed Stock Market Indices 
Correlations with DAX 
Levin, Lin, 
Chu t-stat p-value     
 -123.15 0   
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin Ztbar p-value Wtbar p-value 
 -26.34 0 -25.59 0 
Fisher's type Maddala and Wu Choi 
 PMW p-value ZMW p-value 
  31.00574 0.055115 1.74016 0.040915 
Correlations with S&P 500 
Levin, Lin, 
Chu t-stat p-value     
 -123.15 0   
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin Ztbar p-value Wtbar p-value 
 -965.729 0 -926.562 0 
Fisher's type Maddala and Wu Choi 
 PMW p-value ZMW p-value 
  43.58392 0.00171 3.728945 9.61E-05 
Correlations with FTSE 
Levin, Lin, 
Chu t-stat p-value     
 -123.15 0   
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin Ztbar p-value Wtbar p-value 
 -18.5897 0 -18.1469 0 
Fisher's type Maddala and Wu Choi 
 PMW p-value ZMW p-value 
  34.33662 0.023936 2.266818 0.011701 
Correlations with Nikkei 
Levin, Lin, 
Chu t-stat p-value     
 -123.15 0   
Im, Pesaran, 
Shin Ztbar p-value Wtbar p-value 
 -28.4895 0 -27.9305 0 
Fisher's type Maddala and Wu Choi 
 PMW p-value ZMW p-value 
  51.32612 0.000143 4.953094 3.65E-07 
 
A similar result is obtained when testing for stationarity of the correlations 
of each of the CEE stock market indices with the international benchmarks. In our 
205 
 
 
set of tests, there is no evidence in favour of the null hypothesis of non-stationary 
in any of our series.  This implies that our data is suitable for the panel regressions 
developed below.   
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Figure 8.3: Dynamics of the Panel Unit Root tests for the Volatilities of CEE 
Stock Market log-returns 
 
Samples of 125 days (approximately half a year) were used for the 
computation of the unit root tests 
Our second objective is to determine the robustness of our findings in our 
panel regressions that we will develop. To facilitate this, we build 93 non-
overlapping rolling windows of approximately 6 months (125 trading days each) 
that cover our entire sample. The estimation of the panel regressions will be 
performed for each sub sample, but before this can be done it is necessary to test 
for stationarity of the panel variables in each of these windows. 
Figures 8.3 to 8.7 show the dynamics of both the test statistics and the p-
values of the unit root tests for each rolling window. We can therefore observe the 
manner in which stationarity of each of our panels changed over time. For each 
chart in these figures the bars represent the levels of the p-values for each of the 
93 samples and the continuous lines show the levels of the test statistics.  
Figure 8.3 shows the results for all the samples for the panels of 
volatilities. It is clear that a relatively large number of situations with p-values 
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lower than 5% exist for all four types of tests presented in the Figure 8.3 which 
implies stationarity in all of our panels. 
Figure 8.4: Dynamics of the Panel Unit Root tests for the Correlations of CEE 
Stock Market log-returns with the DAX log-returns 
 
The same type of situation is found for all the series of correlations in our 
analysis. We notice relatively low levels for our p-values, especially in the case of 
the Levin-Lin-Chu test for all correlations.  Similarly, relatively low levels for the 
p-values are recorded for the Im-Pesaran-Shin test for correlations with the S&P 
500 index and virtually all tests provide evidence of stationarity for correlations 
with the Nikkei index. 
The least favourable results from our tests for stationary are those reported 
for our Fisher type of tests (both the Maddala and Wu and the Choi tests) for 
correlations with the DAX and, to a lesser extent for correlations with the FTSE. 
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Figure 8.5: Dynamics of the Panel Unit Root tests for the Correlations of CEE 
Stock Market log-returns with the S&P 500 log-returns 
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Figure 8.6: Dynamics of the Panel Unit Root tests for the Correlations of CEE 
Stock Market log-returns with the FTSE log-returns 
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Figure 8.7: The Dynamics of the Panel Unit Root tests for the 
Correlations of CEE Stock Market log-returns with the Nikkei Log-Returns 
Author’s computations 
8.5 Panel Regression Tests 
In this section we report the results for our panel regressions. We report 
two types of results – those that cover the whole sample of log-returns for all the 
variables in our analysis, and those that provide results for the same type of panel 
regression performed for each rolling window. 
In this investigation we rely on the standard panel analysis methodology 
and therefore run the Hausman test to determine the type of estimation procedure 
most appropriate for each situation considered.  
For the whole sample, the results of the Hausman test are presented in 
Table 8.5.  
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Table 8.5: The results of the Hausman test for the whole sample 
Varname A:FE B:RE 
Coef. 
Diff 
S.E. 
Diff 
CorrsDAX -0.0071 -0.0091 0.0020 0.0003 
CorrsSP -0.0112 -0.0124 0.0012 0.0002 
CorrsFTSE 0.0378 0.0381 -0.0003 0.0000 
CorrsNIKKEI 0.0259 0.0259 0.0000 0.0000 
 
The A variant is consistent under H0 and H1 and represents the fixed 
effects estimation, while the B variant is consistent under the H0 hypothesis only 
and represents the Random Effects estimation. The Hausman test takes the value 
of 83.5183, which yields a p-value of 0 under the Chi squared distribution.  Hence 
we find evidence to reject the null of random effect estimation and we conclude 
that our panel is suited to a fixed effects estimation.  
The results of our fixed effects estimation are provided in Table 8.6 which 
shows that the connection between the volatilities and the correlations with the 
log-returns of the DAX index for the whole sample is significant at the 5 per cent 
level.  Table 8.6 also shows that our coefficients that measure the dependence on 
the correlations with the log-returns of the FTSE and the S&P 500 indices are 
significant at the one per cent level. 
Table 8.6: The results of the Fixed Effects estimation for the whole sample 
Varinces Coefficient 
Std. 
Error t-stat 
p-
value 
Corrs DAX -0.0071 0.0135 -0.5263 0.6110  
Corrs S&P 500 -0.0112 0.0064 -1.7562 0.1130  
Corrs FTSE 0.0378 0.0134 2.8119 0.0200 ** 
Corrs NIKKEI 0.0259 0.0035 7.3779 0.0000 *** 
 
We now use ther same methodology to investigate the dynamics of the 
relationship between the volatilities of the log-returns for the CEE Stock Market 
indices and the correlations with the international stock market benchmarks in 
each non-overlapping window of 125 days. 
Using the Hausman test for each of the rolling windows we find that in 
approximately 74% of the cases there was sufficient evidence to reject the null of 
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Random Effects estimation (69 out of the 93 samples). Figure 8 shows the 
dynamics of the p-values for the Hausman tests. 
Figure 8.8: Dynamics of the p-values of the Hausman tests for the rolling 
Windows 
 
Author’s computations 
The situations of significant coefficients for all the 93 panel regressions are 
also presented in Figure 8.9, where we can see their statistical properties. We 
notice a tendency of the correlation coefficients with the Nikkei indices to have 
larger p-values, and therefore less significant vis-à-vis the CEE stock markets. On 
the other hand, the correlation coefficients with the other three benchmark indices 
show more encouraging results with lower p-values  
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Figure 8.9: Boxplot of situations for significant coefficients in the panel 
regressions 
Author’s computations 
The dynamics of the linear dependences is also shown in Figure 8.10 
where we can see the percentages of the situations in which we find significant 
coefficients in our 93 panels, as well as their dynamics over time (the x-axis shows 
the 125-day samples in time). The y-axis shows the level of the p-values reported 
in each case. We notice a lower percentage of significant coefficients for 
correlations with the Nikkei index and a larger level of dependence on the 
correlations with the FTSE index. 
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Figure 8.10: Evolution of the significant coefficients according to the specific 
model estimated dynamically for each rolling window 
 
The coefficients that reveal the connections with the correlations with the 
DAX and the S&P 500 indices are significant in approximately two thirds of the 
cases reported. 
Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the dynamics of correlation between CEE stock 
market indices on the international stock market benchmarks. We refer to the 
literature on contagion among capital markets in order to build our analysis, as 
well as on the panel analysis methodology. We use a GARCH(1,1) and the DCC-
GARCH(1,1) model applied to the log-returns of a set of 10 CEE stock market 
indices with a daily frequency covering the period of January 2008 until July 
2015. We estimate the volatilities of each of these indices and their correlations 
with the daily log-returns of the DAX, S&P 500, FTSE and the Nikkei indices. 
After running the usual panel data stationarity tests, we use standard panel 
regression analysis to investigate the dependence of the volatilities of the log-
returns of the CEE stock market indices with the international benchmarks. In 
order to investigate the robustness of our findings we run this methodology on the 
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whole sample and on 93 samples of 125 days (approximately half a year). We 
found evidence that the correlations with the international capital market 
benchmarks influence the volatilities of the CEE stock market indices and show 
the intermittence of these influences.  We therefore find significant spillovers from 
our benchmark indices to the CEE stock markets investigated implying that the 
developed markets lead the CEE markets investigated.  We take this as evidence 
that the CEE markets investigated are developed since, as argued in chapter 7, 
comovement is a feature of developed stock markets. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
9.1  Introduction 
This thesis has investigated the emergence and development of stock 
markets in ten former transition economies of CEE.  The establishment of 
functioning stock markets is a necessary part of the transition process and no 
market economy can exist without a stock market where ownership rights in 
companies can be traded and long term capital can be raised for companies to 
begin and/or expand their activities as they grow.  Trading in the secondary 
market is important because no long term investors would be forthconming in the 
absence of a mechanism through which their assets could be converted into cash 
as and when required.  However, the mere existence of a stock market is no 
guarantee that it will discharge its role optimally.  If a stock market is not efficient, 
it will not generate fair prices and investors will be reluctant to invest in 
companies when they can so easily be separated from their savings by those able 
to exploit opportunities presented by the operation of an inefficient market.   This 
would not only restrict the emergence and growth of companies, it also implies a 
sub-optimal allocation of resources in the economy generally since inability to 
attract capital for investment by potentially successful companies would mitigate 
the ability of companies to respond to emerging opportunities reflecting the 
changing preferences of consumers.  This is the main advantage of a market 
economy that, subject to certain conditions, it achieves an optimal allocation of 
resources.  In the absence of an efficient stock market therefore, the implication is 
that transition from Communism to functioning market econonmy would be 
impossible.   
This is the issue at the heart of this thesis and it is contended that stock 
market development can be assessed by whether the stock markets investigated 
function efficienctly.  The evolution from stock market creation to information 
efficiency as well as being a function of time in the sense that there is a learning 
curve to be followed by generations who grew up under Communism and who 
therefore initially possessed at best, rudimenraty knowledge of the operation of a 
stock market and markets generally, also depends on institutional changes.  
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Paramount here is establishing the rule of law that grants and protects rights of 
ownership to private property.  However, more specific institutional changes are 
also necessary to facilitate the emergence of efficient stock markets.  These 
include introducing profit and loss accounting systems, reliable and independent 
auditing of company accounts, establishing governance structures comparable to 
those in developed market economies and so on.  All of these institutional changes 
are necessary channels through which information can be disseminated so that 
investors are able to make informed choices confident in the knowledge that the 
market is generating prices that reflect the fundamentals and, in particular, an 
accurate assessment of risk based on existing knowledge.  This does not imply that 
fraud and other criminal activities aimed at deception do not exist in a market 
economy.  It simply implies that these possibilities are discounted by investors 
when making their choices because safeguards are in place which are accepted as 
minimising the risk of criminal activity to the extent that it is discounted in 
investment decisions. 
9.2 Overview of Research in this Thesis  
To investigate stock market development as implied by the existence of 
efficient markets, we use empirical methods and therefore adopt a positivist 
approach to the research carried out in this thesis.  Positivism implies that “the 
best way to find the truth is to use scientific method” (Jankowicz, 2005, p. 111). 
According to Remenyi et al. (1998), the positivist philosophy tests theories with 
the help of quantitative data. This means that the positivist philosophy takes a 
generalised approach to situations.   
This research investigates the development of stock markets in the CEE 
countries investigated (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia).  A full 
discussion of the specific data used and the individual tests carried out in each 
case is given in chapters 4-8. These chapters detail specific investigations which 
test for defined outcomes for each of the stock markets examined in the CEE 
countries that are the subject of this thesis, and the methodology and data used for 
each specific investigation is detailed there.   
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We test whether stock markets in our target group of countries are 
efficient.  If these markets are informationally efficient they are fully emerged and 
are, by implication, discharging the role a stock market plays in a functioning 
market economy.  This research also tests for comovement between these markets 
with London and Frankfurt.  If there is comovement between the newly 
established stock markets with London and Frankfurt, then, by implication, these 
markets have fully emerged and are integrated with other stock markets on a 
global scale.  As argued in Chapter 3, this is important because stock market 
comovement might imply that stock markets are jointly efficient.  The basic 
premise is that stock market development can be proxied by market efficiency and 
the extent to which markets are integrated internationally.  In an efficient market, 
past prices give no indication of future prices and it is impossible to make 
abnormal returns except by chance.  Market efficiency is one of the tools used to 
evaluate stock market performance and, by implication, how developed a stock 
market is.  Market efficiency is even more important for relatively small markets 
such as those investigated in this thesis because they initially lack liquidity and 
this inhibits growth and development of the wider economy.  If these markets are 
informationally efficient, this will give investors confidence that they are not 
being cheated which will encourage trading and enhance growth.   
As noted above, we further assess the extent of stock market development 
by testing for comovement between stock prices in the CEE markets investigated 
here with London and Frankfurt.  From an investor’s perspective, the extent of 
comovement matters because if stock exchanges are not fully integrated in terms 
of price movements, there is an opportunity for portfolio diversification along 
international lines. The higher the degree of comovement between assets in a 
given portfolio, the lower the gains in terms of risk management stemming from 
portfolio diversification.  However, the lower the degree of comovement, the 
greater the incentive for investors to diversify their portfolios along international 
lines thereby offering increased opportunities for markets to grow and develop.  In 
that sense, if comovement between the relatively new stock markets in the CEE 
countries investigated here and the developed stock markets of London and 
Frankfurt is strong, we might argue that markets have reached a similar stage of 
information efficiency either because they are individually efficient or because 
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they are jointly efficient.  Either way, comovement might imply that the stock 
markets of CEE are fully developed.   
9.3  Brief Summary of Each Chapter 
Chapter 1 provides background on the state of the economies investigated 
when transition first began.  The collapse of Communism left a trail of structural 
destruction in its wake and the magnitude of the task these (and all former 
Communist) economies faced in order to evolve into functioning market 
economies was enormous.  Apart from black markets, Communism provided no 
background in how markets functioned and operated to allocate resources.  As the 
economies of CEE imploded and GDP collapsed, change was forced on them and 
the signs of progress were discernible in the opening of small kiosks catering for 
local demand and serving small communities with whatever could be provided for 
which consumers were willing to pay.  From these fledgling beginnings, the 
concept of private property grew, reinforced by the rule of law.  As transition 
progressed, whole industries and organisations were privatised and markets began 
to develop.  Privatisation was the catalyst that made the creation of stock markets 
essential as investors need an organised route through which trust could emerge 
and their newly acquired assets could be disposed of at informationally fair prices.   
Chapter 2 surveys the development of stock markets from small 
beginnings where markets were universally characterised by thin trading and 
relatively low market capitalistation compared to levels characteristic of 
developed markets.  Indeed, initially newly created stock markets opened for only 
a few hours, usually on one or two days a week.  Slowly trading increased as 
investors developed trust, encouraged, at least in part, by legal protection and the 
establishment of standards of corporate governance comparable with those in 
developed markets.   
Chapter 3 sets out the theoretical foundations that underpin this research.  
The concept of market efficiency is one of the corner stones of the theory of 
finance and stock markets will fail to discharge their role effectively if they are not 
information efficient.  Since stock markets were established from scratch in the 
former Communist countries investigated in this thesis, market efficiency could 
not exist as an immediate state of affairs and would be an evolutionary process (if 
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it evolved at all) as the number of investors and the volume of trading increased.  
Three ever more stringent degrees of information efficiency have been identified: 
Markets are weak form efficient when market prices contain no history and 
therefore give no guide to future prices.  This implies that no information can be 
used to identify recurring patterns in the behaviour of prices that might be 
exploited to gain consistent exces returns over and above the market return.   Since 
data on past prices is readily available, it is relatively easy to test for weak form 
efficiency in stock markets and most empirical work investigating this concept has 
tested whether markets are weak form efficient.  Semi-strong form market 
efficiency implies that prices quoted in the market reflect all publicly available 
information.  This notion appeals most to common sense since the alternative, that 
of ignoring relevant information, would be irrational and would result in sub-
optimal returns being earned.  Note that all publicly available information includes 
information on past price behaviour and therefore a market that is semi-strong 
form efficient is, by definition, also weak form efficient.  A market is strong form 
efficient when all relevant information, public and private, is reflected in prices.  
This is the tightest and most appealing category of market efficiency but it is 
almost impossible to test empirically since those who posess private information 
have every incentive to keep it private and they are therefore unlikely to subject 
the strong form hypothesis to empirical testing.   
Chapter 3 also explains the rationale for testing for comovement between the 
CEE countries investigated here and the developed markets of London and 
Frankfurt.  Comovement is an increasingly common feature among stock markets 
for several reasons, not least that stocks are often cross listed and traded in 
different markets.  In our case, another factor is that the CEE countries 
investigated, with one exception, have become members of the EU which has led 
to an explosion of international trade and investment between these countries and 
other EU members.  However, recent years have also seen a reduction in the costs 
of trading, alongside the emergence of mechanisms that facilitate international 
trading of assets so that geographical borders no longer present problems for those 
wishing to trade in markets abroad.  Stock market comovement is important 
because, as noted in Chapter 3, it is possible that one country’s stock market is not 
information efficient but that that stock market is jointly information efficient with 
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another country’s stock market.  This clearly implies that investors can invest in 
both markets to create portfolio diversification but cannot arbitrage riskless gains 
despite one market being informationally inefficient.  Because of this, it is 
possible that ‘joint efficiency’ among several markets occurs when these markets 
are cointegrated.  Since we argue that stock market development is proxied by the 
existence of information efficiency in that market, we investigate stock market 
comovement among our target group of countries with the developed stock 
markets, particularly London and Frankfurt, in the same vein.     
Chapter 4 provides some results from tests of market efficiency in the CEE 
markets investigated. In general, the results are not encouraging, though limited 
evidence of emerging market efficiency in some cases is provided.  The data set 
for this series of tests is daily and covers a relatively early period in the 
development of the stock markets investigated and truncates on 31st July 2009.  
The earliest observations begin on December 31st 1999 in the case of Hungary 
and the latest set of obsrvations is for Bulgaria and begin on October 20th 2000.  
One reason why the results for the entire sample period fail to provide convincing 
evidence of market efficiency in all of the markets investigated might simply be 
that the sample inevitably covers the early period of stock market trading where 
there can be no expectation of efficiency.  To explore this possibility further, the 
data was broken into a later sample beginning 1st May 2004 to take in the 
accession of most of the countries into the EU.  However, here again the results 
for all markets were less than convincing though again in the later sample some 
markets were efficienct on some of the tests. In terms of the overall thesis, the 
results of the tests in Chapter 4 certainly implied that the markets investigated 
merited further investigation when more data would be available.   
Chapter 5 provides another test of market efficiency using a different 
methodology and a later data set consisting of daily observations and runs from 6th 
January – 29th July 2015.  In this chapter we derive a panel of data because this 
gives a greater data set than a simple time series data set that is not broken down 
into panels of data.  The later start date of the data set is selected so as to avoid 
any repurcussions following the financial crisis which might distort the efficacy of 
the tests and give misleading results.  By 2012 it is reasonable to assume that any 
fall out from the financial crisis was long gone and therefore any results obtained 
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from tests in this later period would be uncorrupted by earlier events that had a 
significant impact on global stock markets at the time.  Once our panel was 
created, we again used a battery of statistical procedures to test for market 
efficiency.  The results are far more encouraging with all CEE markets except 
Romania, being weak form efficient.  Important though this is, in other research 
not included in this thesis, Harrison and Paton (1994 and 2007) find evidence that 
the Romanian stock market is informationally efficient.  In terms of this thesis, 
there is clear evidence that, notwithstanding the case of Romania, that stock 
markets in the CEE countries investigated were developed on our efficiency 
criterion. 
Chapters 6-8 test the extent of comovement with the world’s major stock 
markets.  In finance, markets are said to be integrated when assets of identical risk 
command the same expected return.  In theory, liberalization should bring about 
integration with the global capital market, and its effects on equity markets are 
then clear. Foreign investors will bid up the prices of local stocks with 
diversification potential, while inefficient sectors will be shunned by all investors.  
As noted earlier, stock market comovement is important in terms of this thesis 
because stock markets might be jointly efficient when cointegrated, though not 
necessarily individually efficient.  The data used in this chapter consists of daily 
obnservations and runs from 1st January 2001 -31st December 2014.  This data set 
encompasses the global financial crisis which might impair the accuracy of the 
tests used.  To allow for this, we use the Hansen and Johansen (1992) recursive 
cointegration method with a rolling window.  The results presented in this chapter 
show that there are linkages between stock exchanges in CEE countries and those 
in Western Europe, both before and after the financial crisis, and that this 
relationship has been augmented since  the period of the world financial crisis 
2007-2009.   However, the degree of comovement between these exchanges is not, 
as yet, sufficiently strong to raise issues of international financial stability 
stemming from symmetrical changes in wealth that well developed comovement 
implies.  There is therefore only limited evidence of stock market development on 
our comovement criterion.  
In chapter 7 we use the same data set as used in chapter 6 but this time our 
methodology uses both linear and non-linear cointegration tests, though the tests 
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using linear cointegration techniques differ from those used in Chapter 6.  Again 
we use a rolling window to allow for the effects of the financial crisis.   Our tests 
using linear cointegration techniques yield only limited evidence of comovement 
between the stock markets in Latvia, Lithuania and Bulgaria with those of Western 
Europe.  However, we find stronger evidence of comovement between these 
exchanges and Western Europe using Breintung’s non-linear cointegration 
statistic.  We also find evidence that while comovement between the Czech 
Republic, Hungary Poland and Romania with Western Europe is limited, it seems 
to be increasing over time.  In terms of this thesis, these reults provide clear 
evidence of stock market development. 
The spread of the financial crisis across global markets first became apparent 
with the collapse of Leman Brothers and the fall out from this significantly 
impacted on the volatility of financial markets.  In Chapters 6 and 7, where we 
tested for cointegration, it was noted that the financial crisis might have corrupted 
the results of our tests.  This raised the question of whether testing for spillover 
effects between markets by investigating whether volatilies are related might yield 
interesting insights into the relationship between the markets investigaed in this 
thesis.  We do this in Chapter 8 and our data set cvonsists of daily obsefrvations 
and runs from Jan 1st 2008-July 31st 2015.  It therefore takes in the financial crisis 
and its aftermath.  We again construct a panel of data significantly increasing the 
number of observations and facilitating the use of more powerful statistical tests.  
We investigate the possibility of cointegrating volatility relationships between our 
stock markets and developed Western markets using a battery of statistical 
procedures.  We then test the robustness of our results by building 93 non-
overlapping rolling windows of approximately 6 months (125 trading days each) 
that cover our entire sample.  We find evidence that the correlations with the 
international capital market benchmarks influence the volatilities of the CEE stock 
market indices.  The implication is that significant spillovers exist from our 
benchmark indices to the CEE stock markets investigated implying that the 
developed markets lead the CEE markets investigated.  We take this as evidence 
that the CEE markets investigated are developed since, as argued earlier, 
comovement is a feature of developed stock markets. 
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These chapters therefore are the main focus of this thesis and stock market 
integration between CEE markets and developed stock markets is used as a proxy 
for assessing the extent to which markets in the former CEE transition economies 
have emerged and reached developed status.  The results, though not 
unambiguously conclusive, are certainly encouraging and, at the very least, we 
show that markets in the CEE countries investigated are becoming more integrated 
over time with the developed stock markets of Western Europe. 
9.4  Problems with the Concept of Market Efficiency 
 There are many issues surrounding the concept of market efficiency and it 
is by means accepted as a universal truth either by academics, practitioners or 
commentators.  At best, it is certainly an incomplete paradigm of market 
behaviour and a major problem with the concept is that it says nothing about the 
‘supply side’ of the information market.  It makes no distinction between the 
amount of information that is available and whether the information comes from 
the accounts of firms or the financial press etc.  Neither does it question the 
reliability of the information , the frequency of extreme movments and so on.  The 
efficient market hypothesis says only that there is a given supply of information 
and that investors trade on this until equilibrium is reached and that there are no 
gains at the margin from further trading.    
 There is nothing wrong with this and information is either available or 
unavailable.  However, the salient point is that information is assumed to be totally 
objective with exactly the same impact on all investors.  But investors might 
interpret the information differently and rational investors will base their actions 
not only on how they interpret the available information, but also on the way they 
think other investors will interpret the same information.  Their trading is therefore 
influenced by their incomplete knowledge of the motives of others for trading.  
This uncertainty becomes more important during periods of relatively rapid price 
changes.  During periods of relative stability, investors can reflect on what moved 
prices the previous day when reflective financial commentary is available.  During 
periods of volatility, up to the minute background information is not available in a 
timely manner.  The efficient market hypothesis has nothing to say on these issues. 
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 A crucial assumption of the efficient market hypothesis is that information 
processing is costless and is therefore incorporated into prices immediately and 
precisely.  The cost of acquiring information is costless and is as close to an 
example of a public good as it is possible to find, but information processing is a 
different matter.  Again, the efficient market hypothesis is silent on this issue.  Yet 
the whole concept of market efficiency depends on the accurate processing of 
information by investors who do not act on impulse.  What if the cost of 
processing information is inordinately high in comparison to its value?  The 
implication is that although information is available, it does not always impact on 
investment decisisons because investors will exercise different judgements on the 
quality of information and will process some information more thoroughly than 
other information.  This will inevitably lead to ‘mitakes’ and with hindsight 
investors might exercise better judgement.  This might lead to unreliable results in 
tests for market efficiency. 
 Another problem is that, in general, stock markets are low cost, high 
volume markets; but they are not completely costless.  This limitation raises an 
important conundrum: If there are pricing errors that are not eliminated because 
they are smaller than the transactions costs of exploiting them, is the market 
judged to be efficient because of the absence of profits from exploitable errors or 
inefficient because pricing anomalies persist because of transactions costs?  To the 
best of my knowledge, the role of transactions costs is nowhere addressed in the 
efficient market hypothesis and therefore again tests might report inaccurate 
results because the effects of these on investment decisions are not considered. 
 Similarly other frictions are not considered and the efficient market 
hypothesis ignores taxes.  In reality, many investors pay taxes on dividends and 
capital gains.  Transactions are also subject to VAT.  The effects of taxation are 
not well understood and are certainly not apparent in the efficient market 
hypothesis.  Here again, investigations of market efficiency might report 
inaccurate results which could differ significantly if the effects of taxation were 
considered. 
9.5  Reflections 
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 The thesis grew out of my changing research interests and offered the 
opportunity to marry the two (transition economies and capital market efficiency) 
together.  Following the collapse of Communism, the emerging economies of CEE 
posed an exciting challenge to economists with an interest in this area.  Countless 
papers have been written on the transition from Capitalism to Communism but, at 
the time Communism collapsed, not a single paper existed on the reverse process 
because no-one thought it would happen.  When it did happen, it was spectacular 
and change occurred  with breath-taking speed.  Disquiet emerged in East 
Germany and quickly spread to many countries in the former Soviet Union finally 
erupting into an unstoppable force as people sought greater freedom from State 
involvement in their lives generally, and this led to the collapse of Communism 
and the emergence of decentralised decision taking which is the hallmark of 
Capitalism.   
 Capital market efficiency was, in some ways, a natural choice of research 
area since my main teaching role is in the area of finance.  Capital market 
efficiency is one of the cornerstones of financial theory.  Market efficiency implies 
that prices reflect all available information, though the easiest and most tested 
dimension of this is weak form efficiency whereby prices quoted in the market 
have no memory and all information contained in them is incorporated into the 
current price of the asset.   The common sense underpinnings of market efficiency 
defy argument and therein lies its appeal. 
 The journey from beginning this thesis to completion has been revealing 
not just in terms of the research embodied within these pages, but also because I 
have not worked under pressure of deadlines for many years prior to undertaking 
work on this thesis.  This sometimes resulted in some curtailment of social 
activities which took some getting used to.  That the journey was worthwhile in all 
respects is beyond doubt. 
  Were I to undertake this work again, I would certainly pay much more 
attention to time management though, as everyone who knows me will testify, this 
is not my strong suit.  I wish I could say I have learned, but perhaps, like most 
other people, my experience simply confirms that I work best under pressure.  I 
have also had confirmation that, like Lennon and McCartney, I get by with a little 
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help from my friends.  I am certainly grateful to my friends who helped in more 
ways that they are probably aware of.   
 Initially the motivation for this thesis was an investigation into market 
effieicny in the CEE markets.  The idea for investigating this emerged from the 
realisation that once created in countries where little or no understanding of 
markets existed, stock markets would evolve towards efficiency and this might 
take quite some considerable period of time.  I published in this area, though these 
papers do not appear as part of this thesis.  However, it quickly became apparent 
that conventional tests of market efficiency for the CEE countries alone would not 
result in a fully worked thesis.  Simultaneously my research interest shifted to 
stock market comovement between CEE countries and the developed markets of 
the West.  Were I to start my thesis now, I would focus entirely on this rather than 
matching it with the emergence of market efficiency through conventional testing.  
Stock market comovement probably offers a greater range of testing procedures 
and is still in the process of evolution. On the other hand, the debate on market 
efficiency is far from settled, but it has clearly become one of the dominant 
features of financial theory and is therefore a clearly important concept worthy of 
investigation.     
 9.6  Conclusion 
         Demonstrating market efficiency is important in giving investors confidence 
that investments are properly priced and that the risks they face are the same as 
those facing other investors in the market and in particular that information cannot 
be exploited to make ‘unfair’ gains.  To the extent that this encourages the growth 
of trading, companies will be able to raise risk capital more easily than otherwise. 
This will facilitate their individual growth, but will also encourage economic 
growth as new companies emerge and existing companies expand to reap the 
benefits of economies of scale. 
The ultimate stage of development is complete integration of CEE markets with 
the developed markets of the world. If these markets do not exhibit comovement 
with developed markets, then opportunities exist for investors to diversify their 
portfolios along international lines. Such opportunities are important for investors, 
but also for host economies because if investors are attracted to a particular market 
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in order to diversify their portfolios, this again will encourage growth of these 
markets to the benefit of investors, companies and the economy generally. 
To the extent that the research questions are answered, I hope that this thesis 
makes a contribution to understanding the development of stock markets in the 
CEE region following the collapse of Communism and throughout their transition 
to functioning market economies. 
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APPENDIX 
OVERALL TRANSITIN INDICATORS 
Large-scale privatisation 
1 Little private ownership. 
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed. 
3 More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the 
process of being privatised (with the process having reached a stage at which the state 
has effectively ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major unresolved issues 
regarding corporate governance. 
4 More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private 
ownership and significant progress with corporate governance of these enterprises. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: more than 
75 per cent of enterprise assets in private ownership with effective corporate 
governance. 
Small-scale privatisation 
1Little progress. 
2 Substantial share privatised. 
3 Comprehensive programme almost ready for implementation. 
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state 
ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land. 
Governance and enterprise restructuring 
1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial 
discipline at the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate governance. 
2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate governance. 
3 Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote 
corporate governance effectively (for example, privatisation combined with tight 
credit and subsidy policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation). 
4 Substantial improvement in corporate governance and significant new investment at 
the enterprise level, including minority holdings by financial investors. 
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4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
corporate control exercised through domestic financial institutions and markets, 
fostering market-driven restructuring. 
Price liberalisation 
1 Most prices formally controlled by the government. 
2 Some lifting of price administration; state procurement at non-market prices for the 
majority of product categories. 
3 Significant progress on price liberalisation, but state procurement at non-market 
prices remains substantial. 
4 Comprehensive price liberalisation; state procurement at non-market prices largely 
phased out; only a small number of administered prices remain. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: complete 
price liberalisation with no price control outside housing, transport and natural 
monopolies. 
Trade and foreign exchange system 
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to 
foreign exchange. 
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account 
convertibility in principle, but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully 
transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates). 
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export 
restrictions; almost full current account convertibility. 
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions (apart 
from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct involvement in 
exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading companies; no major non-
uniformity of customs duties for non-agricultural goods and services; full and current 
account convertibility. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of 
most tariff barriers; membership in WTO. 
Competition policy 
1 No competition legislation and institutions. 
2 Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry 
restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms. 
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3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; substantial 
reduction of entry restrictions. 
4 Significant enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: effective 
enforcement of competition policy; unrestricted entry to most markets. 
Banking reform and interest rate liberalisation 
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system. 
2 Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of 
directed credit or interest rate ceilings. 
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for 
prudential supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little 
preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises and 
significant presence of private banks. 
4 Significant movement of banking laws and regulations towards BIS standards; well-
functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; significant term 
lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full 
convergence of banking laws and regulations with BIS standards; provision of full set 
of competitive banking services. 
Securities markets and non-bank financial institutions 
1 Little progress. 
2 Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in 
government paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework for 
the issuance and trading of securities. 
3 Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of 
independent share registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, and some 
protection of minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial institutions (for 
example, investment funds, private insurance and pension funds, leasing companies) 
and associated regulatory framework. 
4 Securities laws and regulations approaching IOSCO standards; substantial market 
liquidity and capitalisation; well-functioning non-bank financial institutions and 
effective regulation. 
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4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: full 
convergence of securities laws and regulations with IOSCO standards; fully 
developed non-bank intermediation. 
  
 
